Counterpublic Discourses in Facebook Comment Sections — A Comparative Analysis of Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish (Social) Media Discourse on Islam by Lien, Anders Nima Jafarnejad
Counterpublic Discourses in 
Facebook Comment 
Sections—
A Comparative Analysis of 
Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish 
(Social) Media Discourse on Islam
Anders Nima Jafarnejad Lien 
ISBN: 978-82-92958-46-9





















 in Sociology // no. 4
8 - 20
21
The objectives of this dissertation are twofold: First, the dissertation seeks to contribute 
to existing literature on Scandinavian discourse on Islam by comparing Norwegian, 
Swedish, and Danish content on Facebook, a central arena for news as well as public 
debate. Second, it aims to contribute to existing literature on counterpublics as it 
attempts to analyse to what extent counterpublic discourses appear in mainstream news 
outlets’ comment sections on Facebook. Existing research on online counterpublics 
has largely focused on (progressive and left-wing) counterpublic collectives in secluded 
communicative spaces, such as blogs, discussions forums, and alternative news sites. In 
contrast, this thesis analyses (both Islam-hostile and Islam-sympathetic) counterpublic 
discourses expressed in the comment sections of highly influential, mainstream news 
media.
A quantitative content analysis is carried out of Facebook posts (and associated articles) 
published by mainstream news outlets (N=602) and comments written by ordinary 
citizens in response to these posts (N=6797), in data from 2018. It is found that while 
the news outlets’ Facebook posts depict Islam mainly positively, the user comments are 
largely negative.
While a majority of the comments are found to express a mainstream view, a substantial 
minority also engages in counterpublic discourses, contesting the bounds of established 
discourse around Islam in the Scandinavian public spheres. It is, however, mainly 
those who are sceptical of Islam and/or Muslims who engage in this agitational activity. 
Particularly the Swedish comment sections are found to be permeated by Islam-sceptic 
counterdiscursive comments, while this is less so the case in Denmark, with Norway in 
a middle position. I argue that different national contexts around Islam, immigration, 
integration, and national identity have created varying incentives for Scandinavian 
citizens to challenge the limits of the debatthrough the online realm, thus leading to 
varying prevalence of counterdiscursive comments in the three countries’ comment 
sections.
In light of the finding that both Islam-sceptic and Islam-friendly commenters engage 
in counterpublic discourses, the dissertation highlights the need to view counterpublics 
as self-perceived correctives to an excluding mainstream rather than as excluded per se.
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The objectives of this dissertation are twofold: First, the dissertation seeks to 
contribute to existing literature on Scandinavian discourse on Islam by comparing 
Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish content on Facebook, a central arena for news as 
well as public debate. Second, it aims to contribute to existing literature on 
counterpublics as it attempts to analyse to what extent counterpublic discourses 
appear in mainstream news outlets’ comment sections on Facebook. Existing 
research on online counterpublics has largely focused on (progressive and left-wing) 
counterpublic collectives in secluded communicative spaces, such as blogs, 
discussions forums, and alternative news sites. In contrast, this thesis analyses (both 
Islam-hostile and Islam-sympathetic) counterpublic discourses expressed in the 
comment sections of highly influential, mainstream news media. 
A quantitative content analysis is carried out of Facebook posts (and associated 
articles) published by mainstream news outlets (N=602) and comments written by 
ordinary citizens in response to these posts (N=6797), in data from 2018. It is found 
that while the news outlets’ Facebook posts depict Islam mainly positively, the user 
comments are largely negative. 
While a majority of the comments are found to express a mainstream view, a 
substantial minority also engages in counterpublic discourses, contesting the bounds 
of established discourse around Islam in the Scandinavian public spheres. It is, 
however, mainly those who are sceptical of Islam and/or Muslims who engage in 
this agitational activity. Particularly the Swedish comment sections are found to be 
permeated by Islam-sceptic counterdiscursive comments, while this is less so the 
case in Denmark, with Norway in a middle position. I argue that different national 
contexts around Islam, immigration, integration, and national identity have created 




through the online realm, thus leading to varying prevalence of counterdiscursive 
comments in the three countries’ comment sections. 
 
In light of the finding that both Islam-sceptic and Islam-friendly commenters engage 
in counterpublic discourses, the dissertation highlights the need to view 
counterpublics as self-perceived correctives to an excluding mainstream rather than 





Denne avhandlingen har to overordnede mål: For det første forsøker den å bidra til 
eksisterende litteratur om skandinavisk diskurs om islam ved å sammenligne norsk, 
svensk og dansk innhold på Facebook, en sentral arena for nyheter så vel som 
offentlig debatt. For det andre tar den sikte på å bidra til eksisterende litteratur om 
motoffentligheter ved å analysere i hvilken grad motoffentlighets-diskurser opptrer i 
hovedstrømsmediers kommentarfelt på Facebook. Tidligere forskning på 
motoffentligheter i onlinesfæren har i stor grad fokusert på (progressive og venstre- 
orienterte) grupper i blogger, diskusjonsfora, alternative nyhetsmedier og andre 
arenaer mer eller mindre avsondret fra mektige offentligheter. Denne avhandlingen, 
derimot, analyserer (både islamfiendtlige og islamsympatiske) motoffentlighets- 
diskurser i kommentarfeltene til innflytelsesrike nyhetsmedier, som i stor grad 
preger den offentlige debatten. 
Kvantitativ innholdsanalyse brukes for å undersøke Facebook-poster (og artiklene 
disse lenker til) publisert av hovedstrømsmedier (N=602) og kommentarer vanlige 
borgere har til disse postene (N=6797). Dataene er fra 2018. Avhandlingen finner at 
mens nyhetsmedienes Facebook-poster dekker islam hovedsakelig positivt, er 
vanlige borgeres kommentarer i stor grad negative til islam. 
Selv om en majoritet av kommentarene uttrykker et mainstream standpunkt, er det 
et betydelig mindretall av kommentarene som inneholder motoffentlighets- 
diskurser. Disse kommentarene utfordrer grensene for etablert diskurs rundt islam i 
de skandinaviske offentlighetene. Det er dog hovedsakelig de som er skeptiske til 
islam og/eller muslimer som bedriver denne agitasjonen. Studien viser at særlig de 
svenske kommentarfeltene er gjennomsyret av islamskeptiske motdiskursive 
kommentarer, mens dette i mindre grad er tilfellet i Danmark, med Norge i en 
mellomposisjon. Jeg argumenterer for at ulike nasjonale kontekster rundt islam, 




de tre skandinaviske landene til å utfordre grensene til islamdebatten gjennom 
onlinesfæren, noe som dermed også har ført til ulikt omfang av motdiskursive 
kommentarer i landenes kommentarfelt. 
Studien finner at både de som er skeptiske og de som er positive til islam formulerer 
motoffentlighets-diskurser. Derfor fremhever avhandlingen viktigheten av å se på 
motoffentligheter som selv-oppfattede korrektiver til en ekskluderende mainstream 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In line with an international trend, researchers have noted that Scandinavians’ trust 
in the established news media is low in relation to the topic of immigration 
(Andersson & Weibull, 2017; Moe et al., 2019). This is not equally the case for all 
citizens, however: those who are critical of immigration and who vote for radical 
right populist parties stand out with lower trust, both when it comes to the media’s 
coverage of immigration and media trust in general (Andersson, 2018). Correlating 
with their low trust in the media and their negative attitudes towards immigrants 
and immigration, this group is also more likely to believe that journalists are biased 
(Moe, Thorbjørnsrud, & Fladmoe, 2017). 
Citizens who experience that the established news media have severe information 
gaps, or perhaps even consider the media’s coverage to be directly misleading, can 
become “alarmed citizens” (Moe et al., 2019, p. 153), who are deeply concerned 
with how society is evolving and who have a low trust in democratic institutions’ 
ability to find adequate solutions. This may in turn prompt them to seek information 
and express their views in channels where gatekeeping may be less extensive, such 
as alternative news sites and social media. These platforms may provide substantial 
affordances for movements on the radical right (and the radical left) to engage in 
counterdiscourses that challenges a (perceived) marginalising and excluding 
mainstream, represented especially by the political establishment and the 
mainstream media (Neumayer, 2013). 
Still, it is not given that oppositional individuals are content with staying within their 
own echo chamber (Enjolras, Karlsen, Steen-Johnsen, & Wollebæk, 2013), where 
they only hear the opinions of like-minded individuals (Sunstein, 2017). They may 
also seek out platforms that allow them to formulate their ideas in proximity to 
mainstream publics, where they may be more influential. Unlike more secluded 




provide substantial affordances in this regard. Still, as pointed out by Toepfl and 
Piwoni (2015), researchers have typically focused on counterpublics as they appear 
in blogs, forums, or alternative online media, rather than in proximity to opinion 
leading mass media. By studying counterpublic discourses in the comment sections 
of established news media, this dissertation aims to contribute to scholarly 
literature by analysing such discourses in the online realm as they are formulated 
near a superordinate public, rather than in more isolated communicative spaces. 
More specifically, this dissertation analyses to what extent counterpublic discourses 
permeate Scandinavian mainstream news outlets’ Facebook comment sections 
around the topic of Islam. The debate on Islam is a central element of a larger 
debate around immigration, integration, multiculturalism, and national identity that 
has been high on the political agenda of most Western countries in recent decades, 
especially since 9/11. As we shall see in this dissertation, these debates have, 
however, been handled quite differently in the three, otherwise relatively similar, 
Scandinavian countries—Norway, Sweden, and Denmark (Brochmann & Hagelund, 
2012). Little is known, though, about how these differences manifest in comment 
sections hosted by mass media, where ordinary citizens can express their opinions 
for a potentially substantial audience to see. 
General Description and Main Objectives 
This dissertation examines how Islam is portrayed and discussed on Norwegian, 
Swedish, and Danish Facebook pages administered by 15 established editorial news 
outlets. A quantitative content analysis is carried out of (a) Facebook posts and their 
linked article texts, i.e. items that the news media themselves have published and 
(b) Facebook comments written in response to this content, i.e. items written by 
ordinary citizens. 
In the analysis of the posts and their linked articles, genres, themes, sources, and 




centres around counterpublic theory, an alternative to the dominant deliberative 
tradition for studying political talk online. Whereas studies analysing deliberative 
norms in political communication online analyse to what degree communications 
fulfils certain standards of “deliberativeness” that facilitate an open and rational 
debate, the focus here is rather to analyse how the comment sections are used to 
challenge (what is perceived as) established discourses around the topic of Islam. 
The general sentiment of comments towards Islam, i.e. whether comments are 
positive, negative, or neutral, is also analysed. Finally, popularity cues, such as the 
number of “likes”, are examined in relation to both posts and comments, the aim 
being to identify potential patterns with respect to the attention that different 
Facebook content on Islam generates. 
The dissertation aims to contribute to scholarly literature in at least three ways. 
First, the aim is to shine more light on Scandinavian discourses on Islam by analysing 
how the subject is depicted and discussed on Facebook—a central arena for news as 
well as public debate. Few studies have comparatively analysed how Islam (or 
immigration) is depicted in the online realm in the Scandinavian context (for 
exceptions, see Andersen, 2019; Moe, 2019a, 2019b; Nygaard, 2019, 2020). 
Andersen (2019) comparatively analysed the Scandinavian immigration debate in 
Facebook comment sections from a rhetorical perspective, but no comparative 
study of Scandinavian discourse on Facebook has yet examined depictions of Islam. 
Second, since this dissertation analyses comments discussing posts about Islam, 
right-wing counterpublic discourses may be prevalent. Scholarly work on 
counterpublics has traditionally focused on progressive and left-wing collectives, 
constituted, for instance, by workers, women, LGBTQ people, and ethnic minorities. 
With radical right-wing parties and movements gaining in popularity over the last 
decade (Lewis, Clarke, Barr, Holder, & Kommenda, 2018), it would, as pointed out by 




wing counter-publics” (p. 197). As argued by Holt (2018, p. 50), researchers have 
largely been reluctant to talk about right-wing populist, far right activists, or 
conservative criticism of the “politically correct” and “leftist” mainstream media 
using theoretical frameworks. This seems to be changing, however, as several 
scholars in recent years have shined a light on radical right-wing actors, for example 
by applying counterpublic theory (Cammaerts, 2009; Holm, 2019; Kaiser & 
Rauchleisch, 2019; Neumayer, 2013; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, 2018; Törnberg & 
Wahlström, 2018). This study aims to contribute to this literature by examining 
counterpublic discourses around Islam, in three national contexts. The perceived 
threat posed by Islam and Muslims is widely highlighted by far-right actors, who 
often blame the political establishment and mainstream media for not taking this 
alleged threat seriously (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017). 
Thus, to study content around Islam may be highly relevant when analysing right- 
wing counterpublic discourses. 
Third, this dissertation analyses counterpublics online as they appear near a 
superordinate public in the form of established news media, rather than in isolated 
communicative spaces, which have been the focus of most previous studies (for 
exceptions, see Chan, 2018; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, 2018). For counterpublics to be 
able to break up consensual patterns in superordinate publics such as in the mass 
media, it is essential to engage with mainstream audiences and target them with 
“counterpublicity” (Asen, 2000, p. 441). Therefore, Facebook comment sections 
below mainstream media content are interesting spaces for discursive contestation, 
where counterpublic-minded individuals may have a particularly strong incentive to 
challenge larger and more powerful publics. 
It is worth noting that rather than seeing online communication as something “out 
there”—detached from (offline) reality—online communication is here understood 




public sphere of a polity. This view is related to the counterpublic perspective, which 
sees counterpublics as part of a wider public sphere, rather than as enclaves (e.g. 
Asen, 2000; Fraser, 1990).1 Therefore, a chapter is devoted to addressing the 
contextual background of the study (see Chapter 2). At the same time, it is 
recognised that the studied platform, Facebook, features certain affordances that 
impacts what content is published by the actors in focus, both with respect to the 
news outlets (in the form of posts) and the ordinary citizens (in the form of 
comments). These affordances are discussed towards the end of this introductory 
chapter. 
Research Questions 
The objectives of the dissertation are reflected in the research questions. RQ1 deals 
with content published by the established news media, RQ2 and RQ3 focus on the 
comments written by ordinary citizens, while RQ4 addresses both posts and 
comments. The research questions are as follows: 
RQ1: To what extent do Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish news outlets’ Facebook 
posts and their associated articles about Islam differ (with respect to genre, theme, 
sources, and sentiment), and how can differences, or the lack of such, be explained? 
RQ2: To what extent do comments on Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish news 
outlets’ Facebook pages differ with respect to the sentiment they express towards 
Islam, and how can differences, or the lack of such, be explained? 
RQ3: To what extent are comment sections on Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish 
news outlets’ Facebook pages permeated by counterpublic discourses around Islam, 







1 As explained by Fraser (1990, p. 67), insofar as counterpublics are publics, they are by definition 




RQ4: To what extent do popularity cues correlate with different Facebook posts and 
comments about Islam, and how can correlations, or the lack of such, be explained? 
The research questions have in common that they are designed to compare how 
Islam is represented and described on the Facebook pages of Norwegian, Swedish, 
and Danish news media. The research questions are mainly descriptive but also 
express a wish to provide explanations for potential differences. At the same time, 
they do not attempt to identify causal effects, as this is notoriously difficult. Rather, 
factors that are deemed likely to have contributed to differences are discussed. 
Organisation of Dissertation 
The dissertation has 8 chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 has until now given a general introduction to the project and presented 
the main objectives and research questions. After this subsection has described the 
organisation of the dissertation, the chapter goes on to give a brief overview of the 
data studied in this dissertation, before it describes existing literature on social 
media discourse on Islam. Then, it considers the main perspectives in research on 
online political communication generally, before it gives an overview of research on 
comment sections, followed by a brief introduction to popularity cues. 
Subsequently, Facebook affordances are discussed in relation to the study at hand. 
The subsection on Facebook affordances also touches on the theoretical 
perspectives applied in the dissertation, the purpose being to give a brief 
introduction to these rather than a detailed account (which is the focus of Chapter 
3). 
Chapter 2 describes the fact that despite of the many commonalities between the 
Scandinavian countries, differences in how Islam and related issues have been 
handled in the three countries’ public spheres have been rather striking. Socio- 
political and historical factors that are deemed likely to have contributed to these 




Chapter 3 explains the theoretical and conceptual approach of the dissertation. The 
focus is primarily on counterpublic theory, both its foundations and how it is used 
specifically in this study. Relevant theoretical insights in the form of Hallin’s spheres 
(1986) and corrective action (Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Hwang, Pan, & Sun, 2008; 
Rojas, 2010) are also examined. 
Chapter 4 opens with discussing relevant ethical considerations of the study. Then, 
data selection and collection are described, followed by an explanation of the 
methodological approach. 
Chapter 5 is the first chapter to present results and discusses findings from the 
Facebook posts and their related article texts, i.e. the content published by the 
established news outlets. Comparisons between the countries are highlighted, but 
some attention is also given to differences between the types of news media 
included in the study (state-financed public service broadcasters, hybrid 
broadcasters, tabloids, and broadsheets). The findings are discussed in relation to 
the contextual background described in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 6 shifts the focus from the news outlets’ posts to the comments written by 
ordinary citizens. Differences between Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish comments’ 
sentiment towards Islam and their expression of counterpublic discourses are 
presented and discussed in light of the wider sociopolitical context, the theoretical 
approach, and the findings from the news media’s posts. 
Chapter 7 examines popularity cues received by posts and comments and considers 
whether there are any patterns in relation to what content about Islam obtains such 
endorsement. The results are discussed in relation with the contextual and 
theoretical chapters. 
Chapter 8 summarises the main findings and discusses the broader implications of 





Facebook Data on Islam in the Studied Period 
This dissertation examines posts and comments about Islam published on the 
Facebook pages of 15 mainstream Scandinavian news media during a seven-month 
period of 2018. Search words related to Islam were used to identify relevant posts, 
from which a selection of comments was analysed (see Chapter 4 for details). 
Figure 1.1: Number of Facebook posts about Islam published by the 15 Scandinavian 

















Relatively few posts were published per day (M = 2.81, SD = 2.82). While there 
arguably were no major deviations in the frequency of posts during the studied 
period, figure 1.1 shows a peak of 20 posts on 1 August, when Denmark and Norway 
implemented bans against face-covering clothing. Denmark banned such clothing 
from public space altogether, while Norway banned it in teaching situations, e.g. in 
universities and high schools. The second highest peak came on 26 October, when 
various outlets reported that artist Sinéad O’Connor had changed her name and 
converted to Islam. 
Although it cannot be asserted that the selection criteria identified all relevant 





































relatively low proportion of the total number of posts published by the 15 studied 
news media. 











Posts about Islam 0,3 (140) 0,6 (224) 1 (238) 0,6 (602) 
 
As depicted in table 1.1, the outlets published a total of 100,512 posts in the studied 
period, and the identified Islam-related posts constituted only 0.6% of these. 1% of 
the Danish posts concentrated on Islam, while the corresponding figures for the 
Swedish and Norwegian posts were 0.6% and 0.3%, respectively. 
We will return to the matter of data selection and collection in Chapter 4. 
 
Discourse on Islam in Social Media 
The voluminous academic literature that has examined how Islam and Muslims have 
been depicted in Western news media (e.g. Ahmed & Matthes, 2017; Axner, 2015; 
Baker, Gabrielatos, & McEnery, 2013; Hussain, 2000; Said, 1997) has generally found 
evidence for negative bias. Some studies have, however, also found tendencies of 
more complex and positive representations of Islam and Muslims (Bleich, 
Stonebraker, Nisar, & Abdelhamid, 2015; Carol & Koopmans, 2013; Vanparys, 
Jacobs, & Torrekens. 2013). 
In comparison to studies of traditional news media, relatively few studies have 
analysed how Islam and Muslims are represented in social media, but the research 
that exists indicates that social media discourse on Islam and Muslims is often 
negative. Most such research is located within the field of cyber hate and has 
actively sought to study anti-Muslim bigotry. For instance, Oboler (2016) in a study 
of 52 (more or less) explicitly anti-Muslim Facebook pages found that Muslims were 




found that the Facebook pages were used to promote threats and violence against 
Muslims (Oboler, 2016, p. 49). Similarly, Awan (2016) examined 500 separate tweets 
to “note and look at patterns emerging regarding online Islamophobia via the 
Twitter search engine” (p. 35), finding that words like “terrorists”, “pigs”, “paedos”, 
and “scum” are frequently used to describe Muslims. Also, Copsey, Dack, Littler, and 
Feldman (2013), aiming to examine the “under-studied relationship between anti- 
Muslim hate crime and the far-right” (p. 5), based on a dataset collected by an 
organisation monitoring hate crimes against Muslims, observed that far-right groups 
were highly active in engaging in hate crimes in social media. Of the 300 online 
incidents of hate crime registered in the data set, the authors found that far-right 
groups were linked to 69% of cases (Copsey et al., 2013, p. 21). 
Some studies have also looked at discourse on Muslims and Islam in online settings 
where it is less expected that negative attitudes will be predominant. Findings from 
these studies indeed find less negative, albeit not necessarily positive, portrayals. 
For instance, Ernst et al. (2017) studied 155 randomly selected user comments to 
YouTube videos created to counteract hate speech and found that the most 
prominent theme was “devaluating prejudices and stereotypes towards Muslims 
and/or Islam” (p. 18). This theme contained comments dismantling prejudice and 
stereotypes against Muslims and Islam, but also some comments that served to 
reproduce these prejudices and stereotypes (Ernst et al., p. 18). Similarly, Magdy, 
Darwish, and Abokhodair (2015), in an analysis of more than 900,000 tweets relating 
to Islam and Muslims after the Islamist terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 
2015, found that while the majority of the tweets defended Muslims and absolved 
them from responsibility for the attacks, there was also a substantial minority of 
tweets that blamed the attacks on Muslims. 
Some research has also considered the relationship between traditional media and 




analysis of a 105 million word corpus of a popular Swedish Internet forum, observed 
that Muslims were portrayed “as a homogenous outgroup that is embroiled in 
conflict, violence and extremism: characteristics that are described as emanating 
from Islam as a religion” (p. 132). While the authors did not carry out their own 
analysis of surrounding traditional media discourse, they argue, based on previous 
literature, that these depictions are similar to, albeit more extreme versions of, 
portrayals found in analyses of traditional media. Thus, they describe the forum as 
an “online amplifier” that reflects and reinforces legacy media discourses around 
Muslims and Islam (p. 141). Similarly, in a comparative study of Norwegian, Swedish, 
and Danish YouTube content on Islam, Moe (2019a, p. 2) report that “Findings 
suggest alignment to previous studies of mainstream news media coverage in the 
countries.” 
McEnery, McGlashan, and Love (2015) also describe that the press clearly influenced 
content on social media in their study of newspaper and Twitter content about the 
2013 London jihadist terrorist killing of British soldier, Lee Rigby. Still, they report a 
striking difference between the press and Twitter relating to the attribution of 
blame and the search for explanations for the attack: while the press tended to 
distance Islam from the killers and linked the killers to an extremist and misguided 
form of the religion, personal sympathy for the bereaved and the clash between the 
British identity of the killers and their acts seemed to be stronger pre-occupations of 
Twitter users (p. 256). Whereas anti-racist discourse was prominent in the press 
following the attacks, attempts by Twitter users to reframe discussions on the 
platform in an anti-racist direction faded over time (p. 256). 
Overall, then, social media discourse on Muslims and Islam has been found to be 
largely negative. There is a difference, however, between the results in studies that 
have actively sought to study anti-Muslim content (Awan, 2016; Copsey et al., 2013; 




Muslim-sympathetic or neutral online settings (Ernst et al., 2017; Magdy et al., 
2017). Also, existing research indicates that social media discourse on Muslims and 
Islam tends to be more negative than traditional media discourse on Muslims and 
Islam. Results are, however, inconclusive with respect to whether social media 
function mainly as an “online amplifier” (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016) or provides 
space for more alternative perspectives on these topics (McEnery et al., 2015). 
Studying Political Communication Online—Main Perspectives 
In an article published in 2003, John Downey and Natalie Fenton predicted that the 
relationship between new media, counterpublic spheres, and the public sphere may 
become central to questions of democracy and legitimacy in the coming years 
(Downey & Fenton, 2003, p. 200). It is easy to agree with their prediction today. 
Although their article was published less than two decades ago, these years have 
featured substantial changes in the media landscape. New media like Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitter have been launched, offering vast amounts of communication 
spaces for billions of people worldwide. While these media have been used for 
many other purposes than to engage in political activity, political communication 
has become commonplace in various social and alternative media. Furthermore, 
malignant forms of online political engagement, what Quandt (2018) has called 
“dark participation”, including misinformation, hate campaigns, trolling, and hate 
speech, has risen high on the political2 and scholarly agenda (e.g. Anderson & 
Revers, 2018; Hedman et al., 2018; Gelber & McNamara, 2016). 
Undoubtedly, the emergence of the Internet as an arena for political discussion has 
inspired a broad range of research questions. As explained by Wright (2012, p. 245), 
 
 









the view that the Internet may “revolutionise” political conversation and debate 
because it, among other reasons, has been thought to have a democratic structure 
that would facilitate deliberative conversation, arose from the earliest days (e.g. 
Corrado & Firestone, 1996; Rheingold, 1993). Opposed to this revolutionist, cyber- 
optimist school is the so-called “normalisation” or cyber-realist school, associated 
with the work of Margolis and Resnick (2000), which holds that political internet 
applications are mainly used by already engaged and active citizens (Hirzalla, van 
Zoonen, & de Ridder, 2011, p. 1). As Freelon (2015) points out, the cyber- 
optimism/pessimism dichotomy that formerly dominated this subject is avoided by 
the best current research, taking more nuanced approaches. The situation may 
indeed be described as “grey” rather than completely “dark” or “light” (Quandt, 
2018, p. 37). 
Still, two theoretical traditions dominate research on citizen communication online: 
one concerned with content production that studies to what extent online citizen 
communication live up to ideals of deliberative communication (e.g. Berg, 2011; Ruiz 
et al., 2011), and a second consumption-oriented branch focused on selective 
perception and ideological fragmentation (e.g. Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2017). 
Freelon (2015, pp. 772–773) argues that both are concerned with the same 
underlying democratic norm—deliberation—which commends a strict set of 
desirability criteria for political discussion (e.g. civility, reciprocity, reason-giving, and 
interaction with individuals with different political views). Therefore, research that 
examines the democratic consequences of political talk online has been developed 
largely against the backdrop of deliberative discursive norms, Habermas’s 
(1962/1989) early work on the public sphere being the most common reference 
(Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, p. 465). 
To broaden the scope of research, Freelon (2015, pp. 773–774), influenced by 




2001), suggests a multi-norm framework in research on online political 
communication. Besides deliberation, he proposes two norms that can be 
operationalised by researchers: a communitarian norm that advocates political 
action and which, like the deliberative position, commends civility, reason-giving, 
and reciprocity but only among like-minded individuals, and a liberal individualist 
norm, marked by the single-minded pursuit of uninhibited self-expression, generally 
at the expense of civility and responsiveness. 
This dissertation does not operationalise these criteria, but is inspired by Toepfl and 
Piwoni’s (2015) operationalisation of a fourth norm for analysing political 
communication online, namely that of counterpublic theory. This norm is marked by 
collectives engaging in discourses that challenges larger and more powerful public 
spheres. Counterpublics is one of the most discussed normative positions in the 
theoretical literature on the affordances of “digital democracy” (Dahlberg, 2011, pp. 
860–863). Nevertheless, researchers have typically focused on (left-wing and 
progressive) counterpublics as they appear in blogs, forums, or alternative online 
media, even though comment sections in proximity to mass media content are 
potentially important arenas to study from a counterpublic perspective (Toepfl & 
Piwoni, 2015). Here, counterpublic-minded individuals have the chance to directly 
challenge mainstream-oriented citizens and news outlets. In other words, comment 
sections may serve as highly fruitful grounds for agitation for counterpublic-minded 
individuals. The extent to which this is the case in Scandinavian comment sections, 
around the topic of Islam, is precisely the key focus of this dissertation. 
Existing Research: Comment Sections 
Since the advent of Web 2.0, characterised by the interactive potential of new 
media and online technologies, increasing scholarly attention has been devoted to 
studying comment features, both due to their prevalence and their ability to 
influence people’s behaviour and opinions (Su et al., 2018, p. 3679). As has been the 




researchers have disagreed about the democratic value of comment sections. 
Comment systems online have lowered the threshold for (public) political 
engagement (Løvlie, Ihlebæk, & Larsson 2018a, p. 2), enabling uncomplicated ways 
for ordinary people to express their political opinions. They may also provide 
journalists with direct and potentially real-time feedback and indicate interest in a 
news item (Ziegele & Quiring, 2013, p. 125). 
At the same time, while this study focuses on counterpublicity rather than 
deliberation, it is worth remark that studies analysing the quality of political 
discussions in comment sections have typically found that comment sections do not 
fulfil ideals of deliberative communication. Scholars have seen comment sections 
(and social media in general) as places where public discourse deteriorates (Løvlie et 
al., 2018a, p. 2), pointing to issues like the emergence of echo chambers and 
increased polarisation (Sunstein, 2017), “trench warfare” (Karlsen, Steen-Johnsen, 
Wollebæk, & Enjolras, 2017), “flaming” (Hutchens, Cicchirillo, & Hmielowski, 2015; 
Santana, 2014), “trolling” (Binns, 2012; Hardaker, 2010), and hate speech (Erjavec & 
Kovacic, 2012; Gelber & McNamara, 2016). 
Moreover, as explained by Løvlie, Ihlebæk, and Larsson (2018b), there is a 
widespread perception among citizens that online comment sections are pervaded 
by harassment directed at certain groups, notably women and minorities (Gardiner 
et al., 2016). For instance, a report by the Norwegian Gender Equality and Anti- 
Discrimination Ombud (LDO) described that more than half of Facebook users chose 
not to participate in discussions on Facebook because the tone of the debate was 
considered too harsh (Burkal & Veledar, 2018). Comment threads about certain 
topics, particularly immigration and Islam, are often characterised as especially 
uncivil and polarised,3 and they are frequently accompanied by discussions about 
 






the normative boundaries in the public sphere (Ihlebæk & Thorseth, 2017, p. 140). 
Among those who choose to participate in online debates, though, Enjolras et al. 
(2013, p. 132) found that those who report often being hurt or sad because of 
online debate is only 4%. 
Despite the widely recognised problems associated with comment sections, there is 
broad consensus among media professionals that mass media outlets should offer 
readers the opportunity to comment on news items (Nielsen, 2012). Both 
democratic responsibility to foster an open public debate and economic incentives 
of user involvement have been used as arguments to keep participatory functions 
(Løvlie et al., 2018b, p. 364). Moreover, it has been argued by Reich (2011) that a 
likely explanation for this consensus is that online comment sections do not 
challenge the journalistic authority in the same way as other forms of audience 
participation, such as public or participatory journalism. 
At the same time, many journalists are critical of comment sections (Bergström & 
Wadbring, 2015), for instance because of the prevalence of personal attacks found 
in these arenas (Nielsen, 2012), and studies have noted how media professionals 
have struggled with the administration of comment sections (Frischlich, Boberg, & 
Quandt, 2019; Ihlebæk & Krumsvik, 2015). Research has also examined how 
editorial control of these spaces are perceived from the users’ perspective (Løvlie et 
al., 2018a, 2018b), finding for instance that users who are sceptical of strict 
moderation policies report being subject to editorial control more often than those 
who prefer stricter moderation policies. 
There is also a range of other studies on comment sections worth addressing. For 




discussions in comment sections (Arkhede, Bergström, & Ohlsson, 2017; Reuters 
Institute, 2019; Rossi, Schwartz, & Mahnke, 2016). Findings show that this varies 
from country to country. The Reuters Institute Digital News Report (2019) shows 
that 20% of Swedes, 17% of Norwegians, and 13% Danes weekly comment on news 
via social media or other websites, while the average user percentage from the 
countries surveyed in the report was approximately 25%, suggesting commenting is 
less common in the Scandinavian countries than what it normally is in other places. 
The Scandinavian figures are, however, similar to those found in other Northern 
European countries.4 
In the field of media psychology, scholars have found that content in comment 
sections can affect news audiences’ perception of a topic, case, and even the 
perceived quality of an article (Lee, 2012; Lee & Jang, 2010; von Sikorski, 2016; von 
Sikorski & Hänelt, 2016). A related group of studies has analysed whether, and to 
what extent, certain features of news items predict the intensity of commenting 
(Boczkowski & Mitchelstein, 2012; Tenenboim & Cohen, 2015; Tsagkias, Weerkamp, 
& de Rijke, 2009; Weber, 2014). For instance, Weber (2014) found that some news 
factors, such as proximity (news stories focusing on something “close to home”, e.g. 
the nation) and impact (news stories describing an event having significant 
consequences for a defined social group or category), were positively related with 
commenting on news items. Conversely, facticity (i.e. providing a mere factual 
report on an event without further interpretation or situational analysis) had a 
negative effect on commenting. 
Also, researchers have examined characteristics and motivations of the readers and 
writers of comments (Diakopoulous & Naaman, 2011; Kalogeropoulos, Negredo, 
Picone, & Nielsen, 2017; Springer, Engelmann, & Pfaffinger, 2015). For instance, 
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Kalogeropoulos et al., (2017), using data from a cross-national survey, describe that 
people who use several social media platforms and who use social media for news 
are more likely to comment on news outside social media; political partisans from 
both the Left and Right are more likely to share and comment, particularly on news 
stories in social media; and people who have a high interest in hard news are more 
likely to comment on news items, both outside and on social media (p. 1). Facebook 
to a larger degree than other social media is used by people with populist views 
compared to those with non-populist views,5 and this goes for reading, sharing, and 
commenting on news (Reuters Institute, 2019). Enjorlas et al.’s (2013) study of 
Norwegian online debaters find a (albeit relatively weak) correlation between low 
social status and participants in online debates, including those discussing in 
comment sections: the probability of a person without higher education 
participating in online debates is 1.2 times higher than the probability of a person 
with higher education participating in online debates, and a person receiving 
disability aid is 1.4 times as likely to participate in online debates compared with 
people not on social support (p. 127).6 The same study found that discussions in 
comment sections are dominated by men7 and that the average age among 
discussants is relatively high (p. 126). 
In this dissertation, particularly studies that centre on the analysis of the content 
published in comment sections are relevant (Andersen, 2019; Douai & Nofal, 2012; 
McCluskey & Hmielowski, 2012; Freelon, 2015; Santana, 2019; Su et al., 2018; Toepfl 
& Piwoni, 2015, 2018; Zhou, Chan, & Peng, 2008). As we have seen, such studies 
 
 
5 Defined in the Reuters News Report as the belief in the existence of a “bad” elite and a “virtuous 
people” and the ultimate sovereignty of the will of the people. 
6 Only among those who debate on Twitter are those with higher education overrepresented 
(Enjolras et al., 2013, p. 127). 
7 Facebook was the only online discussion platform that was not found to be dominated by men 
(Enjolras et al., 2013). Since debates on news sites’ comment sections, which are dominated by 
men, have been moved to Facebook since the authors carried out the study, it is, however, 




have largely focused on the “deliberativeness” of comments and typically found 
these to have low deliberative quality, although there are variances across platforms 
and countries. For instance, Ruiz et al. (2011) found that the comment sections in 
two major newspapers in countries in which English is widely used (The Guardian 
and The New York Times) were closer to Habermasian deliberative ideals than those 
of three non-Anglophone newspapers (Le Monde, El País, and La Repubblica). Berg 
(2011), who looked at three different Norwegian online platforms for political 
discussion, found that the discussions on the platform with the most interventionist 
moderation policies had the highest deliberative quality, while the opposite was the 
case for the platform with the least interventionist approach (see also Jensen, 2003; 
Wright & Street, 2007). 
Some researchers have also studied comment sections from other perspectives than 
the dominant deliberative tradition, some of which are of particular relevance to 
this study. Toepfl and Piwoni (2015) used counterpublic theory and found that while 
German mass media painted the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) 
consentaneously negatively, reader comments generally expressed support for the 
party. Furthermore, Andersen (2019) analysed Scandinavian debates in comment 
sections on Facebook about immigration from a rhetorical perspective, finding that 
while immigrant-critical Danish commenters tended to speak from a perceived 
majority position, Norwegian and Swedish immigrant-critical commenters expressed 
their opinions from a perceived minority standpoint. 
Popularity Cues 
As this dissertation considers popularity cues that Facebook users assign to 
Facebook posts and comments about Islam, a brief background about popularity 
cues’ meaning and function is also required. Porten-Cheé, Hassler, Jost, Eilders, and 




popularity cues, such as likes and shares, point to mainly positive user reactions. 8 
While there is reason to be concerned with manipulation of popularity cues, for 
instance by the use of bots aimed to skew citizens’ perceptions of public opinion, 
the number of popularity cues generally indicate the degree to which people have 
assigned relevance to or endorsed online items, particularly in the context of 
political communication (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, p. 210). This includes expressing a 
variety of affective responses such as excitement, agreement, compassion, and 
understanding.9 Facebook itself describes liking a post as letting “people know that 
you enjoy it without leaving a comment.”10 Similarly, Twitter explains likes as 
something “used to show appreciation for a Tweet.”11 From an individual’s point of 
view, liking a certain political message or opinion may present a low-threshold way 
to affect public opinion, first because one is aware that one’s like adds to possibly 
many others and second, each additional like can contribute to lowering others’ 
restraints to support certain opinions (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, p. 213). 
The share function on Facebook gives the platform’s users the opportunity to spread 
content in their personal network. Similarly to liking, sharing content can be seen as 
a mainly positive reaction towards a (political) message (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, p. 
214). For instance, Bobkowski (2015) found that users share news they perceive as 
relevant for themselves as well as for their peers. Furthermore, because online 
peers tend to be part of the same socio-demographic group and have similar 
political attitudes, sharing can be an instrument for users to increase their 
reputation among (online) peers (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, p. 214). The number of 
 
 
8 While this study also looks at popularity cues in the form of newer Facebook reactions (“Haha”, 
“Sad”, “Wow”, “Angry”, and “Love”), likes and shares are prioritised in this subsection due to their 
more established roles. 
9 It is worth noting that likes may in some instances also be used for other purposes, such as for 
irony and parody (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013, p. 158) or to demonstrate to fellow users that one has 






shares may indicate how relevant a message was considered by previous users. 
Sharing, then, may serve to both highlight an item and to gradually affect what 
political issues other users perceive as important (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, p. 214). 
While both sharing and liking content can be seen as mainly positive reactions, they 
seem to involve different degrees of cognitive evaluation (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, 
p. 214). Compared to a like, which may be one of many and only be visible next to or 
below an item, sharing leads to the item showing up on the user’s own Timeline, 
which means that it is more likely that others will notice the engagement and 
criticise the user. This can be connected to the fear of social isolation (Noelle- 
Neumann, 1993), as studies have shown that group conformity dynamics can 
hamper the willingness to post content in public (e.g. Lee & Nass, 2002). Different 
from when liking an item, users who share may more thoroughly examine an item 
because they want to make sure the message is in line with the current debate 
climate (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, p. 214). The wish to conform can, however, be 
neutralised if users are certain about their opinions (Matthes, Morrison, & Schemer, 
2010)—a relevant aspect given the counterpublic perspective applied in this study. 
From this perspective, users may want to share and like content that is perceived to 
challenge rather than conform with current public discourse or opinion. 
Facebook Affordances 
As we have seen, comment sections have opened for uncomplicated ways of 
discussing politics online but have been criticised for a number of elements, such as 
the prevalence of hate speech, echo chambers, and a general deterioration of civil 
discourse. In recent years, numerous news outlets have removed comment sections 
from their website in order to focus on maintaining sustainable spaces for discussion 
on Facebook. Media professionals and scholars have in this regard noted how 
Facebook pages and their associated comment sections have become an 
“inseparable part of the online news-consumption experience” for many (Su et al., 




(in the form of posts) and ordinary citizens (in the form of comments), it is useful to 
consider relevant affordances provided to these actors by the platform. In relation 
to the comments, the subsection particularly focuses on to what degree Facebook 
comment sections afford counterpublic-minded individuals a space to express their 
(oft-controversial) ideas. 
Affordances can be understood as the action possibilities inherent in technological 
artefacts (in this case Facebook) that enable or restrict certain types of 
communication acts (Kalsnes, 2016a, p. 38). Both the news outlets and the 
commenters are provided certain affordances through Facebook, which may differ 
from affordances on other platforms such as Twitter, YouTube, and (comment 
sections on) news outlets’ main websites. As we shall see in the following 
paragraphs, the news outlets’ Facebook posts can be said to adhere to a social 
media logic that differs from more traditional media logic, and ordinary citizens’ 
commenting activity is influenced by affordances related to moderation policies 
(Løvlie et al., 2018a), identifiability (Rowe, 2015), and networked information access 
(Halpern & Gibbs, 2013). 
News outlets 
The Reuters Digital News Report (2019) shows that as many as 36% of Danish 
respondents, 32% of Swedish respondents, and 45% of Norwegian respondents 
regularly use Facebook for news. These user patterns mean that news outlets feel 
obliged, or are at least economically required, to provide and promote news on 
Facebook (Haim et al., 2019). By sharing content on non-proprietary platforms like 
Facebook and Twitter, news organisations generate traffic to their own sites, which 
generates advertising income (Sjøvaag, 2019, p. 91). The downside is that this also 
involves letting go of control (Boberg, Schatto-Eckrodt, Frischlich, & Quandt, 2018, 
p. 66). This is seen in, for instance, how media organisations sometimes struggle to 
understand why Facebook censors comments that editors perceive as legitimate 




Because users and algorithms on social media such as Facebook prioritise certain 
content, journalists must follow certain social media logics (Klinger & Svensson, 
2014; Van Dijck & Poell, 2013) in order for their content to reach potential readers. 
In a study of all public Facebook posts’ texts published by 478 news outlets from 
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark during an 11-month period, Haim et al. (2019) 
examine the social media logics found in the Scandinavian countries. They compare 
the Facebook post texts to the respective news items’ linked article’s headline and 
teaser, the overarching aim being to compare social media logic to more traditional 
media logic.12 A central finding of their study pertains to the varying prevalence of 
grammatical and emotive features in article texts and post texts. The article texts 
feature more numbers, which may indicate a larger focus on providing facts, and 
also feature more colons, dashes, ellipses, and parentheses, potentially indicating a 
more complex use of syntax than found in post texts (Haim et al., 2019). The use of 
question and exclamation marks, on the other hand, are clearly more common in 
the posts than in the related article texts and, predictably, so is the use of emojis 
(see also Hågvar, 2019; Welbers & Ophenhaffen, 2019). 
Haim et al. (2019) suggest that the relatively frequent use of question and 
exclamation marks in post texts may be related to the job carried out by 
engagement editors (a form of audience-oriented editors). As explained by Ferrer- 
Conil and Tandoc (2018, p. 437), audience-oriented editors’ job description differs 
from those of public editors and ombudsmen used by many news outlets, in that 
their main function is to match news content to the needs and wants of the 
audience. While the public editor or the ombudsman is tasked to react to 
 
 
12 As explained by Kalsnes (2016, p. 44), media logic refers to the “format, rules or ‘codes’ for 
defining, selecting, organising, presenting and recognising information as one thing rather than 
another. Media logic is often used to explain how news is selected, interpreted and constructed.” 
Similarly, social media logic (van Dijck & Poell, 2013) is a model that frames “the ways in which the 
mechanisms of the social media platform impact social interactions and information selection 




traditionally qualitative audience feedback (e.g. readers’ complaints), engagement 
editors, social media editors, and analytics editors (which all are examples of 
audience-oriented editors) are expected to be more proactive and make sense of 
quantitative audience feedback to be able to predict audience preferences. 
The relatively active use of exclamation marks, question marks, and emojis in the 
news outlets’ post texts compared to article texts—and the relatively infrequent use 
of other punctuation—may on the one hand indicate that social media logic is less 
related to grammatical use of language and more related to engagement features 
and calls for action (Haim et al., 2019). This underlines the potentially significant role 
of engagement editors for news on Facebook in Scandinavia, which has already 
been found in other countries (Haim et al., 2019). On the other hand, as noted by 
the authors, the findings could also reflect that journalists themselves are proficient 
in the use of features apt for Facebook, leaving little room to manoeuvre for 
engagement editors (Haim et al., 2019). Regardless, their study points to that 
Scandinavian news outlets adapt to a social media logic when posting content to 
Facebook. 
Interestingly, the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish news outlets’ post texts are more 
similar than is the case with the article texts, suggesting that the already 
homogenous news culture in the Scandinavian countries is even more similar when 
adapting to social media logic than traditional media logic (Haim et al., 2019). Also, 
since this dissertation looks at the most popular (Scandinavian) news outlets on 
Facebook, i.e. those with the highest number of “followers”, it is worth noting that 
outlets with substantial reach tend to engage more heavily in the use of potentially 
more engaging question marks and emojis, whereas smaller outlets’ posts are 
marked by most other forms of punctuation (Haim et al., 2019). As such, audience- 
retentive linguistic features of Facebook seem more prevalent among competing, 




commercial and fully state-owned outlets’ posts, the commercial ones displaying 
more prevalent use of almost all textual features investigated by Haim et al. (2019). 
At the same time, the fully state-owned outlets use emojis more often than the 
commercial outlets do (Haim et al., 2019), indicating that even the fully state-owned 
media organisations’ journalists may feel obliged to market the news on Facebook 
(Tandoc & Vos, 2016). 
News consumers and commenters 
Shifting focus to the audience perspective, it is of potentially high significance that 
there is a difference, as noted above, between the post texts and article texts. This 
difference means that individuals who consume (portions of their) news through 
Facebook may be exposed to different types of writing than those reading article 
texts: fewer numbers, more emotional content, and potentially less complex syntax 
(Haim et al., 2019). Moreover, as shown by Pak (2019), news organisations post 
different news on social media than they do on their own websites. In other words, 
whether someone gets their news through social media or a news outlet’s website 
may also impact the news stories one is exposed to. Furthermore, as we have seen, 
news items on Facebook (and other social media) are accompanied with popularity 
cues, such as the number of likes and shares an item has received, potentially 
influencing how a news item is perceived by the user (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018). As 
pointed out by Haim et al. (2019), while heavy news consumers across a wide 
variety of channels are also often heavy social media news users, the above- 
mentioned factors may lead to forms of polarisation where news is not only 
perceived differently, but where different selection and writing style of news leads 
to, on the one hand, a more fact-oriented depiction of events in news articles, and, 
on the other hand, a more emotive and simplistic depiction of events on social 
media platforms. 
It is possible that these factors may in turn impact how citizens discuss events in the 




more emotional and less fact-based. This perhaps especially applies to debates 
around topics like Islam and immigration, which have been noted for being 
emotional, heated, and polarised (Brox, 2009; Eriksen, 2011; Hagelund, 2004a, 
2004b; Stærk, 2011). At the same time, scholars who have comparatively analysed 
the deliberativeness of Facebook comment sections and comment sections on other 
platforms have found that Facebook comments are more deliberative than 
comment sections on YouTube (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013) and comment sections on 
news outlets’ main websites (Rowe, 2015). Differences in the affordances of 
identifiability and networked information access (in the form of automatic updates 
to friends’ networks when content is generated) have been pointed to as potential 
explanations. As described by Halpern and Gibbs (2013), social media like Facebook 
afford more identifiability as users commonly use their real name and reveal a 
substantial amount of personal information in their profiles (although this depends 
on privacy settings), such as friends, pictures, previous posts, interests, education, 
and place of occupation. This increases the threshold for using aggressive and rude 
language, because there may be social consequences related to publishing such 
content (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013, p. 1166). Moreover, the networked information 
access afforded by Facebook, meaning that when you, for instance, write a 
comment on a public page on Facebook, such as that of a news outlet, your network 
may see your activity, may have a similar effect on people’s willingness to post 
aggressive and rude content. 
In line with spiral of silence theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1993), the affordances of 
identifiability and networked information access may not only inhibit people from 
expressing themselves rudely but also from voicing their opinions at all. From the 
spiral of silence perspective, people monitor their social environment for cues about 
public opinion on controversial political issues, in order to avoid expressing opinions 
that deviate from the predominant opinion (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, p. 217). If 




engaging in discussions that they fear may lead to social consequences. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there may be a lower threshold for voicing 
one’s opinion in a public comment section on Facebook than in a public offline 
setting (see Suler, 2004). 
From another perspective, in line with considering online media to provide 
affordances for counterpublics (Dahlberg, 2011), Facebook comment sections may 
provide fruitful agitational ground for counterpublic-minded individuals—citizens 
who perceive their views to be marginalised or excluded from a larger public sphere 
(Asen, 2000). After all, engaging in these discussions is an uncomplicated way of 
voicing one’s opinion and may be considered a significant opportunity for criticising, 
challenging, and perhaps even convincing, mainstream-oriented actors. In 
combination with the counterpublic outlook, the corrective action perspective 
(Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Hwang et al., 2008; Rojas, 2010) provides a useful 
theoretical vantage point. According to this perspective, citizens who perceive the 
public sphere to be marked by certain “wrongs” will attempt to “correct” these by 
engaging in actions offline and online, for instance by partaking in demonstrations, 
calling a member of parliament, commenting on Facebook posts, or liking a 
comment. From this point of view, it is reasonable that a person who experiences 
the public sphere to be for instance overly positive towards Islam will attempt to 
“correct” this, for instance through voicing Islam-critical views in a comment section. 
Still, even if counterpublic-minded commenters on news outlets’ Facebook pages 
are motivated to take corrective action and are not victim to the spiral of silence, 
they may be restricted in other ways. Facebook’s report function enables users to 
report content that violates the platform’s community standards,13 including 
harassment and hate speech. Furthermore, administrators of Facebook pages, for 






policies. Violating these can get your comment hidden, removed, or lead to a ban 
from participating in future discussions (Ihlebæk & Kalsnes, 2018). Comments can 
also be automatically marked as spam and hidden from the page when using swear 
words if the page has turned on Facebook’s profanity filter, which can be set to 
“medium” or “strong”. Administrators can also filter out other words they deem 
unacceptable or that they know tend to appear in posts that violate their 
moderation policies (Ihlebæk & Kalsnes, 2018). 
While useful for removing e.g. hateful and uncivil content, moderation may from a 
counterpublic perspective also exacerbate a sense of marginalisation if 
counterpublic-minded individuals experience that they are particularly targeted by 
it. For instance, in their study of user experiences with Norwegian news outlets’ 
editorial control of comment sections, Løvlie et al. (2018a) found that those who 
write comments on the alternative, anti-Islamic news outlet Document.no were 
clearly more likely to report problems with editorial control than those who write 
comments on mainstream news outlets, many of those commenting on the anti- 
Islam site expressing belonging to a marginalised group in opposition to the 
mainstream, “politically correct”, liberal elite (p. 14)—much in line with discourse 
used by anti-Islam/anti-immigration actors internationally (see e.g. Heft, 
Mayerhöffer, Reinhardt, & Knüpfer, 2019). 
It is worth noting that moderation policies are not uniform across news outlets’ 
Facebook pages, as media organisations’ editorial strategies to balance professional 
control and open participation can be placed on a continuum between 
interventionist and non-interventionist/anarchic (Ihlebæk, Løvlie, & Mainsah, 
2013).14 For instance, news outlets involve their moderators to different extent in 
the comment sections: where some generally have a hands-off approach, others 
 
 
14 Even journalists of a single outlet may not share common rules when it comes to the 




choose to frequently directly engage with the commenters, e.g. by urging people to 
debate civilly or to provide evidence for one’s claims (Stroud, Scacco, Muddiman, & 
Curry, 2015). 
Furthermore, there is a clear difference in what is accepted as legitimate speech by 
anti-Islam outlets and mainstream editorial outlets, and there are also potentially 
significant differences when it comes to how effectively news outlets enact their 
moderation policies. Regardless, the Facebook comment sections of mainstream 
Scandinavian news outlets, which are the focus of this project, does not, to borrow 
Hallin’s (1986) terminology, afford a clear deviant sphere, although some extreme 
opinions may “slip under the radar”. By deviant sphere, Hallin (1986, pp. 116–117) 
means those actors and opinions considered unacceptable by journalists and the 
political mainstream. This means that affordances in the form of moderation have a 
potentially substantial impact on the prevalence of counterpublic discourse found in 
the studied comment sections, as more extreme comments typically will be 
removed due to established editorial news outlets’ moderation policies and/or 
violations of Facebook’s community standards. More secluded online spaces, such 
as blogs, forums, and alternative media tend to afford space for deviant actors to 
engage more freely in counterpublic discourses, although deviant actors also 
operate on popular social media like Facebook, in various pages and groups.15 
Overall, there are affordances speaking for and against the prevalence counterpublic 
discourses in the Facebook comment sections of established editorial news outlets. 
Generally, though, I would argue that, despite affordances related to identifiability, 
networked information access, and moderation policies, Facebook comment 
sections offer significant incentives for counterpublic-minded individuals to engage 
in counterdiscourses. As pointed out by Toepfl and Piwoni (2015), comment sections 
 
15 A relevant example is the public Facebook page of the organisation Stop the Islamisation of 
Norway (Stopp islamiseringen av Norge, SIAN), which is “liked” by approximately 30,000 users, and 




as public spheres provide counterpublic-minded individuals with “excellent 
opportunities to pursue transformative aims in relation to the public at large” (p. 
471), and they give three reasons for this.16 First, in contrast to more secluded 
online spaces, such as discussions forums and alternative news outlets, comment 
sections are hosted on platforms of mass media outlets (in the case of Facebook, the 
comment sections are found on the Facebook pages of mass media outlets), 
meaning they are highly visible to a large, mainstream audience. While 
counterpublic-minded individuals see mainstream public spheres as narrow-minded 
and marginalising towards their views, mainstream arenas are also admired spaces 
to disseminate one’s ideas (Kaiser & Rauchfleisch, 2019, p. 246). Second, despite 
limits on clearly deviant speech, compared to “letters to the editor”, an earlier and 
related format, more citizens can express their opinions, with gatekeeping 
journalists and moderators typically allowing a significantly wider range of ideas and 
expressive forms to be published (McCluskey & Hmielowski, 2012). Third, comment 
sections make it possible to engage in counterpublic discourses in spatial vicinity to 
specific hegemonic ideas as these are formulated in the mainstream public sphere 
(Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, pp. 471–472). It can also be added that because the 
proportion of people who write online comments is relatively low (Reuters Institute, 
2019), counterpublic-minded individuals can exert a disproportionately high 
influence on the discussions. Thus, they have a significant chance to shape (the 
perception of) public opinion (Duncan, 2020, p. 193). 
For these reasons, at least, comment sections (on established news media’s 
Facebook pages) can be considered a uniquely configured public sphere, which 
stands out from the many (sub)public spheres that constitute the public sphere at 
large. Therefore, counterpublic-minded individuals may have particularly strong 
 
 
16 Although Toepfl and Piwoni’s (2015) insights are based on a study of comment sections on mass 
media’s own websites rather than on Facebook, these principles also pertain to comment sections 




incentives to engage in counterdiscourses in these arenas. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, the different Scandinavian contexts in relation to discourse on 
Islam may, however, provide different degrees of incentive for counterpublic- 
minded individuals to express their views in the comment sections. 
Chapter Summary 
We saw in the opening of this chapter that, in line with an international trend, low 
trust in the media is particularly prevalent among Scandinavians critical of 
immigration. For citizens highly critical of immigration and Islam, (Facebook) 
comment sections may, for instance because of the proximity to mass media items 
and the low threshold for getting one’s opinion published, be a particularly useful 
arena for engaging in agitational activity. While moderation policies generally will 
restrict the most deviant forms of speech, less extreme, yet counterdiscursive, 
speech may find a home in the Facebook comment sections. 
By analysing to what extent (both anti-Islam and pro-Islam) counterpublic discourses 
permeate comment sections in proximity to a mainstream public represented by the 
mass media, this dissertation aims to contribute to the scholarly literature on 
counterpublics. It also seeks to contribute to existing research on Scandinavian 
discourse about Islam by studying content on Facebook—an important arena for 
news as well as public debate. 
The data consists of 15 news outlets’ Facebook posts (and linked articles) about 
Islam and a selection of citizens’ comments to these posts. The items were 
published during a seven-month period in 2018. In the analysis of the posts, genre, 
theme, sources, and sentiment towards Islam are examined. In the analysis of the 
comments, the prevalence of counterpublic discourses and the general sentiment 
the comments express towards Islam are investigated. Furthermore, the number of 




While Chapter 1 considered Facebook affordances that may contribute to shaping 
what is published by the news media and ordinary citizens, the following chapter 





Chapter 2: Socio-Political and Historical Context—Scandinavian 
Discourse on Islam 
The second chapter of this dissertation aims to describe in what way, and for what 
reasons, the Scandinavian countries—Norway, Sweden, and Denmark—despite their 
similarities, have had strikingly different debates relating to Islam, immigration, and 
integration. Drawing on secondary literature, the chapter describes that the Danish 
public sphere has been marked by Islam- and immigrant-negative attitudes to a high 
degree, that critical attitudes to Islam and immigration have been a relatively 
marginal phenomenon in the Swedish public sphere, and that the Norwegian public 
sphere has been in a position between the two (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012; 
Hovden & Mjelde, 2019). In line with a similar systems design,17 the chapter 
discusses potential contextual explanations for these differences emerging in three 
otherwise similar countries. As was noted in Chapter 1, the project does not attempt 
to suggest causal explanations for differences, as this is notoriously difficult and 
beyond the aim of the project. Rather, contextual factors that are deemed likely to 
have influenced developments are highlighted. 
It is worth noting that, although this is a study of discourse on Islam, the topics 
immigration and integration are for several reasons considered relevant for this 
contextual chapter. One reason is that Scandinavian Muslims live in Scandinavia 
primarily as a result of immigration or being born by immigrant parents with a 
Muslim background. Another is that public discourse on immigration, integration, 
and Islam is often interlinked. It can even be argued that the word “immigrant” has 
become synonymous with “Muslim immigrant” in public discourse (Yilmaz, 2016, p. 




17 Most similar systems design is an approach to comparative research that “seeks to identify the 
key features that are different among similar countries and which account for the observed 




immigration; people who express negative views of Muslims also generally favour 
reducing immigration (Pew Research Center, 2018a). 
The chapter begins by describing central similarities between the countries, 
reflected in their shared cultural history and welfare and media systems. It also 
describes how the Scandinavian populations have moved from being largely 
homogenous to more ethnically and culturally diverse. It then presents polls on how 
Scandinavians view Islam and Muslims. Next, it considers in more detail the quite 
different public, political, and media discourse on Islam, immigration and integration 
that has marked the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish public spheres. Then, the 
chapter discusses four contextual factors that may explain why and how these 
differences have emerged. Particular emphasis is put on the fact that radical right 
populist parties have had substantially varying influence in the three countries, and 
on how this can be explained. Towards the end of the chapter, hypotheses that are 
to be tested in the analysis of the Facebook posts and comments are formulated, in 
light of relevant Facebook affordances (described in chapter 1) and socio-political 
and historical factors (discussed in this chapter). 
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark—Three Similar Countries 
As described by Gripsrud (2019), the links between the Scandinavian countries go all 
the way back to Viking times, and political relations have existed through both 
unions and wars. The three languages have common roots in Old Norse, and people 
from the different countries can usually understand each other’s writing and 
speech. As all three countries had Lutheran churches with strong ties to 
states/governments, public religious lives have been similar. Located in the 
northernmost part of Europe, the countries have relatively speaking been largely 
ethnically homogenous until immigration started after the Second World War 




While the countries’ populations have become increasingly religiously diverse, a 
common Christian cultural heritage as well as strong shared secular values remains 
an important characteristic of Scandinavian populations (Lundby, Hjarvard, Lövheim, 
& Jernsletten, 2017, p. 438). The shared linguistic and religious heritage contributed 
to clear similarities in the emergence of civil society, which again led to similar 
political developments. Religious and social movements such as temperance and 
other idealistic associations, professional organisations, and trade unions developed 
in all three countries, particularly in the last half of the 19th century, and a high 
organisation rate has marked all three countries. Most of these organisations 
established sub-public spheres with their own print media, meeting places, rituals, 
and festivities, but were at the same time clearly linked to the general public sphere 
through representatives in the national assemblies and media (Gripsrud, 2019, p. 
132). Movements constituted by peasants’, workers’, and women’s organisations 
were among those that made their way into institutionalised negotiations and 
contributed to shaping the modern state (Lundby & Repstad, 2018, p. 17). 
Especially crucial was the development of strong socialist/social democratic labour 
movements. These gained a stronghold in national politics in all three countries: 
social democratic parties typically constituted single-party governments from the 
1930s to the 60s or 70s in all three countries (Gripsrud, 2019, p. 132). The Nordic 
welfare model (see the next subsection) was formed during this phase, with social 
democratic leadership in all three countries but with considerable cross-party 
support (Gripsrud, 2019, p. 132). The same was the case for public service 
broadcasting monopolies, which contributed substantially to building national 
cultural identity (Syvertsen, Enli, Mjøs, & Moe 2014). Governments in all three 
countries also supported a variety of national institutions and practitioners of the 
various arts through ambitious cultural policies. The governments have, in principle, 
facilitated for the population to be able to benefit from and take part in academic 




As explained by Gripsrud (2019), all these factors have been important in achieving 
high quality government and public institutions, and the countries stand out 
internationally with their low levels of corruption and high levels of social trust. Such 
traits characterise Scandinavia as a region and is a central part of an explanation for 
anything from relatively peaceful social relations, low crime rates, and general 
organisational, socio-economic efficiency (Gripsrud, 2019, pp. 132–133). A self- 
perception as liberal and open-minded is widespread in Scandinavia, and secularity 
is often taken for granted; less than 10% of Scandinavians have a strong religious 
self-identification (Lövheim, Jernsletten, Herbert, Lundby, & Hjarvard, 2018, p. 35). 
Furthermore, gender equality and small gaps between rich and poor are central 
values (Lundby & Repstad, 2018, p. 13). 
The Nordic welfare system 
In his seminal book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), Gøsta Esping- 
Andersen outlines a typology of 3 models of Western welfare states: (1) a liberal 
(Anglo-Saxon) model; (2) a conservative (continental European) model; and (3) a 
social democratic (Nordic) model. He called the third model social democratic 
because of the social democrats’ dominant force behind social reform in the 
Scandinavian countries. Rather than tolerating a dualism between state and market 
and between working class and middle class, the social democrats pursued a welfare 
state that would promote an equality of the highest standards, not an equality of 
minimal needs as pursued elsewhere (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 28). The Nordic 
model depends on strong states to provide public services and to redistribute 
income. In return for relatively high taxes, Scandinavians receive free public 
education, mostly free health care services, guaranteed paid leave from work for 
both mothers and fathers of infants, subsidised childcare, among other benefits 
(Lundby & Repstad, 2018, p. 16). 
Kildal and Kuhnle (2005) argue that although these programmes are instrumental 




the arrangements can be understood as expressions of principles, moral 
conceptions, and values. Brochmann and Hagelund (2012) describe the basic 
principles that characterise the Scandinavian welfare states as follows: (1) everyone 
must be entitled to benefits (universalism), (2) payments must not be random or 
smack of charity (the principle of justice), (3) there must be a connection between 
rights and obligations (the contribution ethic), (4) the strongest backs must bear the 
heaviest burdens (the distribution ethic), and (5) all who are able are in employment 
(the work ethic).18 Also of vital importance is the centralised collective bargaining 
that characterises Scandinavian labour market policy, which over time has led to the 
most egalitarian income structure in the capitalist world and is a key driver of 
economic equality as well as productivity (Moene, 2007). 
Since the early 1990s, a turn right in economic policy has left its marks on the 
welfare systems of both Sweden and Denmark (Gripsrud, 2019, p. 133). In Sweden, 
this shift is characterised by privatisation of areas like health and education as well 
as significant cuts in welfare budgets following an economic crisis around 1990. In 
Denmark, there has been an increasing focus upon “incentives” and the 
“deservingness” of recipients of welfare services—a system that particularly 
disfavours immigrants. While some of these pressures also apply to Norway, money 
made from oil has made the country able to maintain the original system to a 
greater extent (Gripsrud, 2019, p. 133). Wealth gaps, which traditionally have been 
relatively small, have increased over the last three decades, in Sweden more than in 
Denmark and Norway. This may increase the risk for social tensions, which counters 
the Scandinavian ideal of equality (Lundby & Repstad, 2018, p. 17). 
Due to immigration rising to unexpected levels in 2015 in relation to the so-called 
refugee crisis, the pressures on the Scandinavian welfare states have increased in 
 
 





recent years. Sweden is especially impacted, as it has admitted a particularly high 
number of refugees and asylum seekers (Furseth, 2018, p. 5). As described by 
Lövheim, Lindberg, et al. (2018, p. 182), the question of how to combine a situation 
of religious and cultural diversity with the core values in the Scandinavian welfare 
states of universalism, distribution, and egalitarianism is one of the most demanding 
challenges in contemporary Nordic politics (see Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012). 
The Nordic media system 
In Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) seminal study of media systems in Western countries, 
the Scandinavian countries are placed in the Democratic Corporatist/Northern 
Model, together with Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. Other researchers have argued that the Nordic media system is 
sufficiently distinct to be considered a model of its own. For instance, Syvertsen et 
al. (2014) emphasise the distinct organisation of media and communication that has 
evolved in the Nordic region. Characterised by a publicly supported but independent 
press, the Nordic countries have boasted the world’s highest readership figures. The 
strong public broadcasters have strived for enlightenment while maintaining a mass 
audience in the face of fierce competition. There has been political consensus 
around securing the whole population access to high-speed Internet services 
(Syvertsen et al., 2014, p. 1), and Internet and social media use is considerably 
higher in the Scandinavian countries compared to the EU average.19 A strong 
adherence to the principle of freedom of speech has been combined with 
comprehensive state interventions and support schemes (Syvertsen et al., 2014, p. 
1). 
 
The outcome is a media landscape marked by a public media sector with a high 
degree of legitimacy existing alongside a domestically, and to some extent globally, 







media and communications in the Nordic countries is characterised by a 
combination of four pillars: (1) universally available communication systems, (2) 
institutionalised editorial freedom, (3) the presence of an extensive cultural policy 
for the media and consensual policy-making, and (4) compromises between key 
stakeholders (Syvertsen et al., 2014, pp. 1–2). These organisational principles bear 
resemblance to the socioeconomic and political institutions that typically define the 
Nordic welfare state. Therefore, Syvertsen et al. (2014) argue that the Nordic media 
and communication systems can be described as a “Media Welfare State”. This 
media system is considered a cornerstone of Scandinavian democracy (Lundby & 
Repstad, 2018, p. 26). 
Also, Brüggeman, Engesser, Büchel, Humprecht, and Castro (2014) in their 
revisitation of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) typology and dimensions for classifying 
media systems find the Nordic countries included in the study (Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Finland) sufficiently homogenous to constitute a distinct (Northern) 
cluster, separate from the Central, Western, and Southern media systems. 
Brüggeman et al. (2014, p. 1056) describe the Northern cluster as characterised by 
highly professional journalism, an inclusive press market, powerful public 
broadcasting, generous press subsidies, and the lowest levels of ownership 
regulation and political parallelism among the four clusters. 
While there is evidence to suggest that the Nordic media system is sufficiently 
distinct to constitute its own cluster, there are two differences that may be relevant 
for differences in public discourse generally, and public discourse on Islam, more 
specifically. First, Denmark has historically had a lower newspaper readership and a 
stronger position for local free (advertisement-based) newspapers. Second, whereas 
Denmark’s leading tabloids B.T. and Ekstra Bladet are more similar to the German 
tabloid Bild and British The Sun, the Norwegian and Swedish tabloids have a 




journalism (Hovden, Mjelde, & Gripsrud, 2018, p. 331). Thus, they have been called 
“schizophrenic” newspapers—characterised by a balance of sensationalist and 
serious reporting (Eide, 1995). Hovden et al. argue (2018, p. 331) that “These 
differences suggest a somewhat more socially stratified public in Denmark and a 
stronger position for typical tabloid styles in public discourse”. 
Nordic media have been relatively successful in preserving their agenda-setting 
positions in the face of growing influence from social media, streaming services, and 
global content aggregators (Allern & Pollack, 2019, p. 1431). Still, the Nordic media 
model faces some significant challenges. As explained by Sjøvaag (2019), public 
service broadcasting is under attack from private media operators across the region, 
circulation and revenue are declining in the newspaper industry, and advertising has 
moved to global actors such as Facebook and Google. To address (perceived) threats 
from globalisation, digitalisation, and personalisation, policy makers continue to 
support intervention to retain the mixed system characterised by the coexistence of 
a public media sector with high legitimacy alongside successful commercial media. 
Still, the Nordic systems appear increasingly vulnerable, and a movement towards 
economic logic and more segmented markets show that these countries are taking 
on features typically associated with other Western media systems (Sjøvaag, 2019, 
pp. 33–34). 
The Scandinavian public spheres and freedom of speech 
The distinct features of the Scandinavian (and Nordic) welfare societies influence 
these countries’ public spheres. These particularities are marked by state 
intervention, support, and subsidies in all areas of the public sphere: in addition to 
commercial news outlets and public broadcasting, churches, mosques, political 
parties, and NGOs each receive state funding—the purpose being to stimulate the 




Freedom of expression is considered a central principle for a well-functioning public 
sphere (Kierulf & Rønning 2009), and all the Scandinavian countries have enshrined 
the principle in law for more than 150 years, Sweden’s 1766 freedom of expression 
law being the first in the world. The Norwegian Constitution has, since an 
amendment in 2004, required the government to facilitate an infrastructure for “an 
open and enlightened public discourse”. Still, there are legal limits to the freedom of 
expression, such as hate speech, threats, harassment, and discrimination (Lundby & 
Repstad, 2018, p. 25). 
While none of the three countries have laws prohibiting blasphemy (Kühle, Schmidt, 
Jacobsen, & Pettersson, 2018, pp. 94–95), 20 freedom to criticise religion may in 
practice be limited by fear of violent backlash. As shown by Elgvin and Rogstad 
(2017), Norwegian journalists and editors are becoming more reluctant to publish 
content that may provoke radical Islamists. Furthermore, as was touched on in 
Chapter 1, online debates (around Islam and immigration) are (perceived as) so 
harsh and polarised that those who express their opinion risk being met by incivility 
and hate speech, which in turn may cause people to shy away from such debates 
(Burkal & Veledar, 2018; Hagen, 2015). 
Increased religious diversity 
The Scandinavian religious landscapes have gone from being (relatively speaking) 
largely homogenous to slowly growing more diverse, especially since the 1970s, and 
the privileged position of the majority Evangelical Lutheran churches has been 
contested. Denmark is currently the only country to have a state church, a liberal 
“folk church”. Sweden dissolved its state church in 2000, while Norway cut the 
confessional ties to the Lutheran religion in 2012 and took further steps to separate 
 
20 Sweden repealed blasphemy clauses from the Criminal law in 1970, Norway in 2009, and 
Denmark in 2017. While Denmark’s repeal came relatively late, especially compared to Sweden, 
no one in Denmark had been sentenced for violating blasphemy clauses since the first half of the 
20th century. Attempts to bring the Muhammed cartoons to the courts for blasphemy charges 




state and church in 2017. Registered communities, both religious and secular, are 
publicly financed in all three countries. Although such arrangements enjoy broad 
political support, some politicians hold that it should be possible to deny funding to 
communities that violate human rights (Lundby & Repstad, 2018, p. 17). In general, 
the possibility for faith communities to be exempt from requirements in legislation, 
for instance related to gender equality and antidiscrimination, has become more 
limited over the years (Kühle et al., 2018, p. 97). 
Furseth (2018) argues that the Nordic countries are marked by religious complexity, 
i.e. contradictory trends of secularisation and increased visibility of religion that are 
taking place at different levels of society. This includes a growing secularisation in 
the Nordic populations, both differentiation and de-differentiation of religion at the 
state level, a growing presence of religion as a topic at the political level, a greater 
visibility of religion in the media (i.e. a greater focus on Islam), and a de-privatisation 
of religion at the level of civil society (Furseth, 2018, p. 16). 
Although a majority of the populations are affiliated with the majority churches, the 
Scandinavian countries are according to the World Values Survey among the most 
secular in the world (Lundby & Repstad, 2018, p. 20). Secularism has been 
particularly strong in Sweden, where fewer identify as religious than in Norway and 
Denmark (Lundby et al., 2017, p. 444). Compared to in 1988 when 9 out of 10 
Scandinavians were members of the majority churches (Lundby & Repstad, 2018, p. 
21), the corresponding figure was 6 of 10 of Swedes,21 7 of 10 Norwegians,22 and 3 
of 4 Danes23 in 2018. The proportion of the population who practices rites of 
passage is declining and the same applies to the number of people who identify as 










changing views among the majority population and, not least, by increased 
immigration of religious minorities (Lundby & Repstad, 2018, p. 21). Particularly the 
Muslim population has increased, and Islam is the second largest religion in all the 
three Scandinavian countries (Furseth, Ahlin, Ketola, Leis-Peters, & Sigurvinsson, 
2018, p. 51). 
Scandinavians’ Attitudes Towards Islam and Muslims 
As noted previously, a self-perception as liberal and open-minded is widespread in 
Scandinavia. This subsection examines to what extent this tolerance extends to 
Islam and Muslims. 
Generally, when compared to the rest of Europe, the Scandinavian countries appear 
quite tolerant. The Pew Research Center (2018a), based on a survey conducted in 15 
Western European countries from April to August 2017, found that Sweden had the 
lowest score of nationalist sentiment, anti-immigrant attitudes, and anti-Muslim and 
anti-Jewish sentiment in the region. On a scale of 0–10, where 0 indicated the least 
nationalist, anti-immigrant, and anti-religious minority, the median result for 
Sweden was 1.2. The score for Norway was 2.5, the same as France. Only Sweden 
and the Netherlands (2.3) had lower scores than Norway and France. Denmark, with 
a median score of 2.7, followed next with the same score as Belgium. Austria, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK had scores 
between 2.9 and 4.1, i.e. they were found to hold stronger nationalist, anti- 
immigrant, and anti-religious minority attitudes than the Scandinavian countries. 
Considering that Western Europe is more accepting of religious and ethnic diversity 
than Central and Eastern Europeans are (Pew Research Center, 2018b), the three 
Scandinavian populations, especially Swedes, can be considered relatively tolerant 
towards immigrants and religious minorities when compared to general European 
attitudes. At the same time, a particularly substantial proportion of Danes hold 
nationalist, anti-immigrant, and anti-religious minority attitudes. 25% of Danes 




European median of 22% who received a score in the same range. In comparison, 
19% of Norwegians and 8% of Swedes scored between 5.01 and 10. 
Focusing on Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, Lövheim, Jernsletten, et al. (2018) 
present a survey undertaken in April 2015, showing that Scandinavians express 
support for equal rights to practice religion but also scepticism towards public 
expressions of religion. Generally, Norwegians and Danes are more sceptical 
towards public expressions of Islam than Swedes are. More than 70% of 
respondents in the survey agree that all religions should be respected, and more 
than half of Norwegians and Danes and nearly two-thirds of Swedes agree that all 
religious groups should be entitled to the same rights in society. Still, while around 
80% of Scandinavians agree that a cross, church tower, or other Christian symbol 
may be visible on buildings in public space, support for minarets being visible in 
public space is considerably lower: about 60% in Norway and Sweden and 56% in 
Denmark. Support for signs showing the location of a mosque is, however, higher 
(75%) (Lövheim, Jernsletten et al., 2018, p. 37). 
Most Scandinavians are sceptical towards the hijab being worn by hospital staff, 
police, news presenters, and teachers, while a majority in all three countries think 
that pupils in school should be allowed to wear the hijab. Norwegians are more 
negative towards the hijab being worn in the above-mentioned public settings than 
Danes and Swedes are, while Swedes are the least negative (Lövheim, Jernsletten, et 
al., pp. 37–38). More Danes than Norwegians and Swedes, however, hold that 
“Muslim women who live in their country should not be allowed to wear any 
religious clothing” (22%, 19%, and 16%, respectively) (Pew Research Center, 2018a). 
At the same time, fewer Norwegians (26%) than Danes (38%) hold that Muslim 
women who live in their country should be allowed to wear any religious clothing of 




Muslim women who live in in their country should be allowed to wear any religious 
clothing (Pew Research Center, 2018a). 
More than three quarters of Scandinavians agree that religion leads to conflict 
rather than peace (Lövheim, Jernsletten, et al., 2018, p. 40). At the same time, a 
comparatively low proportion of Scandinavians, between 16% (Sweden) and 24% 
(Denmark), believe that the teachings of some religions promote violence (Pew 
Research Center, 2018a). The proportion who said the teachings of some religions 
promote violence and named Islam in particular was 8% in Sweden, 10% in Norway, 
and 16% in Denmark. The typical attitude was rather that some people (ab)use 
religion to justify violent actions (Pew Research Center, 2018a). Similarly, the 
proportion who said that all/most/many Muslims in their country support violent 
extremist groups was 11% in Sweden, 13% in Norway, and 18% in Denmark (Pew 
Research Center, 2018a). The percent of non-Muslims in Scandinavia who agreed 
with the statement “Due to the number of Muslims here, I feel like a stranger in my 
own country” ranged from 14% in Sweden to 21% in Denmark, while Norway was 
again found between the two neighbour countries (Pew Research Center, 2018a). 9 
out of 10 Scandinavians are willing to accept Muslims as neighbours, while 8 out of 
10 are willing to accept Muslims as members of their family. The percent who said 
yes was similar in the three countries. These answers, and the fact that the 
Scandinavian countries score relatively low on nationalist, anti-immigrant, and anti- 
minority religious sentiments (Pew Research Center, 2018a), seem to indicate quite 
positive attitudes towards Islam and Muslims, although as we have seen, scepticism 
towards public displays of (the Islamic) religion, such as wearing religious clothing, is 
common, especially in Norway and Denmark. 
Other responses, however, seem to indicate more widespread negative attitudes 
towards Islam. For instance, 43% of Danes, 40% of Norwegians, and 34% of Swedes 




Research Center, 2018a). Similar, albeit somewhat higher, numbers were found by 
Lövheim, Jernsletten, et al. (2018) in response to the question “Do you consider 
Islam a threat to Danish/Norwegian/Swedish culture?”: 52% of Danes, 47% of 
Norwegians, and 38% of Swedes answered yes to this question. These numbers are 
high compared to views on other religions: around 11% of Scandinavians agree that 
Judaism is a threat to their culture, and 6% to 8% agree that Christianity represents 
such a threat (Lövheim, Jernsletten, et al., 2018, p. 41). 
With respect to how Scandinavian attitudes on Islam and Muslims have developed 
over time, polls typically indicate that they have become less negative, although 
there are signs of a negative trend in recent years in Sweden and Denmark. In 
Denmark there is perhaps even signs of attitudes turning back to where they were 
two to three decades ago. Due to the lack of polls that compare developments in 
the three countries, the following paragraphs describe findings from relevant single- 
country polls. 
Danish national election studies show that the proportion who agreed that Muslim 
countries constitute a threat to Denmark’s security in the long run declined from 
68% in 1990 to 40% in 1994, before rising gradually to 48% in 2007 (Stubager, 
Hansen, Callesen, Leed, & Enevoldsen, 2016, p. 41).24 As for responses to whether 
“Immigrants represent a grave threat to our national character”, Danish voters were 
in 1987/88 split in two, 48% agreeing and 48% disagreeing. From 1987 and until 
2005 (except for in 1990) there were slightly more Danish voters who disagreed 
than agreed with this statement. In 2007 and 2011, the gap in favour of those 
disagreeing increased significantly, and in 2011 the difference reached a high of 22 
percentage points. In 2015, however, the answers were more like those in the 1990s 









favour of those disagreeing that immigrants represent a grave threat to national 
character (Stubager et al., 2016, p. 42). 
In Sweden, 19% completely agreed that immigrants should have the right to practice 
their religion freely in 1993. This number reached a high in 2015 with 35% but 
declined in the aftermath of the refugee crisis to 26% in 2016 and 24% in 2017. This 
number is, however, still higher than it was before 2011 (Demker, 2018, p. 398). 
Hellevik and Hellevik (2017) looked at Norwegians’ attitudes towards Muslim 
congregations in the country, finding that while there in 1995 were 41 percentage 
points more who disliked than liked that Muslim congregations existed in Norway, 
the difference had shrunk to 6 percentage points in favour of those disliking Muslim 
congregations in 2015. In another study, Norwegian responses to the statement “I 
am sceptical of persons with a Muslim faith” did not display more negative attitudes 
after the 2015 refugee crisis than in the years prior to the crisis (Brekke & Mohn, 
2018, p. 74). As such, while the polls of Swedes and Danes indicate a negative trend 
in recent years, a similar development is not found in the Norwegian population. 
It is worth stressing that public opinion does not necessarily convert into public 
discourse. This has been particularly clear in Sweden; while 38% of Swedes consider 
Islam a threat to Swedish culture (Lövheim, Jernsletten, et al., 2018, p. 41) there 
has, as we shall see in the following subsection, only been marginal semblances of 
this in the Swedish public sphere. The following subsection describes Scandinavian 
discourse on Islam, the focus being on comparing the three countries. 
Scandinavian Discourse on Islam 
While the Scandinavian countries have had similar public religious lives, civil society 
development, welfare systems, and media systems, national debates around Islam 
and the oft-associated topics immigration and integration have been marked by 
noticeable differences. These are addressed in this subsection by drawing on 




particular attention is paid to how Islam (and associated topics) have been covered 
in the mass media. Due to the comparative focus of the dissertation, the subsection 
mainly draws on the studies that have investigated differences between the three 
countries’ media discourse on immigration and Islam (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019; 
Lundby et al., 2018), although insights from other important studies are also taken 
into account. In addition to media discourse, public discourse and political discourse 
is considered (although political discourse is mostly discussed in the next subsection 
in relation to radical right populist parties’ influence in three countries). Towards the 
end of this subsection, recent developments are discussed in light of how the 2015 
refugee crisis impacted national debates around Islam, immigration, and integration, 
notably in Sweden. 
Most existing Scandinavian research on media and political discourse on Islam and 
immigration has been qualitative text analyses that have given valuable insights into 
the participants’ rhetoric, discourses, and perceptions of the debate (Brox, 2009; 
Eriksen, 2011; Hagelund, 2004a, 2004b; Stærk, 2011). This literature has found that 
debates around Islam and immigration are polarised, emotional, heated, and that 
the participants often feel bypassed and misunderstood (Figenschou & Beyer, 
2014a, p. 24), although this polarisation is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
Sweden compared to in Norway and Denmark (Eide & Nikunen, 2011). Relevant 
literature has also reported that a fierce criticism of the debate around Islam and 
immigration is that it is curbed by a “politically correct elite” who promotes 
immigration and multiculturalism as a societal good and hinders all critique and 
debate (Hagelund, 2004b; Hellström, & Hervik, 2014; Törnberg & Wahlström, 2018). 
From the other side, public discourse around Islam and immigration has been 





In line with the voluminous academic literature that has studied how Western 
media depict Muslims (and non-western immigrants) (e.g. Ahmed & Matthes, 2017; 
Axner, 2015; Baker et al., 2013; Hussain, 2000; Said, 1997), most studies of 
Scandinavian media have found that the coverage is negative and serves to 
(re)produce stereotypes about Muslims (e.g. Axner, 2015; Horsti, 2008; Lindstad & 
Fjellstad, 1999, 2005; Yilmaz, 2016). Furthermore, studies have found that (religious 
and ethnic) minorities have been systemically underrepresented as sources in the 
media (Hognestad & Lamark, 2017; Madsen, 2005; Strand, Lindebjerg, & Bjune, 
2018). Researchers have, however, also found tendencies of more complex media 
representations of minorities (Eide & Nikunen, 2011; Lindstad & Fjeldstad, 2010; 
Thorbjørnsrud & Figenschou, 2016), and that minority voices have been represented 
to a substantial extent (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014a; Hovden & Mjelde, 2019; Strand, 
Nervik, & Nilsen, 2016). Stokke (2012, p. 253) explains that Scandinavian debates on 
Islam have gone from being predominantly negative to acknowledging a wider range 
of voices to such a degree that some researchers argue that the public sphere has 
become multicultural. This is not only evident in newspapers, but in all kinds of 
media—films, digital media, magazines etc. (Lundby et al., 2018, p. 232). That said, 
this inclusiveness seems to be accompanied by an increased politicisation and 
polarisation, as we will see in the following paragraphs. 
Lundby et al. (2018) analyse how religion is covered in Nordic newspapers in 1988, 
1998, and 2008 and find a growing interest in covering religion driven primarily by 
an increase in articles about Islam. Looking at the Nordic countries (including Finland 
and Iceland), the authors found that Christianity was by far the most covered 
religion during the period, but it declined from being represented in 78% of the 
articles on religion in 1988 to 61% in 2008. Attention paid to Islam, however, more 
than tripled in the same period (from 4% to 13%). This trend is more striking if one 
focuses on the more religiously diverse Scandinavian countries. The Danish 




in 1988 and 58% in 2008. In comparison, Swedish newspapers covered Islam in 21% 
of articles about religion in 2008, which was higher than the 13% of Norwegian 
articles about religion that covered Islam. The percent of articles about Islam that 
were main articles (rather than middle-sized articles or notes) also increased in all 
the three countries, underlining the increased interest in covering Islam (Lundby et 
al., 2018, p. 205). 
While studying the years 1988, 1998, and 2008 cannot necessarily conclude that any 
linear development is valid (Furseth, 2018, p. 327), the reliability of Lundby et al.’s 
(2018) findings is strengthened by other research. Hovden and Mjelde (2019) in 
their study of Scandinavian newspapers’ coverage of immigration from 1970–2016 
find that 15% of all articles on immigration in each country explicitly speak about 
Islam, with clear growth since the 1990s. After 2010, a quarter of all Norwegian and 
Danish items and one in five Swedish articles about immigration mention Islam 
(Hovden & Mjelde, 2019, pp. 144–145). The politicisation of the issue is seen in how 
immigration increasingly has been treated as a partisan-political issue, a trend 
coinciding with the rise in national politician sources, decline in civil service sources, 
and growth in references to experts and media professionals (Hovden & Mjelde, 
2019, pp. 148, 154). The increasing political focus on Islam also been observed in 
Scandinavian parliamentary debates from 1988–2008, albeit to the highest degree 
in Denmark and to the lowest degree in Sweden, with Norway in a position between 
the two (Lövheim, Lindberg, et al., 2018). 
There is also empirical evidence showing increasing focus on debate items at the 
expense of news items in the coverage of Islam (Lundby et al., 2018) and 
immigration (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019). While one possible explanation for this is the 
general development in journalism marked by a shift from news to debate 
(Mathisen & Morlandstø, 2016), the significant increase in debate items may also 




Scandinavian public spheres. In 1988, 25% of articles about Islam were debate items 
in Denmark, while only 2% of articles were debate items in Norway and Sweden. In 
2008, the figure was 57% in Denmark, 12% in Norway, and 27% in Sweden. 
Prominent issues discussed were the hijab and gender equality, ritual slaughtering 
of animals, holidays in the educational system, and other issues of accommodation, 
assimilation, and integration (Lundby et al., 2018, pp. 205–207). 
Similarly, Hovden and Mjelde (2019) describe a Scandinavian trend marked by an 
increase in debate items in newspaper coverage of immigration: while debate items 
constituted one in five articles about immigration in the 1970s, this was true for 
more than half of the articles from 2010–2016. Interestingly, the authors find that 
while Norwegian and Danish newspaper debates have been increasingly marked by 
letters to the editor, the growth in debate genres in Sweden has mainly been in 
editorials and columns, indicating that Swedish newspapers have had a more 
restrictive gatekeeper role and to a lesser degree included ordinary citizens’ voices 
in the immigration debate (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019, p. 143). Immigrants have been 
more prominent sources in the Swedish media than in the Norwegian and Danish 
media, however. They were a source in a fourth of Swedish articles about 
immigration from 1970–2016 and about in a fifth of Norwegian and Danish articles 
(Hovden & Mjelde, 2019, p. 148). 
Important for understanding variations between the countries is that the 
Scandinavian newspapers frame immigration differently (Hellstöm & Hervik, 2014), 
i.e. they emphasise different aspects, which therefore highlights (or even impacts) 
their salience (Entman, 1993). To frame immigrants as victims, e.g. of persecution 
and poor living conditions, war, and racism, has been the most prevalent type of 
frame in newspaper coverage from 1970–2016 in all the three countries, but most 
so in Sweden. 71% of all Swedish articles contain a victim frame, compared to 52% 




2019, p. 151). There has been a growth in the number of items that, on the one 
hand, frame immigrants as victims in Sweden, a decline in Denmark, while there has 
been no clear trend in Norway. To frame immigration as a threat, on the other hand, 
has been much more pronounced in Danish newspapers than in Norwegian and 
Swedish ones. While around one in five Norwegian and Swedish items framed 
immigration as a threat between 1970 and 2016, this was true for half of Danish 
items (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019, p. 152). In fact, Hovden and Mjelde (2019) find that 
the threat frame, marked in particular by an increased focus on threats to social 
cohesion and public order, has been the dominant frame in Danish immigration 
coverage since the mid-1980s (pp. 153–154). Similarly, Boe and Hervik (2008) 
describe Danish media’s dominant discourse on integration as “saturated with 
nationalist ideology that is used to define and manage who is included and who is 
excluded from the nation” (pp. 214–215). 
As such, the difference between Danish and Swedish media coverage of immigration 
and Islam is particularly clear. Plainly illustrating the differences between Danish and 
Swedish (media) discourse on Islam, Hellström and Hervik (2014) found that while 
Islam was constructed as the primary threat in Danish newspapers, the right-wing 
populist party Sweden Democrats filled this role in Swedish newspapers. 
The differences between the three countries’ media discourse on Islam and 
immigration are reflected in how national authorities have approached integration. 
The contrast between Sweden and Denmark is particularly evident, as the 
governments in the two countries have sought to raise their populations in different 
liberal projects (Brochmann, 2018, p. 93). In Sweden, the dominant view has been 
that the majority population should adapt to the minorities to facilitate a 
multicultural society within the frames of liberal democracy. In Denmark, however, 
it has been the dominant view that the minority population should be the ones to 




2018, p. 93). Norway is in a middle position when it comes to ideology and policy on 
immigration and integration. Ambivalence has often characterised the Norwegian 
approach to these issues, at least until 2013, when the right-wing populist Progress 
Party entered government and contributed to taking policy in a more restrictive 
direction (Brochmann, 2018, p. 93). 
In Denmark and Norway there is a higher focus on the duties of immigrants than is 
the case in Sweden. What are referred to as duties in Denmark are in Sweden 
consistently referred to as rights and incentives (Brochmann, 2018, p. 94). These 
differences are related to the different explanations that are given for challenges 
with integration: while Swedish authorities have highlighted structural 
discrimination and (troubling) attitudes among the majority population to explain 
problems with integration, Danish authorities have focused on low work incentives 
due to (overly) generous welfare arrangements (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012). 
An illustrative example of how the different emphasis on duties and rights have 
marked the countries’ approach to immigration and integration is seen in debates 
(and policies) on citizenship acquisition (Borevi, Jensen, & Mouritsen 2017). While 
Denmark since 2001 has moved towards increasingly substantial conditionalities and 
easier loss of nationality, Sweden has had a very liberal regime with few demands 
placed on applicants. Norway’s nationality law falls somewhere in the middle, 
entailing both restrictive and liberal elements. While Danish debates on 
naturalisation have been linked to worthiness, cultural assimilation, security, and 
the view of citizenship as something sacred, which should be difficult to acquire, 
Norwegian debates have been less harsh and focused on that new citizens should be 
able to belong and have undivided political loyalty.25 Similar debates in Sweden have 
been almost non-existent until very recently. No national symbolism has been 
 
25 Norway did not pass legislation allowing dual citizenship (except for in exceptional cases) until 





attached to citizenship acquisition, and naturalisation has been an easy, mainly 
administrative affair (Borevi et al., 2017, pp. 7–8). 
These differences also characterise public discourse on Islam and immigration more 
generally. In the Swedish public sphere, Islam- and immigration-friendly attitudes 
have been dominant, and those who have raised concerns about the hegemonic 
discourse have typically been met with moral condemnation (Brochmann & 
Hagelund, 2012). Unlike in Norway and Denmark, the idea of structural racism has 
been ubiquitous in Swedish public discourse (Andersen, 2019; Dahl, 2019). This is 
different from the Norwegian public sphere, where accusations of racism typically 
have been limited to describe marginal out-groups (Andersen, 2019, p. 204), and 
where general attitudes and practices in the general population has rarely been 
termed racist but rather “indecent” (Hagelund, 2003a, p. 258). The accusation of 
racism is substantially more excluding than accusations of indecency, as it places not 
only the attitudes of the Islam/immigration-critic but their very identity, “outside of 
social norms and socially acceptable behaviour” (Every, 2013, p. 679). 
Differences in the Scandinavian countries’ public discourse on Islam can also be 
illustrated by considering freedom of expression in relation to Islam. While freedom 
of expression is considered a central element of a well-functioning public sphere in 
all the three countries, the countries’ debate climates around Islam have been 
marked by different understandings of how freedom of expression is best practiced. 
In Denmark, the sphere of legitimate controversy (Hallin, 1986) around Islam has 
been extensive, meaning that few opinions and actors have been pushed into the 
sphere of deviance. This is a contrast from the more restricted sphere of legitimate 
controversy that has marked Swedish discourse around Islam. Danish debate on 
Islam has to the largest extent been marked by “absolute freedom” or “liberal 
fundamentalism”, i.e. seeing no limits to the freedom of expression, and viewing 




immigrants) need to learn to “live with Western values”. From this perspective, the 
best way to combat extremism is to open for all kinds of extreme opinions, even if 
they may be considered racist or insulting (Eide, Kjølstad, Naper, 2013, p. 188). For 
instance, studying discussions on the Muhammad cartoon crisis,26 Boe and Hervik 
(2008, p. 231) describe (and strongly criticise) the Danish approach to the 
publications as “integration through ridicule.” 
Swedish debate on Islam and immigration has to the largest extent been influenced 
by the view that freedom of expression should be accompanied with tolerance, i.e. 
practicing “freedom with responsibility” or “liberal pragmatism”, taking other 
people’s sensitivities into consideration, but still defending the right to full freedom 
of expression (Eide et al., 2013, p. 188). Generally, strict norms for “decency” long 
marked Swedish discussions about these topics (Brochmann, 2018, p. 94). 
Corresponding with the limited room for legitimate discussions, immigrant- and 
Islam-critical actors have largely been ignored and silenced. This difference from the 
Danish approach is well illustrated by the different handlings of the Muhammad 
cartoon crisis. While Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Liberals) 
dismissed the idea that the publication of the Muhammad caricatures should have 
any political implications or reactions, Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt 
(Moderates) openly stated that he, as Prime Minister, holds a responsibility for 
securing mutual respect and peaceful co-existence between Muslims and non- 
Muslims in Swedish society (Larsson & Lindekilde, 2009, p. 372). While Reinfeldt had 
the population behind him in his approach, the Danish government’s reaction split 
the population into two almost equally large groups—one approving the strategy of 
“inaction” and the other viewing the government partially responsible for 




26 The crisis began after the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published cartoons that depicted 




Norway’s ambivalent middle position in these debates is illustrated by the intense 
discussions between proponents of a liberal fundamentalist take on freedom of 
speech and proponents of a liberal pragmatist approach. This metadebate was 
particularly central in the Norwegian public sphere after the Oslo extreme-right 
terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011, when Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people, most 
of them members of the Labour Party’s youth organisation. Where some argued for 
what Eide et al. (2013, pp. 190–191) labelled the pressure cooker discourse, others 
endorsed the responsibility discourse. The supporters of the pressure cooker 
discourse advocate that all opinions, including “unacceptable” (and illegal) ones, for 
instance hateful expressions on race or religion, should be heard so that they can be 
“debated to death”. Often these proponents criticise the news media for being 
politically correct and excluding certain groups, notably radical right-wing voices 
(Eide et al., 2013, p. 191). In contrast, proponents of the responsibility discourse 
argue that allowing extremist voices to be heard can lead to a normalisation of these 
ideas. From this view, self-censorship or a degree of sensitivity is advisable (Eide et 
al., 2013, p. 191) 
It has been found that the Norwegian media adopted a temporary responsibility 
discourse in the months after the 2011 terrorist attacks, as immigration was covered 
to a lower extent and also less negatively than it had been in the period before the 
attacks (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014b). Furthermore, news outlets implemented 
interventionist moderation policies to regulate online user comments (Ihlebæk et 
al., 2013). At the same time, the attacks opened mainstream media debate to 
online, deviant anti-Islamic actors who previously were generally silenced and 
ignored, as these actors became highly newsworthy due to the fact that the terrorist 
had been active in anti-Islamic online arenas, and that there were calls to shine a 
light on the extreme ideology that had inspired the attacks (Figenschou & Beyer, 
2014b, p. 445). When giving these deviant actors a voice, editors were, however, 




other guests to discuss the extreme view in television debates or by inviting other 
op-ed writers to join the conversation (Figenschou & Thorbjørnsrud, 2017, pp. 952– 
954). 
Like in the other Scandinavian countries, (the limits of) freedom of expression was 
heavily discussed in Norway in relation with the Muhammed cartoon crisis. It caused 
significant controversy when then Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre 
(Labour) apologised on Arabic TV-channels al Jazeera and al Arabiya for the 
publication of the caricatures but said there was nothing he could do to instruct the 
Norwegian press.27 While Støre met fierce criticism at home for his apology, many 
also thought that he had done the right thing. According to a poll, only a quarter of 
Norwegians completely supported publishing the Muhammed caricatures in January 
2006. Five years later, in January 2011, a poll found that more than half of the 
population in retrospect supported publishing the caricatures.28 In 2018, when social 
commentator Qasim Ali argued for banning caricatures of Muhammed, his views 
were criticised by political parties from the far left to the far right of the political 
spectrum.29 As such, while the period after the 2011 Oslo terrorist attacks is a 
notable exception, there seems to have been a movement in both attitudes and 
discourse on freedom of expression vis-à-vis Islam in Norway, from a relatively 
pragmatist towards a more liberal fundamentalist stance. 
Recent developments 
While we have seen that Swedish discourse generally has been more amicable 
towards Muslims and immigrants than Norwegian, and, in particular, Danish 
discourse, the Swedish public sphere has been marked by a redefinition of the 











that previously were considered deviant have become legitimate. A growing 
number, even among mainstream journalists, have argued that there is some truth 
to the claim that immigration has been off limits for serious discussion in the 
Swedish public sphere for fear of being labelled racist (Truedson, 2016).30 The 
Swedish public sphere has in a short period of time become more similar to its 
Scandinavian neighbours in terms of what is considered legitimate speech and the 
level of conflict that marks discourse on immigration and Islam (Brochman, 2018, p. 
94). 
The change in debate climate was spurred on by the high number of people who 
applied for asylum in Sweden in 2015. 162,877 people applied for asylum, compared 
to 31,145 and 21,315 in Norway and Denmark, respectively—which also in these 
countries constituted a massive increase from previous years (Hernes, 2018, p. 
1312). In an oft-referenced speech from September 2015, Swedish Prime Minister, 
Stefan Löfven (Social Democrats), had stated that “My Europe does not build 
walls”.31 In November 2015, however, less than three months after his optimistic 
speech, Löfven’s message had changed. He explained that it was no longer possible 
for Sweden to keep receiving asylum seekers to the same extent as before, and that 
policies unfortunately had to become more restrictive.32 The Social Democratic-led 
government and centre-right opposition parties agreed on a broad compromise to 
address challenges associated with asylum and integration. This was followed up by 
measures such as restricting the rights for permanent residence and family 




30 In Denmark, and in Norway to some extent, one has talked about “Swedish conditions” for some 
time—referring both to an unwillingness to debate issues related to Islam, immigration, and 
integration as well as the negative development in certain immigrant-dense areas of Sweden, 






Because of the crisis and the response to it, immigration and integration policies 
were pushed to the top of the political agenda (Hernes, 2018, p. 1305). 
While the Scandinavian press’ coverage of the refugee crisis stood out as more 
positive than the European press in general (Norway, and, especially, Sweden, more 
so than Denmark), humanitarian perspectives became less prominent as the crisis 
continued (Hovden et al., 2018). In general, the refugee crisis seems to have 
expanded the sphere of legitimate controversy by making immigrant-critical 
opinions more acceptable. As has been indicated, this was particularly noticeable in 
Sweden, whose largely mild debate climate in relation to immigration, integration, 
and Islam had been dominant prior to 2015. In the years prior to the refugee crisis, 
focus on negative aspects of immigration, especially related to (Islamic) culture, had 
largely come from the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats. Conversely, as a 
result of the refugee crisis lifting immigration and integration to the top of the 
political agenda, the two major parties, the Social Democrats and the Moderate 
Party, started to compete over who had the most restrictive policies. Moreover, 
questions pertaining to religion, notably Islam, became more discussed in 
parliament as well as in the broader public sphere (Demker, 2018, p. 393). Reflecting 
the changed approach by political leaders, the Swedish public’s attitudes towards 
immigration changed substantially in a negative direction from 2015 to 2016. The 
SOM Institute, which has mapped the Swedish public’s attitude towards receiving 
refugees since the 1990, found that while 40% supported a more restrictive line 
towards receiving refugees in 2015, the number was 52% the next year—the largest 
increase since 1990 (Demker, 2018, pp. 393–394). 
Summing up this subsection, we have seen that the Scandinavian countries, 
particularly Denmark and Sweden, have been marked by considerable differences 
with respect to discourse on Islam, immigration, and integration. Danish 




Swedish newspapers have largely framed immigrants as victims (Hovden & Mjelde, 
2019). Similarly, while the Danish authorities have generally attributed problems 
with integration to a lack of incentives caused by the (overly generous) welfare 
state, Swedish authorities have highlighted structural racism and discrimination 
(Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012; Brochmann, 2018). Variations are also manifested in 
different views of freedom of speech vis-à-vis Islam, where the “integration through 
ridicule” approach (Boe & Hervik, 2008, p. 231) has dominated in Denmark, while a 
liberal pragmatist approach has been leading in Sweden (Larsson & Lindekilde, 
2009). On all these points, Norway has been in a position between its two neighbour 
countries. 
In the following subsections, contextual factors that are deemed likely to have 
contributed to the different national debates around Islam and immigration are 
discussed. We start with the varying influence that radical right populist parties have 
had in the three countries. This factor is considered particularly influential and is 
therefore given substantial attention. 
Radical Right Populist Parties and Their Varying Influence 
No longer characterised by a stable five-party system (consisting of a 
communist/left-wing, social-democratic, agrarian, liberal, and conservative party), 
the Scandinavian countries have seen the emergence of not only Christian parties 
and Green parties—but also of radical right populist parties (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014, 
p. 215). Drawing on previous research, it is argued that the influence (or lack 
thereof) from radical right populist parties (RRPPs) and how established parties and 
news media have positioned themselves in relation to RRPPs (Dahlström & 
Esaiasson, 2013; Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008; Heinze, 2018; Strömbäck, 
Jungar, & Dahlberg, 2017) have been crucial for the different Scandinavian debates 




It is also discussed how the RRPPs have used (social) media to impact public 
discourse on Islam and immigration. Communication has been pointed to as a vital 
aspect of RRPPs success, and this has, among other things, been linked to the 
media’s preference for, and receptivity towards, populist actors (Aalberg & de 
Vreese, 2017, p. 3). At the same time, the cultural and ideological gap between 
radical-right actors and mainstream editors and journalists has been particularly 
wide (Benson, 2013). In recent years, RRPPs have surpassed the social democratic 
party-family in becoming the most quoted party family in articles about immigration 
in Scandinavian newspapers (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019, p. 150). The right-wing 
populist parties’ impact has also been striking in the online realm, where they, like 
other far-right actors, have been effective in using social media to spread their 
messages (Larsson, 2014, 2017; Lorentzen, 2014). 
The Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), the Progress Party 
(Fremskrittspartiet, FrP), and the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD), 
which today are the largest RRPPs in each of the Scandinavian countries, all 
emphasise national and/or Christian values and heritage in their party programmes 
and in parliamentary debates (Lövheim, Lindberg, et al., 2018, pp. 169–171.). They 
share a scepticism to immigration, driven both by economic and cultural concerns. 
Cultural concerns are expressed particularly in relation with Islam, which is 
considered a threat to national values and traditions. Having said that, there are 
variations between the RRPPs. For instance, the FrP has been described as a milder 
and less nativist version of similar parties elsewhere (Jupskås, 2015a, p. 83). All the 
three Scandinavian radical right populist parties’ communication styles are, 
however, characterised by what scholars on populism have described as complete 
populism, which include (1) reference and appeals to the people, (2) anti-elitism, 




In the following, the Scandinavian RRPPs are addressed on a country-by-country 
basis, focusing on their (lack of) influence on the politicisation33 and culturalisation 
of immigration in their respective countries. 
Denmark 
Several scholars have noted that a shift in Danish public discourse on immigration 
occurred in the mid-1980s (Kitschelt, 1995; Rydgren, 2010; Yilmaz, 2016). Yilmaz 
(2016, p. 59) describes this shift as one from focusing on immigrants’ social 
problems to their culture, which was primarily expressed in relation to the “Muslim 
threat”. In this period, immigration as a threat to national identity became a central 
element in debates about immigration, and “immigrant” became synonymous with 
“Muslim immigrant” (Yilmaz, 2016, p. 59). From focusing on the “respectful 
integration of immigrants” and immigrants’ rights in the early 1980s, the second half 
of the decade was characterised by a focus on the duties of immigrants, “refugees of 
convenience”, and the “Muslim threat” (Yilmaz, 2016, p. 59). The Danish Progress 
Party (from which a faction of members in 1995 founded the DF) and related actors 
had a strong focus on anti-immigration themes in this period (Rydgren, 2010, pp. 
58–63), and the populist far-right was essential in politicising and culturalising 
immigration (Yilmaz, 2012, p. 368). The increasing salience of immigrants’ culture in 
public discourse was also reflected in opinion polls: while 23% agreed with the 
statement “Immigrants constitute a threat to our national character” in 1985, 
around 40% agreed in 1987 (Madsen, 2000, p. 87). 
Because of a significant increase in the number of asylum seekers, from only 332 in 
1983 to nearly 9,000 in 1985 (Jønsson & Petersen, 2010, p. 163), 34 this was an apt 
 
33 The term politicisation is here used to refer to immigration becoming an issue marked by 
antagonism between significant parties (Bjørklund, 1999, p. 139) and as an issue affecting how 
people vote. 
34 Denmark had prior to the increasing arrivals adopted a new Aliens Act (1983), which 
considerably liberalised the rights of asylum seekers. Several international observers at the time 




time for actors critical of immigration to politicise the issue (Rydgren, 2004, p. 492). 
The radical right populist Progress Party’s anti-immigration rhetoric proved 
effective, as it coincided with the—from a Danish perspective—dramatic increase in 
the number of asylum seekers (Rydgren, 2004, p. 492) and with a change in the type 
of immigration, from labour market immigrants to humanitarian immigrants 
(Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012). The Danish media quickly started covering these 
trends, and content analyses have shown that they framed immigration largely as a 
problem (Gaasholt & Togetby, 1995; Hussain, 2000), with an increasing focus on 
immigrants’ culture (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019; Yilmaz, 2016). 
 
Although the politicisation (and culturalisation) of immigration became visible in 
public discourse in the mid-1980s, immigration remained a relatively insignificant 
influence on how people voted. While a high number of Danes started seeing 
immigrants as a threat to Danish national character from the mid-1980s (Madsen, 
2000, p. 87), only 4% of the electorate mentioned immigration as the number one 
issue affecting how they voted in the 1987 election. In 2001, however, the number 
had risen to 20%, and about half of voters mentioned immigration as one of the 
most crucial issues affecting their decision about how to vote (Yilmaz, 2016, p. 60). 
The Danish People’s Party (DF), which emerged as a much more stable and serious 
political actor than the Progress Party (Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & 
Sitter, 2010, p. 415), was central in making the issue salient in elections (Rydgren, 
2004, p. 481).35 
As explained by Rydgren (2010, p. 61), the DF’s frames around immigration became 
hegemonic in political as well as mass media discourse in the mid-1990s. Andersen, 
Larsen, and Møller (2009, p. 279) describe that the DF managed to launch a new 
 
Since then, though, the country has consistently implemented restrictions with regard to both 
asylum and immigration (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2017, p. 99). 
 
35 The Danish Association, a far-right circle of intellectuals, also played a central role in politicising 




political project in the 1990s, which combined three elements: (1) maintenance and 
improvement of welfare rights and social security for native Danes, i.e. “welfare 
chauvinism”; (2) the re(invention) of a “nationalistic identity” politics (which 
increasingly focused on cultural and security threats posed by Islam after 9/11); and 
(3) the construction of ethnic minorities, in particular Muslims, as both an economic 
burden and a cultural danger eroding the cohesion of the Danish society. The DF has 
also been a vocal critique of the political establishment, which it blames for not 
being willing to preserve Danish traditions in the face of immigration and 
internationalisation (Bächler & Hopman, 2017, p. 33). Distinguishing itself from 
parties and organisations that the party considers to represent the establishment, 
the DF apply various phrases to them such as “the goodness industry” (Rydgren, 
2004, p. 487) and “European(s) by heart” (Jupskås, 2015b, p. 31). 
Crucially, the other political parties have been open to collaboration with the DF in 
order to gain office, which as we shall later see is in stark contrast to Swedish party- 
political dynamics, which has been marked by the isolation of the SD. It also differs 
from the Norwegian case, where the FrP was not accepted as a potential 
collaboration partner by another party until 2009 (Jupskås, 2013). In Denmark, the 
other parties adopted some of the immigrant-critical, anti-multiculturalist discourse 
propagated by the DF already in the 1990s. This was particularly the case for parties 
on the mainstream right-wing, especially the Liberals (Venstre). Green-Pedersen and 
Krogstrup (2008, p. 610) argue that this can be explained by the mainstream right- 
wing parties no longer having any incentive not to prioritise the issue, as the 
immigrant-liberal, centre-right Social Liberals had joined the Social Democrats in 
government. This situation made it attractive for the mainstream right-wing parties 





The Social Democrats originally attempted to defuse the immigration issue, but 
shifted to a more restrictive position, albeit with significant internal disagreement,36 
as the centrality of immigration and integration on the political agenda towards the 
end of the 1990s became increasingly clear (Bale et al., 2010, p. 415). By joining in 
on the discourse used by the DF, the established parties revealed to the voters the 
influence and power of the DF and thus gave the party legitimacy (Rydgren, 2010, p. 
64). During the 2001 election campaign, the Social Democrats and the Liberals, the 
two largest mainstream parties, seemed to fight to be most critical to immigration, 
and the DF was able to radicalise its stand further, a move aided by the 9/11 
terrorist attacks (Heinze, 2018, pp. 293–294). The DF lent its support to mainstream 
right-wing minority governments in the periods 2001–2011 and 2015–2019, giving 
the party substantial influence on issues relating to immigration and integration. 
With respect to the relationship between the DF and the media, the media’s logic, 
notably its emphasis on conflict, has been shown to be conducive to DF’s populist 
communication (Bächler & Hopman, 2017, pp. 35–36). For instance, some studies 
have found that Danish news outlets tend to describe the relationship between 
citizens and politicians as tense, with ordinary citizens as victims of the unreliable, 
reality-detached politicians (Hjarvard, 1999; Phillips, & Schrøder, 2004). Within such 
a media logic, there is significant room to manoeuvre for populist actors like the DF. 
Interestingly, Hellström and Hervik (2014) found that the journalistic language use 
differed between Denmark and Sweden: unlike the situation in Sweden, the DF was 
described as “one of us”, i.e. part of the mainstream (p. 463). The authors also 
found that the media facilitated DF’s Islam-critical communication, since the outlets 




36 Already in the 1980s, Social Democratic mayors from the municipalities around Copenhagen 
with a high percentage of immigrants had publicly expressed a need for a change of course. This 
led to the mayors generating increased support but also significant opposition from Social 




study examining the extent to which the DF was able to communicate their 
messages through the media is one by Karpantschoff (2002), which found that in the 
second half of the election year 2001, Pia Kjærsgaard (the former leader of the DF), 
was the second most quoted person on matters pertaining to immigration, only 
beaten by the immigration minister. At the same time, other research contradicts 
studies that find that the media gives way to populist communication. For instance, 
an observed increased journalistic emphasis on the strategic motives of politicians 
might hamper populist communication reaching citizens unfiltered (Bächler & 
Hopman, 2017, p. 36). 
From the perspective that the media might limit the effectiveness of populist 
communication, social media may represent highly valuable platforms for political 
actors, as they afford parties spaces for communication without the interference of 
the mass media’s journalistic gatekeepers and filter mechanisms (Engesser, 
Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017, p. 1122). The DF was relatively slow in using social 
media strategically. For instance, a study of politicians’ activity during the 2011 
election campaign found that the members of DF had published by far the fewest 
Facebook posts (van Dalen, Fazekas, Klemmensen, & Hansen, 2015). This has, 
however, changed over the years: in the first half of 2018, the DF posted the third- 
highest number of Facebook posts, beaten only by the Liberals and the Alternative 
(a green party). The DF had the highest average of interactions per Facebook post, 
receiving 1.2 million interactions in total (likes, shares, comments, and newer 
reactions e.g. “Angry and “Sad”), half a million more than the following party, 37 
suggesting that its supporters are particularly active on social media. Similar 











The high number of interactions with DF’s social media posts thus supports research 
that has argued that social media are highly advantageous to populist 
communication, for instance because it opens for a direct contact with audiences 
and gives more freedom (than in established mass media) for the use of strong 
language when attacking the elites and ostracising out-groups (Engesser et al., 2017, 
p. 1123). It is also worth mentioning that DF in 2018 launched their own news site, 
ditoverblik.dk.38 
 
As has been implicitly described thus far in Chapter 2, the sociocultural dimension 
(e.g. national identity and crime) has been particularly prominent compared to the 
socioeconomic dimension in Danish politics. This is considered by scholars to have 
boosted the politicisation of issues like immigration and integration in Denmark 
(Bächler & Hopman, 2017, p. 31). For instance, as explained by Ivarsflaten (2005), 
support for populist parties is dependent on populist voters being willing to 
prioritise other issues than economic ones. 
Interestingly, Denmark is the only Scandinavian country where a party to the right of 
the existing RRPP has been able to gain parliamentary representation: The New 
Right (Nye Borgerlige), a party with an even more ardent anti-immigrant, anti- 
Muslim profile than the DF, surpassed the 2% threshold in the 2019 general 
elections. Furthermore, a party called Hard Line (Stram Kurs), which during the 
campaign had endorsed deporting all Muslims, came close to receiving 
parliamentary representation but in the end received 1.8% of the votes.39 
Norway 
Similar to in Denmark, immigration was politicised in Norway in the latter half of the 




The election was held after the studied period, but these newer far-right parties were occasionally 




from below 300 per year throughout the 1970s and early 1980s to a peak of 8,613 
arrivals in 1987 (Bjørklund, 1999, p. 140). As explained by Hagelund (2003b, p. 50), 
the significant increase in the number of asylum seekers caused problems related to 
housing and processing of applications, as there was no institutional apparatus in 
place to handle the high number of applicants. The situation was quickly reported 
on in the media, which described the “streams” and “flows” of asylum seekers 
coming to Norway (Hagelund, 2003b, p. 50), and public interest and concern over 
immigration became highly prevalent (Hagelund, 2002, p. 405). At the same time, 
the Progress Party (FrP) started to position itself in opposition to the dominant 
immigration policies. The party deemed these policies too lenient and brought the 
issue forward on the political agenda, aiming to rally electoral support. While the 
other parties sought consensus and considered it indecent to use immigration to 
mobilise voters, the FrP used the 1987 local election campaign to openly criticise 
what they saw as a privileged treatment of asylum seekers at the expense of 
Norwegians (Hagelund, 2003b, p. 50). This critique mainly had an economic basis: 
the money spent on asylum seekers was depriving “our own”, notably the elderly 
and the ill, of critical resources (Bjørklund, 1999, p. 140). 
Still, fear of Islam became a central part of the 1987 campaign in relation with the 
so-called “Mustafa letter”. Then party-leader of the FrP, Carl I. Hagen, had during 
the campaign read publicly what later proved to be a fabricated letter from a man 
named Muhammad Mustafa, describing how Muslims would take over Norway 
(Bangstad, 2015, p. 57). Even though the party was met with substantial criticism 
from mainstream political and media actors, the FrP achieved its electoral 
breakthrough, receiving 12% of the vote (Hagelund, 2003b, p. 50). As such, it 
became clear that (Muslim) immigration was a highly potent issue around which 
electoral support could be mobilised. In the 1990s, this was reflected also in more 
formal contexts when the FrP began highlighting the cultural threat posed by 




55). While several Norwegian parties have since strongly emphasised the challenge 
of immigration for the economic sustainability of the welfare state, the FrP has 
largely been alone in considering Muslim immigration a threat to Norwegian values 
and culture (Fangen & Vaage, 2018, pp. 466–467). 
Similarly to its Danish sister party, the FrP’s foundation as an anti-tax movement has 
provided a solid “reputational shield”, enabling the party to effectively dismiss most 
accusations of racism (Ivarsflaten, 2006). Moreover, the success of the FrP has by 
some been considerably attributed to the party leaders’ effective communication 
style. For instance, Bjørklund (2004) points to Hagen’s rhetorical skills, characterised 
by e.g. double communication and the use of unarticulated conclusions, which allow 
audiences to interpret the message based on their own prejudices. Siv Jensen, who 
took over as leader after Hagen in 2006, has also been observed to hold similar 
rhetorical skills, in that she tends to be vague, ambiguous, and non-specific in her 
argumentation (Sigurdsen, 2014). As pointed out by Jupskås (2015a), the party 
leaders have been highly controversial externally yet highly popular among the core 
followers of the party, who view them as unafraid, honest, and responsive. 
Like the other Scandinavian RRPPs, the FrP is characterised by complete populism 
(Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, pp. 334–336). This is reflected in how it frequently 
portrays itself as the lone defender of the “common people,” criticises elites (such 
as “mainstream” politicians, bureaucrats, cultural practitioners, media professionals, 
and academics) and excludes various minority groups from the national community, 
notably Muslims and asylum seekers (Jupskås, Ivarsflaten, Kalsnes, & Aalberg, 2017, 
p. 57). 
Politicians from other parties have historically been highly critical of the party’s 
immigration policies and rhetoric (Hagelund, 2003b, p. 52).40 Still, the FrP has been 
 
 
40 The party has also been consistently criticised by most civil society organisations, trade union 




part of a coalition government since 2013 and has not been shunned by the other 
parties in the way that the SD has in Sweden (Jupskås, 2015b) (see the ensuing 
subsection for more about the SD’s position). Having said that, the FrP was not 
accepted as a legitimate governing partner by the other parties for many years 
(Jupskås, 2015b). The Conservatives helped to marginalise the FrP and to defuse 
their issues by enabling broad cross-party consensus on immigration and 
integration, unlike in Denmark where the mainstream right parties adopted DF’s 
agenda (Bale et al., 2010, p. 421). 
In 2009, the Conservatives announced for the first time that they were open to 
governing with the FrP, and in 2012, two centrist parties, the Liberal Party and the 
Christian Democrats, followed suit—albeit also somewhat reluctantly (Jupskås, 
2013). Lending their support to the government in the period 2013–2017, these 
parties hesitated until 2018 (the Liberals) and 2019 (the Christian Democrats) to join 
the government with the FrP and the Conservatives, because they deemed the 
ideological differences to the FrP to be too substantial. The gap between the 
coalition parties on matters pertaining to Islam and immigration continued to 
manifest during the governing period. For instance, when Jensen in 2019 again used 
the term “sneak Islamisation” (she had originally used the term in 2009) to describe 
the development in Norwegian society, this triggered a (more or less) significant 
backlash from FrP’s coalition partners, including the Conservatives.41 Illustratively, it 
was a disagreement pertaining to how to deal with a woman who had travelled to 
ISIS-controlled territory that led to the FrP’s exit from the government in January 
2020.42 
As in the case with the DF in Denmark, the media’s focus on how individual citizens 








(Jupskås, 2015a, p. 31). At the same time, very few journalists seem to vote for the 
party,43 and political commentators have largely been critical of the party’s 
immigration policies and rhetoric. Analysing Scandinavian newspapers’ editorials 
from 2009–2012, Meret, Hellström, and Hagelund (2016) found that the tone 
towards the FrP was generally negative.44 Faced with such opposition, blaming the 
media for being biased (and other political parties for not wanting, or not “having 
the guts”, to discuss Islam and immigration) has proven to be a successful rhetorical 
strategy (Jupskås, 2015a, p. 90). 
While the FrP was the last Norwegian party to use social media strategically (Kalnes, 
2009), it has later seen social media, especially Facebook, as an effective tool to get 
the party’s messages across to the electorate (Kalsnes, 2019, p. 201). The FrP 
prioritises Facebook, which is the most popular social media platform in Norway, 
over other social networks. A part of the explanation for this preference is the 
combination of image, text, and major network of followers (Kalsnes, 2019, p. 193). 
Furthermore, Twitter is (in the Norwegian context) characterised by more urban, 
liberal, and pro-immigration individuals (Enjorlas et al., 2013), meaning the FrP may 
see a bigger benefit in focusing its attention on Facebook. Research indicates that 
the FrP embraces social media logic to a higher extent than other parties, which, as 
we saw in Chapter 1, includes the frequent use of question marks to engage 
audiences. For instance, they frequently ask followers “Do you agree?”, “What do 






44 But the editorials were noticeably more balanced than Swedish newspapers’ editorials about 
the Sweden Democrats. The Danish newspapers’ editorials were the least negative towards the 
right-wing populist party, but also in the Danish case a majority of editorials were negative (Meret 
et al., 2016, p. 121). 






At the time of writing, the FrP is the Norwegian party with the highest number of 
likes on its Facebook page, and it has been found to generate substantially more 
interactions through its Facebook posts about immigration and integration than 
other Norwegian parties have through their posts about the same themes. 
Furthermore, compared to other parties, the FrP are particularly active in 
responding to comments left by ordinary citizens on their Facebook page (Kalsnes, 
2016b, p. 6), which is a part of its social media strategy (Kalsnes, 2019, p. 201). 
Overall, the FrP has punched above its weight in social media. The party’s use of 
social media has, however, not only been a success story. The prime example of this 
is a 2018 Facebook post by then Minister of Justice, Sylvi Listhaug, in which she 
published a picture of ISIS terrorists accompanied with a text accusing the Labour 
Party (Arbeiderpartiet) of thinking that “The rights of terrorists are more important 
than national security”, which eventually ended in her having to withdraw from her 
position as Minister of Justice.46 The post was considered particularly troubling 
because of the 2011 terrorist attack on the island of Utøya, where the terrorist 
targeted and killed members of the AUF, the youth organisation affiliated with the 
Labour Party. At the same time, Listhaug received a sea of flowers from fans who 
meant she had been wrongly treated by the political establishment and mainstream 
media.47 
Being in government position from 2013–2020, the FrP has tried to balance being a 
part of a coalition government with its image as an “outsider” that challenges what 
it sees as the consensus-oriented discourse and policies related to immigration, 













While radical right populist parties (RRPPs) in Denmark and Norway achieved 
substantial electoral support by problematising immigration and Islam from the mid- 
1980s, the same did not occur in Sweden. Apart from New Democracy’s short-lived 
success in the early 1990s, an RRPP did not gain parliamentary representation until 
the Sweden Democrats’ (SD) breakthrough election in 2010, when the party polled 
5.7% and gained 20 seats in the Riksdag. As noted by Strömbäck et al. (2017, p. 68), 
scholars have described Sweden’s lack of a strong right-wing populist party as a 
European “exception”, “deviation”, “negative case”, and “failure”. While the SD 
became the country’s third largest party in the 2018 elections,48 the lack of a strong 
right-wing populist party until recently has likely contributed to a noticeably 
different public debate around Islam and immigration than in the other 
Scandinavian countries, especially compared to Denmark. 
The long-time absence of a successful RRPP in Swedish politics is interesting given 
that the country has been strongly affected by international migration. Compared to 
Norway and Denmark, the level of immigration has been considerably higher, and 
asylum seekers (many of which have come from majority Muslim countries) have 
arrived in large numbers (Pettersen & Østby, 2013, pp. 77–79). Moreover, although 
the Swedish population in European comparisons have been found to be highly 
tolerant towards ethnic and religious minorities (Pew Research Center, 2018a) as 
well as highly supportive of migration (Heath, Richards, & Ford, 2016), there has 
been no shortage of opposition towards immigration among the Swedish population 
in absolute terms (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2013, p. 346). Furthermore, the political 
impact of the Green Party shows that the institutional setup is conducive to niche 










Given these factors, it may seem puzzling that an RRPP was unable to achieve 
national representation until 2010. Scholars have given several reasons for this 
“failure”. First, the socioeconomic left-right dimension has been particularly salient 
in Swedish politics, and sociocultural issues (e.g. immigration, national identity, and 
crime) have thus been less prominent than in Norway and Denmark. Second, the SD 
has its roots in explicitly racist organisations, meaning that it lacks the reputational 
shield wielded by the DF and FrP, which originally were anti-tax parties.49 Third, the 
Swedish established parties’ dismissive approach towards debating immigration has 
impeded the politicisation of the issue (Strömbäck et al., 2017, pp. 68–82). The SD 
was until 2019, when the party leaders of the mainstream right parties the Christian 
Democrats (Kristendemokraterna) and the Moderates (Moderaterna) opened for 
cooperation, largely isolated by the other parties.50 This isolation has further 
impeded people from joining the party, since the social costs are high, and it may 
also have increased the threshold for voting for the party (Art, 2011; Strömbäck et 
al., 2017). 
Importantly, there has been a major disparity between the attitudes of the Swedish 
population and their elected politicians in relation to immigration. From 1990–2006, 
the proportion of Swedish citizens wanting a more restrictive refugee policy never 
dropped below 43%, with a high of 65% (Demker, 2009, p. 49). In contrast, the 
highest number among Swedish members of parliament who wanted a stricter 
policy never exceeded 17% (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2013, p. 349). Compared to 
issues such as environmental protection and traditional left-right policy, the gap 
between members of parliament and voters was consistently three to four times 
 
49 That is not to say that these parties were not also marked by anti-immigrant and racist views. 
For instance, the Danish Progress Party, a precursor to the DF, had as an objective to make 
Denmark “free of Muhammadans” in 1980 (Valbum, 2008), and the founder of the Norwegian 
Progress Party, Anders Lange, was a staunch advocate of the apartheid regime and called those 
who supported a majority rule in South Africa “traitors of the white race” (Rindedal, 2013, p. 33). 
50 Because this study analyses data from 2018, the SD was still isolated by all the other parties in 




higher for immigration (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2013, p. 349). Moreover, surveys 
from 1987–2006 show that immigration was regularly seen as one of the most 
central problems facing the country by between 7% and 25% of Swedes throughout 
the period. While it never was the top concern during these years, it was 
consistently seen as one of the top three issues facing the country (Dahlström & 
Esaiasson, 2013, p. 351). 
Therefore, the lack of a strong Swedish right-wing populist party cannot be 
explained by low demand for more restrictive immigration policies (Strömbäck et al., 
2017, p. 71). Rather, it is necessary to highlight the issue strategies of the 
established parties, more specifically how they have dismissed the immigration issue 
(Strömbäck et al., 2017, p. 71) and (until 2019) erected a cordon sanitaire towards 
the SD, i.e. largely avoided any collaboration (Rydgren, 2010, p. 58). 
Swedish political parties’ dismissal of the immigration issue is well illustrated by 
Dahlström and Esaiasson (2013), who find that during the period 1970–2006 a 
maximum of 4% of issue messages in political party programmes were about 
immigration. For reference, they report that the corresponding number for the 
environment issue was between 2% and 10%. The same study found that televised 
party leader debates during the same period also almost never discussed 
immigration. For most years, the proportion of issue messages related to 
immigration in these debates did not exceed 1%, with the 2002 election as an 
exception.51 Voter studies where respondents were asked about what issues the 




51 In 2002, the centre-right Liberals (Liberalerna) proposed a policy that would require immigrants 
to pass a language test to obtain citizenship. In the election the same year, the Liberals was 
awarded significantly by the voters and gained 8.7 percentage points. The proposal was met by 
condemnation by the established parties (Lapidus, 2019) and led to immigration rising on the 
agenda, allowing the SD to focus on its core issue, leading to it more than tripling its electoral 




mirrored the low presence of the immigration issue in the party programmes and TV 
debates, again with the notable exception of 2002 (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2013, p. 
352). Illustratively, in the 1988 election when the Greens gained representation in 
the Riksdag, their main issue was high on the agenda of also the established parties. 
This was not the case with immigration, as the established parties dismissed it as an 
issue (Dahlström & Esaiasson, 2013, p. 351). 
Describing different party-political dynamics in Sweden and Denmark that may be 
useful for understanding how differences in national discourse around immigration 
came about, Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008, p. 610) emphasise the role of the 
mainstream right-wing parties. As we saw in the subsection on Denmark, the Danish 
Social Democrats’ alliance with the liberal centre party meant that mainstream 
right-wing parties were pushed to explore cooperation with the radical right 
populists to win government position. In Sweden, however, the Social Democrats 
were able to form majority governments by cooperating with parties to the left, 
which meant that the mainstream conservative party could form alliances with 
parties in the centre and had little incentive to seek cooperation with the radical 
right populists. This ability also meant that it would be a risk for the mainstream 
right party to politicise immigration, because this easily leads to conflict with the 
centre-right. Thus, right-wing populist voices were, unlike in Denmark, not in 
positions of power, which in turn may have contributed to the relatively weak 
position of anti-immigrant/anti-Islam positions in Swedish discourse. 
With respect to the news media, it largely ignored the SD until 2006, when the party 
started receiving more attention (Strömbäck et al., 2017, p. 74). Scholars have 
argued that the increased media coverage may have benefited the party, at least to 
some extent. Hellström and Bevelander (2018) studied the parliamentary periods 
2006–2010 and 2010–2014 and contend that the media was important for the 




the coverage was largely negative, the party gained support due to the increased 
visibility (Strömbäck et al., 2017, p. 75). As elsewhere, mass media’s conduciveness 
to populism (Mazzoleni, 2008) may have benefited the SD; whether the coverage is 
negative may matter less than if media coverage is marked by personalisation, 
negativism, simplification, and more space for the drama of politics (Strömbäck et 
al., 2017, p. 75). 
The negative media coverage, combined with the political cordon sanitaire, may 
have given incentives to citizens sympathetic to the SD to form counterpublics and 
engage in counterdiscourses, e.g. in social media and right-wing alternative news 
sites (Meret et al., 2016, p. 122). These alternative news sites, which especially focus 
on crime committed by Muslims and immigrants (Nygaard, 2019), are more popular 
in Sweden than in Norway and Denmark (Reuters News Report, 2019), and several 
of the outlets employ previous members of the SD.52 Furthermore, the SD and its 
supporters have proven themselves highly active in social media like Facebook and 
Twitter. Because of their experience with the “opinion corridor” (åsiktskorrodor), a 
metaphor closely related to Hallins’ spheres (1986) used to describe the consensus 
that has marked Swedish discourse and made it difficult to challenge established 
ideas, particularly around immigration-related issues, the SD has had strong 
incentives to use alternative channels. 
As described in a study by Kalsnes (2019, p. 202), social media have been considered 
a vital part of the legitimation and normalisation process of the party. For instance, 
when the party gets opinion pieces published in established editorial news outlets, 
they link to them on social media not only to get more attention but to show that 
they gained access outside their own domain. The same study compared the social 








hostile media landscape, has prioritised using social media to express their messages 
rather than to communicate with supporters in the comment sections, unlike the 
FrP, which have used social media both to communicate their own messages and to 
reply to supporters in the comments. Facebook especially has been an important 
platform for the SD, and it has focused on obtaining shares to an even higher degree 
than the FrP, because shares are considered to generate more visibility than likes 
(Kalnes, 2019, p. 202). 
Like the radical right populist parties in Denmark and Norway (as well as RRPPs 
elsewhere), research shows that the SD have been highly successful in creating 
engagement on social media (Larsson, 2014, 2017). In the five months leading up to 
the 2018 elections, the SD had 2.55 million interactions on its Facebook posts, while 
number two, the Moderates, had 900,000 interactions. Furthermore, the far-right 
Alternative for Sweden (Alternativ för Sverige), founded by rejected members of the 
SD, which received only 0.3% of the votes in the general election, had 650,000 
interactions on its posts—only beaten by the three largest parties—the Sweden 
Democrats, the Moderates, and the Social Democrats.53 Overall, then, it seems clear 
that Swedish radical right actors thrive on online platforms. 
Interestingly, while other parties started engaging more actively in the immigration 
debate in relation with the refugee crisis, the SD strengthened its issue ownership of 
immigration and integration from September 2014–April 2018, suggesting that the 
focus on immigration and integration contributed to boosting citizens’ faith in the 
SD’s policies on these issues (Hambraeus, 2018). The increased support for the SD 
was confirmed in the 2018 general election, when the party received 17.5% of the 
votes, a considerable increase from the 12.9% it polled in 2014. 
The fact that other parties and the media have no longer been able to ignore the 






2013; Strömbäck et al., 2017). It is also worth mentioning that the Sweden 
Democrats has moderated some of its policies, expelled some of its extreme 
members, and broadened its political appeal. Furthermore, the mainstream parties 
have converged on the socio-economic dimension—making such issues less decisive 
(Strömbäck et al., 2017, pp. 71–72). Subsequently, the salience of the sociocultural 
dimension has increased (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014), especially in the wake of the 
refugee crisis, which has clearly benefited the SD in the polls. 
Integration/immigration was the most important issue for Swedes in 2015, 2016, 
2017, and the second most important issue in 2018, when healthcare was number 
one (Martinsson & Andersson, 2019). Due to significant problems with crime—law 
and order has also been considered a crucial issue in recent years54—and the issue 
has repeatedly been addressed in media and political discourse in relation to 
problems with immigration and integration.55 While some established parties now 
make a (more or less) direct link between crime and immigration, the results of the 
2018 election may suggest that the voters are awarding the SD for its consistency in 
these issues. 
Summing up this subsection, we have seen how the three countries’ radical right 
populist parties have had varying success and thus varying degrees of influence on 
public discourse around immigration, integration, and Islam. While several factors 
may explain this, particular focus has here been on how established parties and 
mass media have adapted to the emergence of these parties. In Denmark, 
particularly the mainstream right-wing parties adopted some of DF’s anti-immigrant, 












centrist social liberal party served in government with the Social Democrats, the 
parties on the mainstream right were incentivised to seek collaboration with the 
right-wing populists (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008). Through its position as a 
support party to minority governments from 2001–2011 and 2015–2019, the DF had 
significant influence over policy pertaining to immigration and integration. The 
party’s support role also gave it a central position from which it could express its 
opinions on these matters. This may have contributed to more negative attitudes 
towards immigrants and Muslims in the public sphere overall. Furthermore, unlike 
the SD, which for a long period was considered a deviant actor by the mass media 
and the political mainstream, the DF has been treated by the national press as “one 
of us”, i.e. a part of the mainstream (Hellström & Hervik 2014, p. 463). 
The Norwegian Progress Party, while not shunned by the other parties like the 
Sweden Democrats have been in Sweden, were kept at arm’s length for several 
decades. It was not until 2009 that the Conservatives expressed a willingness to 
cooperate with the FrP in government (Jupskås, 2013). Having been in government 
since 2013, the party has moved towards the mainstream (or, from another 
perspective, the mainstream has moved towards the FrP), but it keeps making 
statements related to immigration and Islam that face substantial backlash from 
other parties and mass media (e.g. talking about “sneak Islamisation”), thereby also 
maintaining its image as an outsider party. 
The Sweden Democrats was for a long period treated as a deviant actor by the mass 
media and other political parties. The cordon sanitaire erected towards the SD 
postponed debates around Islam, immigration, and integration, which took place 
earlier in the neighbour countries, due to the influence by the DF and the FrP. The 
SD has, however, had tremendous success in recent years, both in terms of electoral 
support and in the form of parties on the mainstream right opening the door for 




to what it considers to be a hostile mass media environment. Being active on 
alternative platforms has given the party a chance to challenge the (relatively 
restricted) sphere of legitimate controversy in the Swedish public sphere from 
outside the mainstream. 
From having considered the varying influence of Scandinavian right-wing populist 
parties in this subsection, we will in the next subsection focus on older historical 
factors as potential explanations for differences between the countries. It is argued 
that these factors led to the formation of different views on nationalism and 
liberalism, which in turn may have led to divergent discourses on Islam, 
immigration, and integration. 
Different Views on Nationalism and Liberalism Explained by Older 
Historical Factors 
Although the countries share relatively similar histories of ethnic homogeneity, civil 
society development, Lutheran state churches, as well as relations that go back all 
the way to Viking times, the countries have also had different experiences that likely 
have influenced attitudes and debates about Islam, immigration, and integration 
(Storsveen, 2004, p. 378). 
Gripsrud (2019) highlights that the Scandinavian countries were influenced to 
varying degrees by the romantic nationalist movement that marked Europe in the 
19th century. This influence was strong in Norway and Denmark and less substantial 
in Sweden. Romantic nationalist ideas were particularly notable in Denmark after 
the country lost one third of its territory in a war with Germany over the southern 
part of Jutland in 1864. Consequently, a view of the country as small and vulnerable 
became an integral part of national identity. Danish nationalism was influenced by 
theologian Nikolaj Grundtvig “whose mix of religion, folkelighed (“folksiness”), and 




Toward the turn of the 20th century, Sweden was marked by a struggle between 
proponents of a left-wing vision of the country as the most modern, advanced 
country in the world and a right-wing, upper class interest in constructing a 
backward-looking national identity. The left-wing vision of Sweden as a super- 
modern, liberal, advanced country became the official and leading idea of the 
country (Gripsrud, 2019, pp. 130–131). Illustrating how this ideology has 
manifested, Gripsrud (2019, p. 131) refers to a 2002 interview with a leading 
Swedish social democrat, Mona Sahlin, in which she states the following: “I think 
that is why many Swedes are so envious of immigrant groups. You have a culture, an 
identity, a history, something that binds you together. And what do we have? We 
have Midsummer’s Eve and some ‘silly’ songs.”56 
Also highlighting historical factors as explanatory factors for why Islam and 
integration have been handled differently in the Scandinavian countries, Jakobsen 
(2016) points to different views on liberalism: while Sweden has been marked by 
classical liberalism, characterised by freedom from state intervention (i.e. negative 
freedom), Denmark has been marked by a focus on “freedom to” (i.e. positive 
freedom) an idea referred to in the field of history of ideas as republicanism,57 with 
roots in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rosseau and the French revolution.58 While the 
classical liberalist tradition is consistent with a multiculturalist policy, the republican 
view holds that freedom entails active democratic participation, and that it is 
through one’s participation in democratic processes that freedom is achieved. From 
the latter perspective, using e.g. face veils like the burqa or niqab would be 






57 Not to be confused with the type of republicanism that is in opposition to monarchical rule. 






whereas from the classical liberalist perspective, the state should not meddle in how 
people choose to practice their religion (Jakobsen, 2016). 
Sweden and England are examples of countries characterised by classical liberalism 
and multiculturalism, whereas France and Denmark are countries that have been 
strongly influenced by republicanism—and that have argued that integration 
necessitates more active measures. Norway is found in a position between the two 
traditions of liberalism, although the country has a strong democratic unity culture, 
like Denmark. Denmark and Norway were characterised by absolutism (enevelde) 
for many centuries. In contrast, Sweden was never an absolutist state and has 
stronger classical liberalist traditions, out of which the multiculturalist ideology 
could develop (Jakobsen, 2016, p. 157). Jakobsen explains that “Sweden and 
England are countries with strong liberal traditions and elites who for historical 
reasons are very confident. They have not lost big wars, been occupied, or 
experienced revolution. The governing elites in these countries have a historical 
confidence, which says that ‘coercion is unnecessary, the others want to become 
like us anyway’” [my translation from Norwegian].59 
In addition to different influences found in the history of ideas, the countries have 
different histories of emigration and immigration, which also may have affected how 
they have debated Islam and related topics. Emigration overseas in the 19th and 
early 20th century, especially to North America, was major from all the three 
countries, but more significant from Norway and Sweden than from Denmark.60 The 
countries also had different experiences with immigration after the Second World 
 
59 From an interview with Jakobsen in the print version of Vårt Land 22 September 2018, pp. 12– 
17. 
60 Sweden, which had around 5 million inhabitants in 1900, had 1.5 million emigrants. Denmark 
had about 2.5 million inhabitants, and 400.000 emigrated (Borevi et al., 2017, p. 7). Norway, which 
had a population of around 2.2 million, was the Scandinavian country with the highest number of 
overseas emigrants relative to its population (Østby, 2005, p. 26), with as many as around 800.000 





War, which started earlier and was larger in Sweden than in Denmark and Norway. 
Sweden was, unlike Norway and Denmark, not occupied during the war and could 
continue its industrial development relatively unhindered (Brochmann & Hagelund, 
2012). Sweden therefore experienced the need for labour migrants after the war 
sooner. While particularly Finns and Estonians migrated to Sweden, Sweden had 
immigrants from Southern Europe already in the 1950s (Gripsrud, 2019, p. 131). 
It may also have played a role that while Denmark had colonies (Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands) and a small German-speaking minority in Schleswig, only Norway and 
Sweden had “internal” aboriginal minorities (the Sami people and Finnish 
populations). Furthermore, Sweden’s neutrality during the Second World War may 
have prompted a more persistent self-examination of its past and impetus towards 
anti-racism compared to the other two countries (Borevi et al., 2017, p. 7). 
The differences outlined likely contributed to the different discourses (and policies) 
on Islam, immigration, and integration that have developed in the three countries. 
While Denmark has predominantly underlined the assimilation of immigrants, i.e. 
the view that newcomers should one-sidedly adapt to Danish culture, following 
ideas of the priority of a Danish “leitkultur”,61 Sweden was in the forefront in Europe 
when it came to state-sponsored multiculturalism in the late 1970s and 1980s 
(Larsson & Lindekilde, p. 2009, p. 363). In fact, Sweden was the only of the three 
Scandinavian countries to officially (for a limited period) introduce a 
multiculturalism that explicitly assumed responsibility of protecting immigrants as 
ethnic minority group (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012). Although not going as far in 












from Sweden’s approach in the 1970s, before later moving closer to Denmark’s 
assimilationist line (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012). 
 
Different Experiences With Violent Right-Wing Extremism 
In addition to varying influence from right-wing populist parties and different views 
on nationalism and liberalism emanating from older historical factors, another 
contextual factor that may explain different discourses on Islam is different 
experiences with violent right-wing extremism. While a democratic right-wing 
populist party struggled for a long time to break through in Sweden, Sweden was 
the Western European country with the highest number of right-wing extremist 
motivated murder incidents relative to its population from 1990–2015 (Enstad & 
Ravndal, 2015). Enstad and Ravndal (2015) argue that this is the result of a 
combination of three factors: (1) record high levels of immigration, (2) a debate 
climate where legitimate criticism of immigration has been morally condemned, and 
(3) having the largest right-wing extremist movement in the Nordic region. 
 
In the 1990s, militant right-wing movements grew strong in Scandinavia. During the 
2000s, however, these movements collapsed in Norway and Denmark and were 
replaced by less violent and more populist movements and parties. Conversely, the 
Swedish Nazi-movement has operated continuously ever since the inter-war period 
(Enstad & Ravndal, 2015). A stronger presence of neo-Nazis in Sweden than in the 
other Scandinavian countries may have contributed to making established 
politicians and media less willing to accept criticism of immigration and Islam, 
fearing that this could lead to the demonisation of minorities that could be exploited 
by militant far-right actors. Moreover, the relatively large presence of neo-Nazi 
actors may have contributed to strengthening anti-racist attitudes—and thus also 




Varying Involvement in the “War on Terror” 
The Scandinavian countries’ varying degrees of involvement in the United States-led 
“War on Terror” may also have contributed to different debates around Islam.62 
Denmark has followed the U.S. very closely despite there being general European as 
well as intra-Nordic reservation about involvement in some parts of the War on 
Terror, such as the invasion of Iraq (Gebhard, 2017). Denmark has therefore had a 
more active participation with more casualties in wars in Muslim majority countries 
than Norway and Sweden have. This may have contributed to more widespread 
negative attitudes towards Muslims and Islam, and thus a higher presence of such 
attitudes in the Danish public sphere. With 43 casualties, Denmark is the coalition 
country in Afghanistan with the highest number of deaths relative to its 
population.63 Norway has suffered 10 casualties from the war in Afghanistan 
(Gabrielsen, 2012), and Sweden has suffered 5 casualties (Wendt & Åse, 2017). 
Still, while the varying involvement in these operations may have reinforced 
differences, it did not cause them. As we have seen, Danish discourse on Islam, 
influenced by the Danish People’s Party, started to diverge substantially from 
Norwegian and Swedish discourse already in the latter half of the 1990s, in other 
words before the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the ensuing “war on terror”. 
From having described the differences between Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish 
discourse on Islam and suggested potential explanations for these, this chapter 
concludes with formulating hypotheses to be tested in relation to the analysed 
Facebook posts and comments. These hypotheses are based on the empirical 
context outlined in this chapter, Facebook affordances (see Chapter 1), and the 
theoretical perspectives applied in this study (see Chapters 1 and 3). 
 
 
62 Professor at the University of Copenhagen, Stig Hjarvard, makes this point in an article by The 







Research question 1 of this dissertation was as follows: To what extent do 
Norwegian, Swedish and Danish news outlets’ Facebook posts and their associated 
articles about Islam differ (with respect to genre, theme, sources, and sentiment), 
and how can differences, or the lack of such, be explained? 
The counterpublic perspective, which we were briefly introduced to in Chapter 1 
and which will be elaborated in the following chapter, considers digital 
communication to be facilitating both dominant and counter-publics. Dominant 
discourses are reproduced through for instance mainstream media and established 
politicians’ digital communication (Dahlberg, 2011, p. 861). It is thus expected that 
the findings from analysing the mainstream news outlets’ posts and linked articles 
largely will reflect findings from existing research of Scandinavian mass media- and 
political discourse on Islam and immigration. As we have seen, Scandinavian 
comparisons have typically found that discourse on Islam and immigration has been 
highly negative in Denmark, relatively amicable in Sweden, with Norway in a 
position between the two (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012; Hovden et al., 2019; 
Hovden & Mjelde, 2019). However, given the change in Swedish debate climate 
since the refugee crisis, and studies that have shown Swedish media tend to cover 
Islam negatively (Axner, 2015; Hvitfelt, 1998; Lundby et al., 2018), the difference 
between Swedish and Norwegian news outlets is expected to be relatively small. It is 
therefore assumed that: 
H1: Danish posts (and their associated article texts) will cover Islam more negatively 
than Norwegian and Swedish posts (and their associated article texts) will. The 
Norwegian posts will be more negative than the Swedish posts, albeit the difference 
will be marginal. 
Research question 2 was as follows: To what extent do comments on Norwegian, 




sentiment they express towards Islam, and how can differences, or the lack of such, 
be explained? 
In line with the corrective action perspective, which predicts that citizens will 
attempt to “correct” perceived “wrongs” in the public sphere by taking action, it is 
assumed that the comments will show an almost diametrically opposed result from 
the news outlets’ posts and the public sphere at large. This effect is however 
expected to be dampened (in the case of Denmark) and strengthened (in the cases 
of Sweden and Norway) by the fact that those participating in online discussions on 
immigration tend to be more negative to immigration than the general population 
(Enjolras et al., 2013), and that studies of social media discourse on Islam and 
Muslims have found mainly negative depictions (Awan, 2016, McEnery et al., 2015; 
Oboler, 2016, Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016). By this I mean that in the Norwegian, 
and, in particular, the Swedish case, where there is reason to believe that Islam- 
critical commenters may have an extra strong incentive to correct what they 
perceive to be an overly Islam-friendly public sphere, this effect will be strengthened 
by the fact that social media discourse on Islam generally tends to be negative. 
Conversely, in the Danish case, it would from a corrective action perspective be 
expected that Islam-friendly individuals would be more likely to express their 
opinions than Islam-sceptic individuals, due to the prevalence of anti-Islam views in 
the Danish public sphere. This effect will, however, likely be dampened or 
eliminated because of the general dominance of negative voices in social media 
discourse on Islam. Therefore, it is assumed that: 
H2: All countries’ comment sections will have more negative than positive 
comments about Islam. In line with the corrective action perspective, the Swedish 
comment sections will have the highest number of negative comments compared 




negative compared to positive comments, and the Norwegian comment sections 
will be in a middle position. 
The third research question was: To what extent are comment sections on 
Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish news outlets’ Facebook pages permeated by 
counterpublic discourses around Islam, and how can differences, or the lack of such, 
be explained? 
As was touched on in Chapter 1, this project views comment sections on the 
Facebook pages of established news outlets as arenas where counterpublic-minded 
individuals may have particularly strong incentives to express their opinions. It is, 
however, not expected that this will manifest to the same extent in the Danish, 
Swedish, and Norwegian comment sections. In a relevant study, Heft et al. (2019) 
examined the inhibitors and drivers of alternative right-wing media in six countries. 
They pointed to the inclusiveness of established media towards radical right-wing 
actors as well as the electoral success of RRPPs as key factors influencing the 
demand for right-wing alternative news sites. In Sweden and Germany, where these 
outlets are popular, established media have been unaccommodating towards radical 
right attitudes, and radical right populist parties have (until recently) had low 
success and been largely shunned by the other parties. In Denmark and Austria, 
where alternative right-wing news outlets are relatively unpopular,64 established 
media have been largely inclusive of radical right populist actors and views, and 
these parties have had great electoral success and influence (Heft et al., 2019). 
While Norway was not included in Heft et al’s (2019) study, the most popular 
alternative right-wing outlet in the country is read on a weekly basis by 7% of 




64 Demand for alternative right-wing outlets in Austria was higher than expected by the authors, 





Given Norway’s middle position also when it comes to openness to radical right- 
wing voices in the established media and influence of right-wing populist parties on 
public discourse, this is consistent with Heft et al’s (2019) analysis. It is expected 
that the same logic that seems to apply to the demand for right-wing alternative 
news sites will be applicable to the prevalence of counterdiscursive comments 
found in this study. Thus, it is assumed that: 
H3: Islam-critical counterpublic discourses will be most prevalent in the Swedish 
comment sections, the least prevalent in the Danish comment sections, while the 
Norwegian comment sections will be found between these. Correspondingly, Islam- 
positive counterpublic discourses will be most prevalent in the Danish comment 
sections and the least prevalent in the Swedish comment sections, with Norway 
again expected to be in a middle position. 
The fourth and final research question asks: To what extent do popularity cues 
correlate with different Facebook posts and comments about Islam, and how can 
correlations, or the lack of such, be explained? 
Given how radical right-wing actors have had significant success in creating 
engagement in social media (Larsson, 2014, 2017; Lorentzen, 2014), it is predicted 
that: 
H4a: Negative posts about Islam will receive many more popularity cues than 
positive posts will. The hypothesis is considered to have strong support if negative 
posts have 1.5+ times as many shares and likes as positive posts do. 
Hypothesis 4b also deals with popularity cues assigned to posts, and is based on the 
view that those who have a particularly high incentive to “correct” what they 
perceive to be wrong about how Islam is handled in the public sphere will to a high 





H4b: In line with the corrective action perspective, Swedish Islam-negative posts 
will receive the highest number of likes and shares relative to the number of likes 
and shares received by Islam-positive posts, while Danish Islam-negative items will 
receive the lowest number of likes and shares relative to the likes and shares 
received by Islam-positive items. Norway will be found between the two in terms 
of the ratio of popularity cues on negative and positive items. 
Following the same logic for the comments, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4c: In line with the corrective action perspective, Swedish Islam-negative 
comments will receive the highest number of likes relative to the number of likes 
received by Islam-positive comments, while Danish Islam-negative comments will 
receive the lowest number of likes relative to the likes received by Islam-positive 
comments. Norway will be found between the two in terms of the ratio of likes on 
negative and positive comments. 
Finally, it is predicted that: 
 
H4d: In line with viewing comment sections as providing substantial affordances for 
counterpublic-minded individuals to challenge mainstream-minded individuals, 
counterdiscursive comments will receive a higher number of likes than mainstream 
comments will. Particularly comments engaging in anti-Islam counterpublic 
discourse will receive many likes. 
Chapter Summary 
While the Scandinavian countries share central traits like long histories of cultural 
homogeneity and Lutheran state churches, as well as similar civil society 
development, welfare systems, and media systems, they have had noticeably 
different discussions around Islam, immigration, and integration. Roughly put, 
Danish discourse on Islam and immigration has been harsh and polarising, Swedish 
discourse has been relatively amicable towards Islam and immigration, while 




however signs of convergence, as the spheres of consensus, legitimacy, and 
deviance (Hallin, 1986) have been considerably redefined in Sweden in the wake of 
the refugee crisis (Truedson, 2016), and more Islam- and immigrant-critical voices 
have gained access to prominent arenas of the public sphere (Brochmann, 2018). 
To explain the differences between the countries’ discourse on Islam, one factor 
that has been highlighted in particular is the varying level of influence of radical right 
populist parties, which has been substantial in Norway, and, especially, Denmark, 
while it has been almost non-existent until recently in Sweden. The extensive 
influence of the Danish People’s Party on Danish debate contributed to making 
immigrant-critical and anti-multiculturalist views commonplace among other 
political parties and the established news media from the mid-1990s. In contrast, 
the Sweden Democrats, which did not have its electoral breakthrough until 2010, 
has been isolated by the more established parties and was largely ignored by the 
media until 2006, postponing debates around Islam, immigration, and integration. In 
Norway, the Progress Party has been essential for the politicisation of immigration 
and Islam. While it has been criticised by the other parties and political 
commentators for its Islam/immigrant-negative remarks, the party has been 
relatively popular among Norwegian citizens and managed, at least to some degree, 
to uphold its image as an “outsider” party in relation to debates on immigration and 
Islam, despite being in government from 2013–2020. 
The differences in political, media, and public discourse is, as indicated by the 
formulated hypotheses, expected to affect the findings from the studied Facebook 
posts and comments in certain ways. 
In the following chapter, the theoretical and conceptual approach of the 




Chapter 3: Theoretical and Conceptual Approach 
This chapter initially outlines the theoretical foundation of the dissertation, rooted 
in counterpublic theory. Subsequently, it presents the theoretical framework 
applied, which is built on the theoretical foundations laid out in the initial subsection 
of the chapter. Finally, it returns to two concepts briefly addressed in the previous 
chapters, Hallin’s spheres (1986) and corrective action (Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; 
Hwang, Pan, & Sun, 2008; Rojas, 2010), which are applied in this dissertation to 
provide further theoretical insights in the discussion of the data. 
Counterpublic Theory 
Writings on counterpublics (Negt & Kluge, 1972/1993; Felski, 1989; Fraser, 1990) 
rose in response to Jürgen Habermas’s pivotal work The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (1962/1989). 
These writings criticised Habermas’s understanding of a singular, overarching public 
sphere where individuals bracket status differentials and deliberate rationally “as if” 
they were social equals. Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1972/1993) were the first 
to use the term counterpublic (Gegenöffentlichkeit) in their book Public Sphere and 
Experience (Öffentlichket und Erfahrung). They described what they called a 
“proletarian public sphere”, a distinct and oppositional public to the “bourgeois 
public sphere” that Habermas considered as a normative model. While Habermas 
saw proletarian public spheres as merely a passive echo of the bourgeois public 
sphere and thus not worthy of much attention (Habermas, 1992, p. 427), Negt and 
Kluge believed in the productive possibilities of counterpublics. As explained by 
Downey and Fenton (2003, p. 17), Negt and Kluge saw the formation of 
counterpublics as offering forms of solidarity and reciprocity grounded in a 
collective experience of marginalisation and expropriation. 
As the term “proletarian public sphere” indicates, Negt and Kluge primarily focused 




point for the whole spectrum of groups and movements … because it allowed these 
groups to think of their work as at once oppositional and public” (Hansen, 1993, p. 
xvi). This marked, on the one hand, a considerable shift in the way of thinking of the 
public sphere, because to be radically oppositional in the Habermasian bourgeois 
public sphere is to be at odds with the very idea of publicness itself, i.e., it is to be 
illegitimate (Farmer, 2013). Negt and Kluge, on the other hand, open for groups and 
movements to consider themselves as simultaneously oppositional and public 
(Farmer, 2013). Whereas Habermas highlights formal conditions of communication 
(free association, equal participation, deliberation, polite argument), Negt and Kluge 
emphasise questions of constituency, concrete needs, interests, conflicts, protest, 
and power. In so doing, they shine a light on the structures that control what can be 
said and what cannot be said and which and whose experience is considered 
(ir)relevant (Hansen, 1993, p. xxxi). 
Because Negt and Kluge’s book about the proletarian public sphere was not 
translated into English until 1993, Rita Felski (1989) in her book Beyond Feminist 
Aesthetics: Feminist Literature and Social Change was the first to use the term in an 
English text (Brouwer, 2006, p. 195). Focusing on the feminist public, Felski (1989, p. 
167) argues that “The experience of discrimination, oppression, and cultural 
dislocation provides the impetus for the development of a self-consciously 
oppositional identity”, namely a feminist counterpublic sphere. Similarly, Nancy 
Fraser in a pivotal essay, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the 
Critique of Actually Existing Democracy” (1990), argues that groups like women, 
ethnic minorities, labourers, and LGBTQ people have been excluded and 
marginalised from the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere, and that they have 
been forced to form their own publics to be free from (formal and informal) 
constraints. In an oft-cited definition, Fraser calls such publics who contest 
dominant publics “subaltern counterpublics” and describes them as “parallel 




counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (Fraser, 1990, p. 67). As 
such, counterpublic theory reveals oblique relations of power that inform public 
discourse and, at the same time, discloses that participants in the public sphere 
partake in potentially emancipatory practices with the aim of reconfiguring power 
(Asen, 2000, p. 425). 
Felski’s and Fraser’s work on counterpublics appeared around the time of the 
English translation of Habermas’s Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 
1989. At the conference to mark the English translation, Craig Calhoun opposed 
Habermas’s view that the consequences of mass media were uniformly negative. 
Habermas (1962/1989) had argued that mass media, which were controlled by large 
corporations, were more concentrated on entertainment and profit than facilitating 
rational debate. Responding to this, Calhoun argued that there is certain room for 
manoeuvre for “alternative democratic media strategies” (Downey & Fenton, 2003, 
p. 186). He referred, on the one hand, to the possibility of groups in civil society 
influencing the mass media, and on the other, of establishing alternative, 
discursively connected public spheres (Downey & Fenton, 2003, p. 186). While 
maintaining that most of his earlier description of the public sphere in the 20th 
century is correct, Habermas (1996) has revised his original thesis to take account of 
such phenomena. This relates particularly to instances of intentional political 
mobilization that aim to intervene in the mass media public sphere or to develop a 
counterpublic (Downey & Fenton, 2003, p. 187). As explained by Downey and 
Fenton (2003, p. 187), Habermas currently recognises not only the existence of 
alternative public spheres but also their capacity for challenging domination. 
Crucially, many theorists in this vein have criticised the idea of a unitary public 
sphere and tend to underline the power differences and competitive relationship 




Habermas’s original understanding of the public sphere, it is now widely accepted 
that there are, and were at the time of the emergence of a bourgeois public sphere 
in the 18th century, multiple publics (Eley, 1992; Felski, 1989; Fraser, 1990; 
Habermas, 1996; Ikegami, 2000). The movement toward multiplicity in the scholarly 
literature on the public sphere, i.e. that there are multiple, unequal publics, was 
driven by a recognition of sociocultural diversity; a single, overarching public sphere 
ignores or denies such diversity. 
It is as a public within a public sphere conceived as a multiplicity that counterpublics 
emerge (Asen, 2000, p. 425). As Asen (2000) explains, Foucault, among others, has 
argued that norms are always active in discursive encounters, which implicates 
relations of power. These (oft-implicit) norms regulating discourse are likely to 
benefit some participants and to disadvantage others (p. 425). Participatory norms 
can be “powerful silencers or evaluators of speech in many actual speaking 
situations where culturally differentiated and socially unequal groups live together” 
(Young, 1996, p. 124). If materialised in a singular public sphere, these norms link up 
with similarly reified, already established notions of the common good and function 
as “complementary exclusionary mechanisms that restrict discursive engagement 
and undermine the interests of oppressed groups” (Asen 2000, p. 425). Therefore, 
scholars on counterpublic theory have emphasised that the (formal and informal) 
exclusions of e.g. women, workers, LGBTQ people, and ethnic minorities disprove 
the idealistic claims of accessibility and open debate that legitimated the historical 
bourgeois public sphere described by Habermas in The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere (e.g. Felski, 1989; Fraser, 1990). 
A similar conception of democracy to the one described in Fraser’s (1990) essay was 
launched by Mouffe (2000) in the form of what she called an “agonistic” model of 
democracy. Whereas the deliberative model of democracy that was developed by 




interlocutors bracket passions, the agonistic model has as a basic premise that 
“Politics consists in domesticating hostility” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 15). According to 
Mouffe (2000, p. 15), “Politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict 
and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an ‘us’ by the termination 
of a ‘them’”. Envisaged from this point of view, the aim of democratic politics is “to 
construct the ‘them’ in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be 
destroyed, but an ‘adversary’, i.e. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose 
right to defend those ideas we do not put into question” (Mouffe, 2000, p. 15). 
Rather than eliminating passions from public spheres, the agonistic model holds that 
the main task of democratic politics is to mobilise those passions towards 
democratic designs (Mouffe, 2000, p. 16). This view relates to a key thesis of the 
agonistic model, namely that agonistic confrontation is the very condition of 
democracy’s existence. Thus, the agonistic model considers legitimating conflict and 
acknowledging the pluralism of values that exists in democracy crucial for 
democratic societies (Mouffe, 2000, p. 16). An agonistic understanding used in 
research of political debates online will focus less upon the performance of rational 
deliberation and more upon the way sites for online communication can operate as 
arenas of discursive struggle and conflict (Dahlberg, 2007, p. 60). 
Counterpublics can have an important function within an agonistic model of 
democracy. For instance, the democratic aim of feminist counterpublics would be to 
transform the hegemonic structure of the overarching public sphere into a new 
hegemonic structure integrating feminist interests and needs (Toepfl & Piwoni, 
2015, p. 469). Counterpublics have been able to make issues long ignored by 
dominant publics become important matters of public debate. Fraser (1990, p. 67) 
gives the example of feminist women who in the late 20th century invented new 
terms for describing social reality, including sexism, the double shift, sexual 
harassment, and marital, date, and acquaintance rape: “Armed with such language, 




the extent of our disadvantage in official public spheres”. From this it follows that 
counterpublics are in no way intended to be separatist or isolated enclaves of 
discourse.65 Rather, their principal purpose is to engage in publicity and break up 
hegemonic consensual patterns within dominant public spheres, and to expand 
discursive space and offset the “unjust privileges enjoyed by members of dominant 
social groups” (Fraser, 1990, p. 68). 
Still, it is in a dialectic between two functions that the emancipatory potential of 
counterpublics resides (Fraser, 1990, p. 68). This dual character (Asen 2000; Felski 
1989; Fraser 1990; Warner, 2002) takes the form of functioning as spaces of 
withdrawal and regroupment, on the one hand, and functioning as bases and 
training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics, on the other 
(Fraser, 1990, p. 68). Whereas the former function, which consists of inward- 
oriented goals, can be expected to be pursued in safe, secluded communicative 
spaces, the latter function, which consists of outward-oriented goals, are expressed 
in communicative spaces that are attended by mainstream audiences but that allow 
counterpublic-minded individuals to express their opinions (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2018, 
p. 2014). Inward-oriented goals’ primary function is to invent, elaborate, and 
formulate alternative identities, interests, and needs (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2018, p. 
2014). Outward-oriented goals are ultimately to break up and shift consensus 
structures within dominant publics by engaging wider publics and targeting 
dominant publics with “counterpublicity”—an activity akin to “going public” (Asen, 
2000, p. 441). 
It is primarily the outward, agitational activity that is studied in this project. The 
established news outlet’s Facebook pages feature large audiences, where 
counterpublic-minded individuals have a significant opportunity to challenge wider 
 
65 Squires (2002) proposes that one separates between enclaves, counterpublics, and satellite 
public spheres based, in part, on the degree to which discourse is concealed from the wider public 




publics. At the same time, publishing impolite and emotional comments may also be 
seen as a (although not necessarily intentional) way of building identity among 
counterpublic-minded individuals, i.e. inward-oriented goals. Furthermore, the mere 
presence of counterdiscourses in an arena with a wide audience may contribute to a 
sense of identity-building among counterpublic-minded individuals, because the 
presence of counterdiscursive ideas may create a sense of being a part of a larger 
group or movement. In this sense, outward-oriented communication can potentially 
achieve the goals of inward-oriented communication (Kaiser & Rauchfleisch, 2019, 
p. 249). Generally, though, inward-oriented goals are likely most effectively pursued 
in more secluded communicative spaces. 
Counterpublic collectives can operate in numerous communicative spaces, and this 
has been truer than ever after the advent of the internet and social media. Research 
has shown that counterdiscourses emerge on online arenas like alternative news 
sites, blogs, social media, and comment sections (Eckert & Chadha, 2013; Geiger, 
2016; Jackson & Welles, 2015, 2016; Leung & Lee, 2014; Renninger, 2015; Toepfl & 
Piwoni, 2015, 2018). As was argued in Chapter 1, counterpublic-minded individuals 
may have particularly high incentives to comment and to like items they support in 
arenas close to a superordinate public sphere, such as comment sections below 
mainstream news posts. First, this relates to the fact that these comment sections 
are visible to a large audience, meaning they provide a unique opportunity to 
challenge (what is perceived as) mainstream actors and ideas. Second, despite 
moderation rules restricting the most deviant forms of speech, there is still a 
relatively low threshold for what content can be published in the comment sections 
compared to letters to the editor, an earlier and related format. Third, comment 
sections make it possible to engage in counterpublic discourses in spatial vicinity to 
specific hegemonic ideas as these are formulated in the mainstream public sphere 
(Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, pp. 471–472). Moreover, since relatively few people in 




2019), counterpublic-minded individuals have a chance to considerably impact the 
content in this arena, and thus also influence how people perceive a case or topic 
(Lee, 2012; Lee & Jang, 2010; von Sikorski, 2016; von Sikorski & Hänelt, 2016). 
As this subsection about counterpublic theory’s background has implied with 
mentions of feminists, workers, LGBTQ people, and ethnic minorities, 
counterpublics have typically been associated with left-leaning and progressive 
collectives (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2018, p. 2025). Scholars have often analysed how 
people have sought to overcome exclusions based on race, gender, class, sexuality, 
ethnicity, and other factors (Asen, 2016, p. 5). Still, it is important to note that 
counterpublics can also be right-wing, populist, and nationalist (Downey & Fenton, 
2003). Some publics can even be anti-democratic (Cammaerts, 2009). Fraser herself 
specifies that she does “not mean to suggest that subaltern counterpublics are 
necessarily virtuous” (1990, p. 67). Generally, though, she sees the proliferation of 
“subaltern counterpublics” in stratified societies as a good thing—insofar as these 
counterpublics emerge in response to exclusions within dominant publics, and, thus, 
help expand discursive space (p. 67). 
Importantly, studying counterpublic discourses expressed by nationalist, right-wing, 
or anti-Islam collectives implicates a challenge to Fraser’s (1990) definition of 
counterpublics with respect to her characterising them as subaltern. Warner (2002, 
p. 56) makes this point when he describes counterpublics as those publics that are 
“defined by their tension with a larger public”, without using an additional criterion 
of being subaltern. If we consider that counterpublics can be nationalist, right-wing, 
or anti-Islamic, it seems probable that participants in such publics are not 
necessarily subaltern in terms of material resources or social identity (e.g. gender, 
ethnicity, religion, sexuality). In fact, they may be among the more well-off people in 
society. This can also be illustrated by the fact that, while women and workers 




counterpublic collectives can be people of high social status, for instance academics. 
As such, participation in counterpublics is not dependent on a subaltern social status 
and identity and can just as well be based on issue-specific political solidarity 
(Breese, 2011, p. 141). 
In fact, in some cases, the only reason participants are considered subaltern is their 
engagement in the counterdiscourse. In other words, as argued by Warner (2002, p. 
87), subordinate status of participants in a counterpublic does not simply reflect 
identities formed elsewhere; participation in such a public contributes to forming 
and transforming members’ identity. To take a relevant example, anti-Islam 
counterpublic-minded individuals are not necessarily marginalised because of their 
social status and identity, but they may be marginalised because of how their 
participation in the counterdiscourse leads to a tension with a larger public (see e.g. 
Løvlie et al., 2018a). 
A related, crucial point is that counterpublics can emerge without the participants 
actually being excluded from or marginalised within wider publics. What is decisive 
is rather whether they have a perception of themselves as excluded or marginalised 
(Dahlberg, 2011, p. 860). As Brouwer (2006, p. 197) explains, “Counterpublics 
emerge when social actors perceive themselves to be excluded from or marginalized 
within mainstream or dominant publics and communicate about that marginality or 
exclusion” [emphasis added]. Similarly, Asen’s (2000) focus is not on exclusion per 
se, but on the recognition of exclusion, because this avoids “essentialist 
understandings of difference and situates counter as a constructed relationship” (p. 
427). For instance, while some criticise a politically correct elite that decides what is 
accepted discourse and is ready to demonise you if you dare to oppose these 
boundaries of discourse in the immigration debate, others may see this criticism as 
completely misguided and as an attempt to legitimise racism, discrimination, or 




perceptions of how issues are treated in the public sphere, it is best to view the 
“counter” as a self-perceived position. 
 
This is well illustrated by Neumayer’s (2013) study of two parallel counterpublics in 
Germany: neo-Nazis and anti-fascists. She describes both publics as subordinate, in 
the sense that they feel marginalised from the larger public sphere (Neumayer, 
2013, p. 33). Scandinavian discourse on Islam are also marked by groups on “both 
sides” who feel that their perspectives are marginalised or excluded from the 
mainstream. For instance, Scandinavian alternative, anti-Islamic news outlets aim to 
convince the public that the Scandinavian societies have become unsafe due to 
increased (Muslim) immigration, and that the political elite, the mainstream media, 
and the criminal justice system are to blame for the perceived societal crises the 
Scandinavian countries are finding themselves in (Nygaard, 2019, p. 1147). At the 
same time, progressive and left-wing actors have positioned themselves as 
correctives to what they have seen as a public debate rampant with racism, 
emanating from the top (Gullestad, 2002; Mulinari & Neergard, 2017). 
The existence of right-wing counterpublics have some potentially significant 
implications for the literature on counterpublics, traditionally marked by a 
normative focus on progressive and left-wing collectives’ struggle to achieve 
political change. While Fraser (1990) mentions that counterpublics can be anti- 
democratic, and Downey and Fenton (2003) highlight the need to understand and 
research right-wing actors from a counterpublic perspective, there have been 
relatively few such studies, albeit there seems to have been an upswing in recent 
years (see e.g. Cammaerts, 2009; Holm, 2019; Kaiser & Rauchfleisch, 2019; 
Neumayer, 2013; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, 2018; Törnberg & Wahlström, 2018). A 




(progressive) counterpublics has limited the scope of research, leading to right-wing 
groups falling outside the theoretical map.66 
At the same time, the relational perspective, i.e. that counterpublics are best 
understood as self-perceived correctives to a dominant, excluding public sphere 
(Asen, 2002; Brouwer, 2006; Warner, 2002), rather than that they are excluded per 
se, provides a highly useful vantage point for studying counterpublics emanating 
from different ideologies. This aspect of the theoretical literature on counterpublics 
is thus emphasised in this dissertation, because it is expected that the comments on 
Islam will feature counterdiscourses from at least two opposing perspectives, 
deriving both from those highly sceptic and those highly sympathetic towards Islam 
and/or Muslims. 
This chapter has until now outlined the theoretical foundations of counterpublics. In 
the following, it will be specified how the theory is used in this dissertation to 
develop a theoretical framework for analysing the prevalence of counterpublic 
discourses in the analysed comment sections. 
Theoretical framework 
To identify an appropriate theoretical framework, the dissertation draws largely on 
Toepfl and Piwoni’s (2015) framework for studying counterpublics. Like the majority 
of recent theoretical accounts of the public sphere (e.g. Asen, 2000; Breese, 2011; 
Fraser, 1990; Dahlberg, 2007, 2011), they view the overarching public sphere of a 
polity—“the public sphere at large” (Fraser, 1992, p. 124)—as being comprised of a 
multiplicity of unequal (sub)public spheres. They suggest that researchers can 
delimit each of these subpublic spheres for heuristic purposes, by evaluating the 
characteristics of three criteria: (1) the communicative spaces within which a public 
sphere operates (e.g. the mass media, social networks, salons, parliament, online 
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forums); (2) the shared discursive patterns that distinguish a public sphere (e.g. 
deliberative discursive norms in the Habermasian tradition or the perception of 
exclusion in counterpublic theory; and (3) the participants who constitute a public 
sphere, both those actively contributing and the audience (e.g. journalists, activists, 
politicians, ordinary citizens) (Toepfl & Piwoni 2015, pp. 469–470). In addition, a 
fourth criterion (attitude) was added in this study to account for the fact that 
participants in the same communicative space may engage in similar discursive 
patterns and still have diametrically opposed views. This was necessary as 
commenters were found to challenge the wider public sphere by being both highly 
negative and highly positive to Islam. 
The heuristically delimited subpublic spheres in this study operate within the 
comment sections on Facebook (communicative space), express a perception of 
exclusion or marginalisation and often use informal and emotional language, 
although some comments are removed due to moderation rules against hate speech 
and other uncivil talk (discursive patterns), are made up by politically interested 
citizens who express their opinions about news on Islam on Facebook, while 
journalists function as moderators and, sometimes, as intervenors (the participants), 
and express fringe opinions on Islam and/or Muslims, one being highly negative, the 
other being highly positive (attitude). These two subpublic spheres, which are 
identified as analytically separate based on the criterion of attitude, are further 
separated from a third subpublic sphere. This subpublic sphere is found in the same 
communicative space, i.e. the Facebook comment sections, and is also marked by 
(at least superficially) similar participants, i.e. politically interested readers who 
express their views on Islam. This third subpublic is, however, different with respect 
to discursive patterns and attitude, as it does not presume to be marginalised or 
excluded. Rather, it engages in mainstream discourse (see the end of this subsection 
for a distinction between mainstream and counterpublic discourse) and is marked 




identification of three distinct subpublic spheres operating in the studied comment 
sections: (1) an anti-Islamist/Islam-critical/anti-Islam/anti-Muslim counterpublic 
sphere, (2) a pro-Islam/pro-Muslim counterpublic sphere, and (3) a mainstream 
public sphere. There was also semblance of a (4) counterpublic sphere marked by 
Islamist and conservative Islamic attitudes, although this group was highly marginal. 
The above-mentioned subpublics operating within the comment sections were 
identified as separate from a substantially more powerful subpublic sphere. This 
subpublic sphere is found in the established news outlets’ Facebook posts, which 
typically link to a longer news item on the established news media’s website 
(communicative space). The language used is typically more formal, and established 
norms for press coverage and journalism are central (discursive patterns). Media 
professionals in the form of editors and journalists function as gatekeepers and 
primarily present the voices of elite sources such as politicians and civil servants. 
The audience is (as with the readers of comment sections) politically interested 
citizens (participants). The opinions on Islam found in this subpublic sphere are 
typically more moderate compared to several of the other analytically identified 
subpublics (attitude). 
As pointed out by Toepfl and Piwoni (2015), the mass media is arguably one of the 
most powerful subpublic spheres within the public sphere at large, as it has a huge 
audience, is widely consumed by the countries’ elites, “and can thus be considered 
as having considerable impact on the formation of political will” (p. 470). In 
comparison, the subpublics in the comment sections are read by fewer people and 
can be considered much less powerful, as they feature less respected speakers and a 
significantly smaller, less influential audience. At the same time, they can be 
considered markedly more influential than secluded subpublics found, for instance, 
in issue-specific forums or on blogs, which are spaces that typically have a yet 




pointed out by Springer et al. (2015), since user comments are presented beneath 
news items, they are distributed via mass media, thus having the potential to reach 
a large audience. 
As we saw in the previous subsection, this study views counterpublics as self- 
perceived correctives, rather than as excluded per se (Asen, 2000; Brouwer, 2006; 
Warner, 2002). This means examining how such perceptions are manifested in 
discourse, rather than being fixed on persons, spaces, or topics as necessary 
markers of counterpublic status. Although counterpublics emerge in constellations 
of these elements (as the theoretical framework outlined in this subsection 
suggests), reductionism manifests if scholars regard a particular person, place, or 
topic as necessarily defining the limits of a counterpublic (Asen, 2000, p. 426). This 
does not mean that discourse is the only quality of counterpublics worthy of 
scholarly examination.67 Still, critical attention is most productively focused on the 
communicative qualities of counterpublics when evaluating how they position 
themselves against wider publics or the state (Asen 2000, p. 437). For example, it 
would be reductionist to consider a comment section itself a counterpublic, as 
commenters in a comment section may use different discursive patterns and have a 
range of different attitudes. It would also be reductionist to focus on identity-based 
conceptions of groups as a marker of counterpublic status, as it implies that all 
members of a “group” (e.g. women, workers, immigrants) have the same interests 
and agree on strategies to promote their interests. 
From this it follows that in order to study the prevalence of counterpublics in the 
Facebook comment sections, it is necessary to analyse what the commenters 




67 While Asen (2002, pp. 430–435) warns against the reductionism of using these three elements 
to determine what a counterpublic is, he still underlines the value of studying persons, spaces, and 




elements of counterpublic discourse. To measure the prevalence of these 
subpublics, then, it is necessary to define counterpublic discourse. 
Drawing on Toepfl and Piwoni (2015, p. 471), who based on the theoretical 
literature about counterpublics identify three characteristics of counterpublic 
discourse, counterpublic discursive patterns are here understood as talk that: 
(1) sets itself off from a superordinate public sphere which it explicitly 
deconstructs as being mainstream and dominant (deconstructing power 
relations, see Asen, 2000; Downey & Fenton, 2003); or 
(2) puts forward arguments that challenge the consensus of this superordinate 
public sphere (argumentative countering, see Fraser, 1990; Warner, 2002); or 
(3) seeks to strengthen a sense of collective identity among the supporters of the 
subordinate public sphere (strengthening identity, see Dahlberg, 2011; Fraser, 
1990). 
We will see in more detail how these three characteristics of counterpublic 
discourse were operationalised in this study in the following chapter. Before 
outlining the methodology, though, some additional theoretical perspectives are 
addressed. Unlike the three characteristics of counterpublic discourse described 
above, the following perspectives do not form the basis of the variables used in the 
content analysis but provide additional insights for discussing and making sense of 
the data. These are the concepts of the spheres of consensus, legitimate 
controversy, and deviance (Hallin, 1986) and the theory of corrective action 
(Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Hwang et al., 2008; Rojas, 2010). We start with Hallin’s 
spheres. 
Hallin’s Spheres 
In his book The Uncensored War (1986) about press coverage during the Vietnam 
War, Daniel Hallin examines the claim that during the Vietnam War the news media 




occurred not until after parts of the American political elite turned against the war. 
Thus, the event perhaps most cited as a case of news media influence on 
government policy actually is a case of political elites becoming divided over policy 
and news media coverage simply being a reflection of this (Robinson, 2001, p. 526). 
Based on these findings, Hallin (1986) develops the concept of three spheres, one of 
consensus, one of legitimate controversy, and one of deviance. These exist in 
relation to any given political issue. 




As shown in figure 3.1, he represents the spheres by a figure showing concentric 
circles, where the sphere of consensus is found in the centre, the sphere of deviance 
is found outside the circle, and the sphere of legitimate controversy is found 
between the spheres of consensus and deviance (Hallin, 1986, pp. 116–117). Each 
sphere represents levels of how acceptable certain political views and actors are in 
the eyes of the political mainstream and journalists. Within the sphere of consensus 
are those views and actors not regarded by journalists and most of society as 
controversial. Within this sphere, journalists do not feel bound to present opposing 
views or to remain disinterested reporters. On the contrary, the journalist’s role is to 




legitimate controversy, electoral contests and legislative debates take place. People 
may have (very) different views within this sphere, but this disagreement is 
considered valid. Objectivity and balance are therefore dominating journalistic 
virtues within this region. Beyond the sphere of legitimate controversy lies the 
sphere of deviance, consisting of those political actors and views which journalists 
and the political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard 
(Hallin, 1986, p. 117). Within this sphere, neutrality once again falls away, and 
journalism becomes a “boundary-maintaining mechanism”:68 “It plays the role of 
exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda those who violate or 
challenge the political consensus. It marks out and defends the limits of acceptable 
political conflict” (Hallin, 1986, p. 117). 
Hallin’s model recognises that it is the media that police the boundaries between 
the different spheres. In other words, the media have the power to decide whether 
to place actors and viewpoints within the different spheres (Taylor, 2014, p. 40). 
Importantly, each sphere has internal gradations, and the boundaries between them 
are often fuzzy. Within the sphere of legitimate controversy, for instance, near the 
border of the sphere of consensus, journalists practice objective journalism, where 
objectivity entails a pure recitation of official statements. Farther out, as the news 
media discuss issues on which consensus is weaker, the “adversary” ideal of the 
journalist as an independent investigator who holds powerful actors to account is 
emphasised (Hallin, 1986, pp. 117–118). 
It is worth noting that there is great disagreement pertaining to how the spheres are 
defined in Scandinavian debates on Islam and immigration. As we have seen in the 
subsections on counterpublics, there are both Islam-sceptic and Islam-sympathetic 
actors who perceive their views to be in opposition to the mainstream, illustrating 
the contested character of the limits of the debate. Defining the spheres is further 
 




complicated by the fact that they are dynamic, depending on the political climate 
and on the editorial line of the various media outlets (Hallin, 1986). In other words, 
the spheres can expand and contract over time. This is, for instance, illustrated by 
the shift in Swedish discourse following the 2015 refugee crisis, which led to intense 
political discussions around religion and migration (Demker, 2018, p. 393). In today’s 
media landscape, the many channels available for meta-debates mean that 
participants in debates around Islam and immigration regularly experience these 
vague borders between “inappropriate and “appropriate” topics and viewpoints 
(Figenschou & Beyer, 2014b, p. 433). 
While this study acknowledges that the spheres are contested, dynamic, and vague, 
there is little doubt that the three spheres have been defined differently in the 
Scandinavian countries when it comes to discussions around Islam and immigration. 
This is illustrated in the figure(s) below, which are based on the discussions in 
Chapter 2. 
Figure 3.2: Spheres of consensus (white), legitimate controversy (blue), and deviance 
(outside the concentric circles) in Scandinavian debates on Islam, immigration, and 
integration before 2015 refugee crisis 
Denmark Norway Sweden 
 
In Denmark, where the Danish People’s Party has had considerable influence on 
discourse since the mid-1990s, the acceptance of Islam- and immigrant-negative 
opinions have been the norm rather than the exception. As indicated by figure 3.2, 




limited, and thus a wide range of opinions have been considered legitimate. The fact 
that the major parties already in the latter half of the 1990s adopted some of DF’s 
anti-Islam rhetoric contributed to redefining the spheres relatively early compared 
to in Norway and Sweden. Since then, and particularly after 9/11, negative discourse 
on Islam in the Danish public sphere has moved closer and closer from the sphere of 
legitimate controversy to the sphere of consensus. Positive views towards Islam 
have correspondingly moved the other way in Hallin’s model, i.e. from well within 
the sphere of legitimate controversy to moving towards the edge of the sphere of 
legitimate controversy. Some also argue that positive opinions about Islam or 
criticism of anti-Islam rhetoric can be considered deviant in Danish public 
discourse.69 In fact, Hervik (2018, p. 10) argues that in all the Nordic countries apart 
from Sweden, race and racism are tabooed words, that “are not used due to 
political correctness, particularly when talking about anti-Muslim or anti-Islam racial 
slurs.” 
The Norwegian public sphere is, as we have seen, found between the Swedish and 
Danish public spheres in terms of the attitudes that have been expressed towards 
Islam and immigration. Since the 1980s, the Progress Party has impacted political, 
media, and public discourse, and over time, the repetitive, controversial statements 
made by members of the party led to perspectives that earlier bordered the deviant 
sphere gradually becoming accepted (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014b, p. 435). Still, 
radical right-wing actors, including members of the FrP, do not seldom make 
statements that are widely condemned by other parties and the media 
commentariat, such as claiming that Norway is victim to “sneak Islamisation”70 and 
that another crusade may be necessary to handle Islam.71 The consensus of 
 








Norwegian debates on Islam and immigration has been relatively limited compared 
to in Sweden but more limited than in Denmark. According to Figenschou and Beyer 
(2014b, p. 434), there has only been consensus about fundamental principles such 
as that skin colour or race should not decide how people are treated, and that basic 
human rights should be respected. 
Islam- and immigration-negative views in Sweden, notably represented by the 
Sweden Democrats, have largely been found in the sphere of deviance. The political 
establishment and mainstream media have described these positions and actors as 
xenophobic, racist, fascist, and Nazi, thus keeping them outside the sphere of 
legitimate controversy. The large consensus has been marked by positive views 
towards Islam, multiculturalism, and immigration. Describing the difficulty of 
challenging the strong consensus in Swedish discourse on various topics, including 
immigration, political scientist Henrik Oscarsson (2013) coined the term “opinion 
corridor” (åsiktskorridor). This metaphor is closely related to Hallin’s spheres (1986) 
and illustrates that there has been little room for legitimate debate about issues 
that people have markedly different opinions on than what is reflected in public 
debate. While not indicated in figure 3.2, the Swedish spheres (or, to use 
Oscarsson’s terminology, opinion corridor) have clearly been redefined following the 
2015 refugee crisis, as Islam- and immigrant-critical views have become more 
legitimate, and the sphere of consensus has contracted substantially. Today, the 
debate climate is more similar to that of its Scandinavian neighbours (Brochmann, 
2018), although the Sweden Democrats was shunned by the other parties until 
2019. 
In line with an international development, the Scandinavian countries have seen the 
emergence of more and less deviant anti-Islam actors online, marked especially by 
alternative news outlets. These outlets are often criticised by politicians and media 




regard for facts.72 In response, they actively portray themselves as victims of 
political censorship and consensus culture, to the extent that they have been forced 
to create their own publics (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014b, p. 436). These news sites 
are central actors in the anti-Islam counterpublics found in the three countries, 
sometimes being able to put issues on the political agenda that the established 
news media have been reluctant to or not deemed important. Like right-wing 
populist parties, their content is widely shared through social media (Hedman et al., 
2018). At the same time, unlike the right-wing populist parties, the most radical anti- 
Islamic news outlets do not strive to enter the sphere of legitimate controversy, as 
they consider the established news media and political establishment to be a lost 
cause. Instead, they choose to remain in the sphere of deviance, communicating 
their message to a substantial number of devoted readers (Figenschou & Beyer, 
2014b, p. 436). 
Figenschou and Ihlebæk (2019, p. 1225), describing the Norwegian context, argue 
that anti-Islamic news sites can be said to lie on the border of the sphere of 
legitimate controversy, i.e. they are sometimes invited into mainstream public 
debate but are generally dismissed for being too radical. This can arguably also be 
said about the Danish alternative right-wing media, whereas the Swedish alternative 
news sites more clearly find themselves in the sphere of deviance, i.e. journalists 
and the political mainstream (generally) dismiss them as unworthy of being heard 
(Hallin, 1986, p. 117). At the same time, this type of outlet is more popular among 
the Swedish than the Norwegian and Danish populations (Reuters Institute, 2019), 
indicating that the relatively mild Swedish debate climate has been conducive to 











immigration (Heft et al, 2019). For the same reason, Islam-critical counterpublic 
discourses are expected to be highly prevalent in the comment sections of Swedish 
news outlets examined in this study. 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, however, Facebook affordances related to, for 
instance, moderation policies mean that the comment sections on the Facebook 
pages of established news media likely will not feature the most deviant opinions. 
Still, the relatively low threshold for getting one’s opinions published in comment 
sections compared to in more traditional media formats such as letters to the editor 
(McCluskey & Hmielowski, 2012) speak in favour of counterpublic-minded 
individuals’ active participation, as they seek to challenge mainstream audiences 
and expand the sphere of legitimate controversy. 
Corrective Action 
It may be useful to think of citizens’ commenting activity as a form of corrective 
action in order to understand differences between the countries’ comment sections. 
While inspired by the corrective action hypothesis (Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Hwang 
et al., 2008; Rojas, 2010), which has found that people who perceive media to be 
biased and influential will be more likely to take action to “correct” for this in the 
public sphere, the term corrective action is here used more broadly. Rather than 
linking it strictly to presumed media bias and influence, it is assumed that 
commenters also are likely to take action to correct political discourse and 
viewpoints in the public sphere more generally. For instance, in the same way that 
someone may perceive media to be biased and have influence over others, 
someone may think that the political establishment or public sphere in general are 
dominated by overly Islam-friendly perspectives that impact how others view Islam. 
Whether these perceptions are right or wrong, they may prompt people to engage 
politically in various ways to correct for these (perceived) phenomena, to prevent 




The corrective action perspective may be considered to be at odds with the “spiral 
of silence” theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1993), which predicts that those who perceive 
their opinions to be in the minority will be less likely to express themselves due to 
fear of social isolation. Researchers have pointed out, however, that these theories 
do not necessarily clash, but rather operate under nuanced circumstances and 
contexts (Duncan et al., 2020, p. 192). For instance, Tsfati and Cohen (2005) find 
that perceived negative coverage of Israeli settlers makes those settlers more willing 
to forcibly resist the government. Tsafti (2007), on the contrary, shows another 
effect among minority Arab groups in Israel, who feel more alienated as a result of 
media hostility perception and presumed media influence. In addition to socio- 
political contexts, personality traits such as outspokenness influence willingness to 
speak up against perceived bias (McKeever, McKeever, & Li, 2017). 
Moreover, there are differences between political partisans and those with 
moderate opinions. Political partisans, especially those who have strong opinions, 
are not likely to alter their stances when confronted with oppositional arguments 
(Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009) and are relatively willing to participate in discussions 
in comment sections that oppose their opinion (Duncan et al., 2020). Centrists, 
however, are susceptible to group preferences and more likely to conform to the 
perceived opinion climate (Mutz, 1992). They are also less likely to write in 
comment sections than political partisans (Kalogeropoulos et al, 2017). At the same 
time, it has been found that centrists’ willingness to comment is not dependent on 
whether they agree or disagree with the dominant opinion, i.e. they do not seem to 
be victim to a spiral of silence (Duncan et al., 2020, p. 198). 
Overall, the reason for adopting the corrective action perspective in this study 
rather than that of a spiral of silence is largely based on political partisans’ high 
commenting activity and willingness to correct discourse they disagree with, in 




Kalogeropoulos et al., 2017). Furthermore, corrective action as a theoretical lens 
harmonises well with viewing comment sections as providing significant affordances 
for counterpublic-minded individuals, who for various reasons may have a strong 
incentive to use these arenas to correct for perceived “wrongs” in the public sphere. 
This includes for instance the fact that comment sections provide a good 
opportunity to challenge a wider, mainstream audience. At the same time, it is 
recognised that many choose not to participate in the comment sections, not 
necessarily because they are afraid of social isolation due to disagreeing with 
perceived dominant opinions (i.e. spiral of silence), but because they view comment 
sections as places ridden with impolite speech and harassment (Burkal & Veledar, 
2018). 
If the corrective action perspective is predictive of the results in this dissertation, it 
can be expected that Islam-critical comments will dominate the Swedish comment 
sections, given the relatively strong presence of Islam-positive discourse in the 
Swedish public sphere, while there will be fewer Islam-critical comments in the 
Danish comment sections, given the relatively strong presence of Islam-negative 
discourse in the Danish public sphere. Correspondingly, the opposite will be the case 
for Islam-positive comments, i.e. they will be relatively marginal in the Swedish case 
and relatively prevalent in the Danish case. Norwegian comments, due to the 
Norwegian public sphere being in a position between the Swedish and Danish one 
when it comes to debates on Islam, are expected to be found in a position between 
the two. 
Still, it is worth reiterating that the element of perception is key. Those expressing 
that e.g. the political establishment or mainstream media is afraid “to tell the truth” 
about Islam are here understood to be self-perceived correctives. For instance, 
Danes may view national discourse on Islam and immigration as overly friendly, 




national discourse on Islam as fundamentally racist, even if most research describes 
the Swedish public sphere as the least critical to Islam and immigration among the 
Scandinavian countries (see Chapter 2). 
Viewing Scandinavian debate on Islam more generally through the lens of the 
corrective action perspective, the radical right populist parties have been central in 
“correcting” the discourse. In all the three countries, although only very recently in 
Sweden, they have contributed to moving perspectives on Islam and immigration 
from the sphere of deviance to the sphere of legitimate controversy, and they have 
done so by, among other things, targeting the other political parties and the 
established news media. All the three major Scandinavian radical right populist 
parties have for instance attacked the fully state-owned public broadcasters for 
having a left-wing agenda.73 They have also used social media strategically to 
communicate their messages unfiltered to the audience (and in some cases to 
interact with supporters) (Kalsnes, 2019), generating levels of engagement that are 
unmatched by the other parties. The same description applies not least to anti- 
Islamic news outlets, who, as we have seen, brand themselves as a corrective to the 
biased and “politically correct” mainstream media (Holt, 2018), which is considered 
to hide the truth about the dangers posed by (Muslim) immigrants (Nygaard, 2019). 
Progressive actors have also taken corrective action in response to what they have 
perceived as an essentialising and problem-fixated public discourse on Islam and 
immigration. A good example of this is the Danish grassroots movement 
Venligboerne (“The Friendly Neighbours”), founded in 2013, whose aim is to build 
bridges between people and to make refugees feel welcome in Denmark.74 Starting 
 
 









as a local initiative in the remote town of Hjørring, Venligboerne (VB) spread 
through social media, becoming an international movement. In Denmark, 
membership numbers reached 150,000 in less than a year, primarily accounted 
through Facebook group memberships, one of the core organising principles of the 
movement (Koukouzelis, 2019). The movement’s activities are based on three 
guiding principles: (1) be friendly in the meeting with others, (2) be curious when 
you meet people who are different from you, and (3) meet diversity with respect 
(Siim & Meret, 2019, p. 37). Central for VB has been the attempt to challenge the 
distinction between “Dane” and “refugee” (Nygaard, 2017). While the Hjørring 
segment of the movement prefers to focus on the local and everyday character of 
the activities, Copenhagen VB prefers a critical political approach that includes 
criticising the governments’ asylum, migration, and integration policies (Siim & 
Meret, 2019, p. 37). As such, they have chosen different strategies to “correct” for 
opposition to accommodating refugees and asylum seekers in Denmark. 
Chapter Summary 
Based on critical examinations of Habermas’s pivotal study of the structural 
transformation of the public sphere, researchers have identified what are called 
counterpublics (Felski, 1990; Fraser, 1990; Negt & Kluge, 1972/1993). While there 
are several definitions of counterpublics, the one provided by Fraser (1990) has 
been particularly influential. Noting how women, workers, peoples of colour, and 
LGBTQ people have repeatedly found it advantageous to constitute alternative 
publics, Fraser (1990) defined what she called “subaltern counterpublics” as 
“parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and 
circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional 
interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (p. 67). Counterpublics have 
twofold aims: one marked by inwards-oriented goals (formulating alternative 




(shifting consensus structures within dominant publics) by engaging larger publics 
and targeting dominant publics with “counterpublicity” (Asen, 2000, p. 441). 
 
Although existing literature on counterpublics has largely focused on progressive 
and left-wing actors, counterpublics can also have a right-wing or extreme-right 
ideology (e.g. Cammaerts, 2009). This is exemplified by Scandinavian debates on 
Islam and immigration, where both left-wing and right-wing actors position 
themselves as correctives to powerful publics. Therefore, counterpublics may be 
best understood as self-perceived correctives, rather than groups or movements 
that are “objectively” marginalised from the public sphere at large. A related, key 
point is that the “counter” in counterpublics is best examined through analysing 
discourse, because reductionism manifests if people (e.g. all black people or all 
women) or particular spaces (e.g. comment sections and blogs) are considered 
counterpublics (Asen, 2000, p. 437). 
Drawing on Toepfl & Piwoni’s (2015, p. 471) definition of counterpublic discourse, 
counterpublic discourse is here understood as talk that: (1) sets itself off from a 
superordinate public sphere which it explicitly deconstructs as being mainstream 
and dominant (deconstructing power relations); (2) puts forward arguments that 
challenge the consensus of this superordinate public sphere, and (3) seeks to 
strengthen a sense of collective identity among the supporters of the subordinate 
public sphere (strengthening identity) (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, p. 471). These 
characteristics are used in the content analysis of the comments to evaluate the 
prevalence of counterpublic discourses. 
This chapter has also addressed Hallin’s (1986) spheres of consensus, legitimate 
controversy, and deviance. While there is no doubt that the spheres are contested 
and vague, they have been defined quite differently in the Scandinavian countries 
when it comes to debates around Islam and immigration. Sweden has stood out 




practiced by mainstream media and the political establishment to keep Islam- and 
immigrant-critical actors in the sphere of deviance (see also Chapter 2). 
The corrective action perspective may be useful to explain differences between the 
countries’ comment sections. Drawing on this perspective, it is predicted that 
citizens’ comments will display a principally opposite sentiment towards Islam from 
the general Scandinavian public spheres. Actors from the far left to the far right 
have sought to “correct” perceived “wrongs” in the public discourse on Islam and 
immigration to avoid others being swayed by these opinions, and comment sections 




Chapter 4: Methodology 
Chapter 4 describes the methodological approach, with particular emphasis on how 
the comments are analysed using the counterpublic framework outlined in the 
previous chapter. The chapter begins, though, with discussing the relevant ethical 
considerations of studying comment sections on social media. Second, it addresses 
data selection and collection, both with respect to posts and comments. Third, it 
gives a brief description of the main tenets of quantitative content analysis, 
including how to measure (intercoder) reliability. Finally, the chapter explains the 
variables used in the quantitative content analysis of the posts and comments. 
Ethical Considerations When Researching Comment Sections on Social 
Media 
The massive and increasing numbers of people engaging with social media75 have 
led to massive amounts of data on any number of topics, ranging from consumer 
behaviours to attitudes on political issues, being available “at the click of a button”. 
While the opportunities that these developments facilitate for researchers are 
momentous, they are not without ethical challenges (Golder, Ahmed, Norman, & 
Booth, 2017; Townsend & Wallace, 2016), particularly relating to researchers’ 
responsibility to respect social media users’ right to privacy. 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide an extensive discussion 
of ethical considerations related to social media studies in general, I focus on two 
central considerations that I deem particularly relevant to the study at hand and 
that are also emphasised in the academic literature on the ethics of social media 
research (e.g. Golder et al., 2017; Fossheim & Ingierd, 2015; Moreno, Goniu, 
Moreno, & Diekema, 2013). One ethical consideration pertains to whether 
researchers should be required to inform and obtain consent from their social media 






relation to the use of quotes, which may enable the identification of data subjects 
due to the persistent and searchable nature of Internet communication (Boyd, 
2008). I view these ethical considerations as related, because, for instance, 
presenting the data in a way that may enable the identification of a data subject 
may necessitate obtaining consent. 
While it is widely accepted in the social sciences that ethical research will aim to 
obtain informed consent from all participants involved, informed consent may be 
difficult to obtain in online contexts (NESH, 2019; Willis, 2019), particularly in studies 
with thousands or hundreds of thousands of data subjects. This is relevant for this 
study, which analyses comments published by several thousand Facebook users. At 
the same time, due to the importance of obtaining informed consent, some scholars 
have argued that a study of public information should not be carried out if informed 
consent cannot be obtained (see e.g. Duncan, 1996). Similarly, Hoser and Nitschke 
(2010) argue in relation to the use of social media data that nobody else than the 
intended audience, i.e. the social media community in question, should be allowed 
to use the data generated in such a site, unless consent is obtained. They point out 
that, “Researchers are probably not the audience an average user intends to reach 
by his or her postings and serving as a research object is normally not the purpose 
an average user has in mind when posting on a social network site or in a 
newsgroup” (Hoser & Nitschke, 2010, pp. 185–186). 
 
Generally, though, there is wide acceptance for a more flexible approach that 
considers the individual characteristics of each project (see e.g. Elgesem, 2015; 
Townsend & Wallace, 2016; Willis, 2019). This view is also reflected in the guidelines 
for internet research outlined by The Norwegian National Committee for Research 
Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities (NESH), which describes that the 
requirement to inform and obtain consent from the research subjects depends on 




the sensitivity of the information, (3) the vulnerability of the participants and (4) the 
interaction with the participants (NESH, 2019, p. 13). In addition, the dissemination 
of research results should be considered (Townsend & Wallace, 2016). Following this 
more flexible approach supported by NESH, it will in the next paragraphs be 
evaluated how these factors relate to the study at hand. 
With respect to accessibility in the public sphere, this dissertation studies online 
comments published on public Facebook pages. Such studies have lower 
requirements related to informing the data subjects and obtaining consent than 
studies of private (and more blurred private-public) online settings do, because the 
information may reasonably be considered to have a wider intended audience 
(NESH, 2019, p. 10). The fact that the Facebook pages of the selected news outlets 
for this study are “liked” and “followed” by several hundred thousand Facebook 
users underlines the public nature of the studied arenas. While it is likely true, as 
Hoser and Nitschke (2010) argue, that people who partake in these (public) 
discussions do not expect their statements to be studied by a researcher, neither is 
it a reasonable expectation, given the context, that the information will not be used 
in research (Elgesem, 2015, p. 26). This can be contrasted with, for instance, a study 
of a small, private Facebook group, where individuals have a reasonable expectation 
that their communication will not be used in research, given the private context of 
the channel. In the latter case, using the communication in research will demand 
obtaining consent, while in the former, not obtaining consent can be justified due to 
the information’s accessibility in the public sphere. 
As for the sensitivity of the information, opinions on political issues are generally less 
sensitive than information of a more personal nature (for instance related to mental 
or physical health). At the same time, Islam is arguably one of the more sensitive 
topics of political debate in the Scandinavian public spheres. The high occurrence of 




serves as an illustration. It is understandable if people who have published a 
comment do not want to be associated with that comment in a dissertation or other 
form of publication, for instance if the comment is harsh or aggressive. Thus, the 
way the results are disseminated becomes relevant for whether consent should be 
required. 
The ethics related to dissemination of research results are particularly relevant with 
respect to the use of quotes: is it ethical to quote comments from public, popular 
Facebook pages discussing Islam without obtaining consent? I would argue that this 
depends on the likelihood of the quote leading to identification of the commenter 
and the value in using quotes in the presentation of the results. When presenting the 
findings from the studied comments on Islam, it was found in this study that while 
synthesising the communication was sometimes adequate, quotes proved valuable 
in illustrating several types of comments and made the presentation more vibrant 
and authentic. It was therefore desirable from the researcher’s perspective to use 
quotes. Using “composite narratives” (Davidson & Letterby, 2014) where quotes are 
rewritten to avoid searchability was considered, but because this strategy involves 
the modification of data, which necessarily reduces data quality (Hård af Segerstad, 
Howes, Kasperowski, & Kullenberg, 2016, p. 222), the decision was made to stick 
with quotes. In order to pay due caution to the data subjects, metadata such as 
Facebook page and post link were not cited.76 Only the nationality of the 
commenter was mentioned, because this was unlikely to contribute to identifying 
the commenter and because nationality could be important for the dissemination of 
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Denmark. Furthermore, quotes were translated from Scandinavian languages into 
English,77 meaning they were not searchable. 
When it comes to the case of the vulnerability of the research subjects, this is hard 
to evaluate when studying a high number of online comments, written by many data 
subjects with various backgrounds. For instance, children and adolescents who 
participate in research are entitled to special protection (NESH, 2019, p. 12), and 
although the vast majority of Facebook users are adults, children above 13 are 
allowed to use the platform, and, due to trivial prevention methods, more than 20 
million users below the age of 13 are also estimated to be using Facebook (Lee, 
2017). It was therefore difficult, if not impossible, to guarantee that children did not 
author some of the comments in the studied material, which entailed an extra 
responsibility to ensure that the data were safeguarded. Therefore, the collected 
data were anonymised and kept on a password-restricted PC. 
There was no interaction with the research participants in this study, i.e. the 
researcher did not participate in the exchange of opinions. A study with no 
interaction between researcher and research participants may be exempted from 
the obligation to inform and obtain consent (McKee, 2009; NESH, 2019), although, 
as we have seen, this depends on several factors. 
Overall, then, the decision was made not to inform and obtain consent from the 
data subjects. This can be justified by the fact that the information is highly 
accessible in the public sphere and that the researcher had no interaction with the 
research participants. In order to account for potentially sensitive communication 
and the potential participation of children or adolescents, concerns related to 




77 All quotes were translated by the researcher, a native Norwegian speaker with good command 
of English, who studied in the UK for three years at undergraduate level. The researcher also has 




searchability were addressed in order to avoid identification. While quotes were 
used because of their valuable role in the presentation of the results, they were 
translated into another language, and metadata such as post link and date of 
publication were not presented, which served to limit the likelihood of the Facebook 
users being identified. Based on these considerations, the project was approved by 
the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). 
Data Selection and Collection 
The 5 news outlets from each country with the highest number of “followers” on 
their Facebook pages were selected for analysis. These are Aftenposten, Dagbladet, 
Norsk rikskringkasting (NRK), TV2, and Verdens Gang (VG) from Norway; 
Aftonbladet, Expressen, Nyheter24, Sveriges Television (SVT), and TV4 from Sweden; 
and B.T., Danmarks Radio (DR), Ekstra Bladet, Politiken, and TV2 from Denmark. The 
outlets’ most popular Facebook pages have between 265,000 and 592,000 followers 
(early 2019), indicating that a substantial proportion of the relatively small 
Scandinavian populations follow what these outlets post on Facebook (albeit not 
necessarily actively). By focusing on the most followed news media, the study 
analyses content from the Scandinavian news outlets whose reach on Facebook can 
be presumed to be the largest. 
Table 4.1: Type of news media included in the study 
 
News media Type 
NRK, SVT, DR Traditional public service broadcaster 
Aftenposten, Politiken Broadsheet 
Dagbladet, VG, Aftonbladet, Expressen, 
Nyheter 24, B.T., Ekstra Bladet 
Tabloid 
TV2 (NO), TV4, TV2 (DK) Hybrid broadcaster 
The selected news media could be placed into four groups: (1) traditional public 




advertising; (2) broadsheets; (3) tabloids; and (4) hybrid broadcasters (HSBs)—i.e. 
terrestrial free-to-air broadcasters with commercial funding plus must-carry 
privileges and some co-regulated public service obligations (Lund & Berg, 2009, p. 
21). As shown in table 4.1, tabloids were the most represented type of news media. 
It is worth noting that the profiled Swedish broadsheet Dagens Nyheter is not one of 
the top 5 most followed Swedish news media on Facebook and was thus not 
included in the study, unlike Norwegian broadsheet Aftenposten and Danish 
broadsheet Politiken. This may have some implications for the results, as 
broadsheets tend to have a less sensationalist style than tabloids do. For instance, it 
is possible it could lead to a relatively higher focus on negatively loaded themes like 
Jihadism, crime, and honour culture in the Swedish posts than what would have 
been the case if Dagens Nyheter had been included. To the extent that commenters 
are influenced by the content to which they are responding, this may also affect 
what people write about Islam in the comment sections. The benefit of basing the 
selection on popularity is that it enables the study of counterpublic discourses in 
near proximity to the presumably most influential Scandinavian news outlets on 
Facebook. The fact that five news media from each country were chosen, rather 
than for instance two to three, may alleviate the impact that the lack of a 
broadsheet in the Swedish selection can be expected to have on the comparative 
findings. 
As we have seen, this study focuses on Facebook. Therefore, if an article or video 
was published on the news media’s main website but not on one of its Facebook 
pages, the item would not be included in this study. Most Facebook posts published 
by the news outlets did, however, have a link to an article on the outlet’s main 
website, and these articles were included in the analysis. 
All identified Facebook pages administered by the selected media outlets were 




NRK Nordland, TV2 Østjylland), the emphasis of this study being on national rather 
than regional and local discussions. Some outlets have numerous Facebook pages, 
while others have only two or three. Most have what may be considered a main 
Facebook page using just the name of the outlet (e.g. Aftenposten, VG, Ekstra 
Bladet), which typically has the most followers. Other Facebook pages are related to 
different TV or radio channels associated with the outlets (e.g. DR1, DR2), certain tv 
or radio shows (e.g. NRK Brennpunkt, DR Detektor), topics (e.g. Aftenposten Politikk, 
B.T. Underholdning, Expressen Kultur), and genres (e.g. Aftonbladet Ledare, 
Dagbladet Meninger, SVT Dokumentär). 
Posts on the 15 news media’s Facebook pages from 1 June–31 December 2018 that 
included at least one of the following search words in their title or introductory 
description were selected for analysis:78 “allah”, “burka”, “burqa”, “fatwa”, “hijab”, 
“imam”, “islam”, “koran”, “mekka”, “medina”, “mohammed”, “muhammed”, 
“mohammad”, “muhammad”, “muslim”, “moske”, “moské”, “mufti”, “mujahedin”, 
“mullah”, “nikab”, “niqab”, “quran”, “sharia”, “slør”, “slöj”, “tørklæde”.79 The search 
words were based on those used by Baker et al (2013, p. 28), who studied the 
representation of Islam in the British press, albeit they were adjusted to the 
Scandinavian languages and contexts. The selected period (1 June–31 December 
2018) was chosen with the aim of analysing relatively recent discourse on Islam. The 
downside of studying a single period is that one is vulnerable to period-specific 
events impacting the results. For this study, this means that it is necessary to 
especially consider how the Danish ban of face-covering clothing and the Swedish 





78 All forms of the words were included (e.g. also Islamist, Islamists, and Islamism in addition to 
Islam). 




Data that met the selected criteria were identified through a two-step approach. 
First, the social media data service Twingly was used. Twingly returns a collection of 
Facebook posts matching a specified query, which in this case was based on the 
previously mentioned selection criteria. Seven such queries were made—one each 
month—as Twingly restricts gathering data to one month back in time. Second, a 
manual search was done on all relevant Facebook pages to look for posts matching 
the selection criteria to check if there were posts that had not been identified by 
Twingly. After completing these steps, all the identified posts were read to confirm 
that they dealt with Islam or Muslims. Except for some items that mentioned the 
name Muhammed and Medina in nonrelevant contexts, the posts identified were 
considered relevant (N=602).80 
While all 602 posts (and their associated articles) were analysed, the decision was 
made to focus on a selection of the several hundred thousand comments 
responding to the posts. Only original comments were selected, i.e. comments 
replying directly to the posts published by the news outlets rather than comments 
replying to comments written by other ordinary citizens. The rationale for this is that 
original comments are typically those that engage most clearly with the content in 
the posts (and the wider public sphere) and were therefore most relevant for 
analysing the relationship between the (counterpublic) subspheres operating within 
the comment sections and the more powerful subpublic operating in the posts, 
represented by the established news media. The direct conversation between 
citizens in the comment sections is thus not considered here (cf. Andersen, 2019 for 
a study on rhetorical perspectives on Scandinavian citizens discussing the 
 
 
80 After having carried out the selection process a second time in the final stage of the dissertation 
to see how many of the total number of posts published by the news media were about Islam, 36 
relevant posts that had not been originally identified were found. These posts were checked for 
their theme and sentiment to see whether they deviated from the 602 originally identified posts, 
and it was found that they did not. Because including these would not have changed the results, 




immigration issue in the Facebook comment sections of established news media). 
10% of the (original) comments replying to each post were selected for analysis but 
with a maximum of 50 comments from each post in order to avoid the results being 
affected significantly from replies to a few engaging posts. For instance, if a post had 
3000 original replies, 50 comments were coded rather than 300. Correspondingly, a 
minimum limit of 5 comments per post (unless there were less than 5 comments) 
was set to facilitate that comments responding to a wide range of posts would be 
included in the data set. Which 10% of the comments to analyse was based on 
chronology; the first published comments were selected.81 Comments that could not 
be coded, for instance because they were off-topic or too brief for their meaning to 
be interpreted, were discarded. In total, the described criteria gave 6797 comments 
to be analysed. Thus, this project analyses 602 Facebook posts (and associated 
articles) published by established news outlets and 6797 Facebook comments 
written in response to these. 
Quantitative Content Analysis 
To analyse the posts and comments, a quantitative content analysis was conducted. 
Kerlinger (1986) defined content analysis as a method of studying and analysing 
communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose 
of measuring variables. As explained by Østbye, Helland, Knapskog, Larsen, and Moe 
 
 
81 Most Facebook pages let you sort comments from newest to oldest. This does, however, not 
give perfect (reverse) chronology. If the oldest comment (which will be at the bottom when 
sorting from newest to oldest) receives a reply, it will be moved to the top of the comment section 
above the newest original replies. It is possible to check exactly when a comment was published 
by hovering the mouse over a comment, but this is not feasible in the long run when dealing with 
sometimes thousands of comments. To make the selection as chronological as possible given 
these challenges, a decision was made to select one comment from the top of the comment 
section (that had at least one reply) for every fourth comment that was selected from the bottom 
of the comment section. As such, the selection process was adjusted to the fact that some old 
comments were pushed to the top of the comment section, although recognising that perfect 
chronology could not be achieved. The order of comments on the few outlets’ Facebook pages 
that let you sort comments from oldest to newest rather than from newest to oldest is not 
impacted by replies and shows comments in a perfect chronological order. Thus, no adjustment 




(2013, p. 208), the systematic character of content analysis means that general rules 
are formulated for analysing the material, which are described in a so-called 
codebook. Every selected textual unit (in this case Facebook posts and Facebook 
comments) is classified (“coded”) for every variable. This dissertations’ codebooks 
are found in Appendices 1 and 2, where Appendix 1 pertains to posts and Appendix 
2 pertains to comments. Objectivity with respect to quantitative content analysis 
means limiting the influence of a sole person’s interpretation. In practice, this is 
typically done by testing intercoder reliability, i.e. seeing how congruently two or 
more individuals (coders) judge a subselection of units (see e.g. Krippendorff, 2018; 
Neuendorf, 2016). Objectivity in this setting does not imply that the analysis is 
congruent with “reality”, only that reliability is achieved through the consistent 
coding of two or more individuals (Østbye et al., 2013, p. 208). Intercoder reliability 
can be measured in a number of ways and there is no consensus on which measure 
to use (see the following subsection for a description of measuring reliability). The 
quantitative character of a content analysis indicates—as the name suggests—that it 
is an approach aimed at describing data through numbers (Østbye et al., 2013, p. 
208). 
 
When studying nominal data, the values of the analysed variables must be 
independent, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive. To illustrate this point, Stemler 
(2001) gives the example of an analysis attempting to code the kinds of courses 
offered at a particular school, where the coding scheme has five values: 
mathematics, science, literature, biology, and calculus. This scheme is troubling, 
because whenever a biology course is coded it would also be coded as a science 
course. As such, the values are not independent or mutually exclusive. Furthermore, 
since you are likely to encounter courses at a school that are not found in the coding 






The most intuitive and historically most popular coefficient for measuring intercoder 
reliability is simple percent agreement. In the methodological literature, however, 
percent agreement is considered a misleading and inappropriately liberal measure 
of intercoder reliability, as it does not account for the fact that coders are expected 
to agree with each other a certain percentage of the time simply based on chance 
(Krippendorf, 2004; Lombard, Snyder-Dutch, & Bracken, 2002; Neuendorf, 2016). 
For instance, agreement between coders on a variable with only two values (e.g. 
something is present or absent) is easy to achieve because chance alone could 
produce agreement half of the time (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005, p. 142). Consequently, 
numerous coefficients have been developed to take chance agreement into 
consideration. To measure reliability in this study, I use Cohen’s kappa (1960), which 
is one of the most used chance-correcting coefficients.82 
The kappa coefficient approaches 1 when coding is perfectly reliable and goes to 0 
when there is no agreement other than what would be expected by chance. If it 
goes below 0, reliability is lower than what could be expected by chance (Stemler, 
2001). As explained by Neuendorf (2009), there is no universally agreed-upon 
minimum levels for the various reliability indexes. Pertaining to Cohen’s kappa, 
Banerjee, Capozzoli, McSweeney, and Sinha (1999) argue that a kappa of 0.75+ 
indicates excellent agreement beyond chance; 0.40–0.75 is fair to good; and below 
0.40 is poor agreement. Landis and Koch (1977) hold that a kappa coefficient of 
0.81–1.00 indicates almost perfect agreement, 0.61–0.80 is substantial, and 0.41– 
0.60 is moderate. Kvålseth (1989) describes a kappa coefficient of 0.61 as 
representing reasonably good overall agreement. Popping (1988) advocates a 
stricter line and proposes a cutoff criterion of 0.80 for Cohen’s kappa. Based on a 








consideration, Neuendorf (2016, p. 168) describe that 0.80 or greater would be 
acceptable to all, 0.60 or greater would be acceptable in most situations, and below 
that, there exists disagreement. Following general recommendations in the 
methodological literature, acceptable reliability of the variables in this study was set 
at 0.60+. 
To carry out an inter-coder reliability test in this study, a random selection of 10% of 
the posts and their associated article texts (n=60) were analysed by another doctoral 
student. The same doctoral student and a student on undergraduate level carried 
out individual analyses of a random selection of 5% of the comments (n=340).83 
Their analyses of the posts and comments, respectively, were tested against my 
analyses to measure intercoder reliability. The coders had limited knowledge about 
the project and were trained in the relevant coding scheme (one for posts, one for 
comments) before carrying out the analysis. The software package SPSS was used to 
calculate the kappa coefficients. 
Post variables 
In the analysis of the Facebook posts—the main variables source, theme, genre, 
sentiment (towards Islam), and popularity cues (i.e. the number of shares, 



















83 The undergraduate student carried out an analysis of 393 comments, 5% of N=7859, i.e. the 















Popularity cues Not 
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As depicted in table 4.2, satisfactory intercoder reliability (0.60+), as measured by 
Cohen’s kappa, was achieved for all post variables: source (0.83), theme (0.8), genre 
(0.94), and sentiment (0.74). Inter-coder reliability was not measured for popularity 
cues, as coding these was a straight-forward process of simply registering the 
number on the screen. In addition to a variable that coded the source’s 
position/role, two related variables were coded: whether a source was Muslim 
(Cohen’s kappa 0.81) and whether the Muslim expressed a liberal, conservative, 
(radical) Islamist, or undefined stance (0.85). In the following, the post variables are 
described in more detail. 
When coding the source of a post, only the main source was coded. The first source 
in a post was coded as the main source, as long as the next source was not given 
twice as much space (in an article) or time (in a video). To be considered a source in 
a news post, the person had to be quoted; it was not enough to just be mentioned. 
For debate articles, the author of the article was coded as a source. In video posts of 
debates and speeches, the main speaker was coded as a source. Source was thus 
defined broadly to be found in both news and debate items. The source was coded 
according to the position he or she appeared as in the post (e.g. politician, civil 




Also, to measure the representation of Muslim voices, sources were classified as 
either Muslim, non-Muslim, or unclear. Another variable classified the perspectives 
that Muslims expressed as either liberal, conservative, (radical) Islamist, or 
undefined. Admittedly, these characteristics were simplified and far from 
representative of the wide and eclectic range of views among Muslims, the point 
being merely to give an impression of the Muslim perspectives that were voiced 
through the Scandinavian news outlets’ Facebook posts. It is worth noting that one 
by categorising people as e.g. Muslim and non-Muslim and liberal and conservative 
one risks contributing to the “Othering” one wishes to measure (Eide, 2010; 
Figenschou & Beyer, 2014a; Fonn, Orgeret, & Simonsen, 2012). People may not 
want to be primarily presented as a member of a religious group, even though 
research has found this to be the case to a large degree (e.g. Jacobsen, Jensen, 
Vitus, & Weibel, 2013). The reason why this study still seeks to measure the 
presence of Muslim sources, is because it considers it important and necessary to 
see to which degree Muslims’ own perspectives are represented in the news 
media’s coverage on Islam. 
 
With respect to the theme variable, the main theme, i.e. the subject most in focus, 
was coded. If a post contained several themes and there was doubt pertaining to 
which theme was most prominent, the headline decided which theme would be 
coded. If the main theme still could not be decided, the picture would determine 
what to code. In the last instance, the introduction would be the decisive factor. It is 
worth noting that there were some challenges related to making the theme values 
mutually exclusive. This pertained to the theme honour culture, a relatively broad 
value which in public debate is often linked to discussions around the wearing of the 
hijab and face veils, refusal to shake hands with the opposite sex, among other 
subjects. In this study, honour culture was coded as a theme on the same level as 
these other themes. If a post highlighted, on the one hand, that parents forcing their 




control, honour culture would be coded as the main theme. On the other hand, if no 
mention was made of honour culture in such a post, and the focus was on the hijab 
without linking it explicitly to honour culture, then hijab would be coded as the main 
theme. 
In terms of genre, the posts were grouped as either news, debate, or comedy items. 
News items included (links to) news articles, feature articles, interviews, fact checks, 
notices, and documentaries. Debate items included (links to) opinion articles, 
speeches by politicians, and video excerpts from television and radio debates. The 
third, and by far smallest, group consisted of comedy items, typically taking the form 
of brief video skits performed by professional comedians. 
With respect to sentiment towards Islam, four values were used that described the 
posts’ depiction of Islam: negative, positive, neutral, or negatively loaded. The 
negatively loaded value was used to account for posts that were not negative 
towards Islam or Muslims per se but that focused on a negatively laden theme, such 
as Islamism, Jihadism, war, honour culture, or crime. A post was coded as negative if 
it conveyed criticism of Islam, Islamic practices, Muslims, immigration (from 
countries with a substantial Muslim population), and/or Islam/immigration-friendly 
parties or politicians. A post was not coded as negative if it conveyed criticism of 
negatively laden themes (in these cases the negatively loaded value was coded)—as 
long as not the post linked Islam or (most) Muslims to these phenomena. A post was 
coded as positive if it conveyed support, sympathy, respect, or tolerance for Islam, 
Islamic practices, or Muslims, emphasised problems with other religions than Islam, 
argued that problems associated with Islam are exaggerated, and/or criticised 
Islam/immigrant-critical parties or politicians. A post was coded as neutral if it 





It should be noted that while most of the posts had a neutral tone, the sentiment 
coded depended on the content reported rather than on whether an article was 
objective in its coverage. For instance, a post could describe in an impartial and 
factual manner how a majority of the Norwegian Parliament voted to face-covering 
clothing in teaching situations, but since the ban seeks to restrict Islamic practices, 
such a post would be coded as negative. As noted by Benson and Hallin (2007, p. 
32), no information can be conveyed without framing as the selection and 
presentation of facts are often rooted in ideological assumptions. 
Besides themes, sources, genres, and sentiment—metadata in the form popularity 
cues—i.e. the number of shares, comments, likes, and newer forms of Facebook 
reactions (e.g. “Haha” and “Angry”) were coded, the aim being to examine whether 
there were any patterns in how these were used in response to different content. 
Comment variables 
The comments written by ordinary Facebook users were coded for the sentiment 
they expressed towards Islam. In addition to being coded as negative, positive, or 
neutral, a fourth value similar to the one used for the posts was used to account for 
comments that were not negative towards Islam or Muslims in general but that 
targeted Islamism, Jihadism, war, honour culture, and/or crime—without blaming 
these phenomena on Islam or most Muslims.84 The comments were, like the posts, 
also coded for the number of popularity cues they received. 
The comments were also analysed in line with the theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter 3, which was the basis for most of the variables used in the content analysis 
of the comments. As we saw, counterpublic discursive patterns were defined as 
featuring three characteristics: (1) argumentative countering, (2) strengthening a 








Piwoni, 2015, p. 471). Different ways of operationalising these characteristics were 
considered. 
One potential approach would have been to have defined clear criteria for what 
constitutes argumentative countering, deconstructing power relations, and 
strengthening a sense of identity among supporters of the subordinate public. This 
was the approach used by Toepfl & Piwoni (2015) in their study of the pro-Alternativ 
für Deutschland (AfD) counterpublic operating in the comment sections of German 
newspapers, where comments were coded as either counterpublic or mainstream 
based on whether they challenged or aligned with the consensual anti-AfD content 
found in the news articles that the comments responded to. The benefit of using 
this approach is that one can measure the number of counterpublic and mainstream 
comments, thus enabling the researcher to present a clear result on the extent to 
which counterpublic discourses permeate the comment sections. 
Despite the benefit of the above-mentioned approach, it was found that it would 
not be feasible in this study to follow this methodology, more specifically in relation 
with the argumentative countering and strengthening identity categories (this 
challenge was not present in relation with the deconstructing power relations 
category).85 The reason this approach was not viable for these two characteristics of 
counterpublic discourse is that this is a comparative study of three countries, which, 
as we saw in Chapter 2, have been marked by significant differences in debates 
surrounding Islam.86 This means that what can be considered mainstream speech 
 
 
85 Comments featuring this characteristic explicitly targeted a superordinate public (e.g. the 
mainstream media or political establishment), which clearly indicated that the commenter felt 
marginalised or excluded from the larger public sphere. As such, these comments were 
unmistakably counterdiscursive. 
86 Another reason is that it is hard, if not impossible, regardless of national differences, to define 
firm boundaries for what is legitimate and what is illegitimate speech in the Scandinavian public 
spheres when it comes to Islam (see Chapter 3). This can be contrasted with a topic like climate 
change, where one can confidently classify climate change denial as an expression of 




around Islam is different in the three national contexts. This would have had to be 
taken into consideration if clear criteria for what constitutes argumentative 
countering and strengthening a sense of collective identity (among the supporters of 
the subordinate public) were to be defined. In other words, the coding scheme 
would have to take certain, often very subtle, distinctions into consideration, and 
Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish comments would have had to be coded differently, 
according to the different public spheres in which they operate. 
While national variances in the coding scheme could be supported with previous 
research and empirical data to a certain point (as Chapter 2 and parts of Chapter 3 
are a testament to), highly subjective evaluations would likely be unavoidable in 
several instances. For example, is it mainstream to describe Islam as an inherently 
violent religion in Denmark but not in Norway? Is it mainstream to describe Islam as 
a peaceful religion in Sweden but not in Denmark? Does a Swedish commenter 
arguing that people should be banned from wearing a hijab in parliament engage in 
counterpublic discourse, while a Danish commenter arguing the same merely 
reflects mainstream speech? Is it illegitimate to claim that face veils should be 
entirely banned from public space in Sweden but not in Denmark? These are just a 
small number of the questions that would have to be answered resolutely when 
taking an approach that confidently classifies comments as either a part of a 
counterpublic or as part of a mainstream public. In other words, it should be 
acknowledged, as we saw in Chapter 3, that Hallin’s spheres of opinion are often 
fuzzy and contested, and that this undoubtedly is the case with respect to 
Scandinavian debates on Islam. 
Rather than immediately classifying a comment as either a part of a mainstream 
public or a counterpublic, then, an evaluation of to what degree the comment 
sections in the three countries were permeated by counterpublic discursive patterns 




comments, 50 Swedish comments, and 50 Danish comments had argued that Islam 
is an inherently violent religion, it would be coded that 50 comments from each 
country had described Islam in a negative essentialist way, but no variable would 
firmly classify whether this was a part of a mainstream- or counter-public discourse. 
The discussion relating to what the implications of the results are from a 
counterpublic perspective are instead discussed in relation with the presentation of 
the findings, with Chapter 2 serving as background for the discussion. 
To clarify, this does not mean that the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3 
is irrelevant to this study. The implication is rather that it is necessary to adapt the 
framework to the study at hand, more specifically related to two of the three 
characteristics of counterpublic discourse: argumentative countering and 
strengthening identity . Let us therefore now consider how these categories were 
operationalised in this study, including also what made the deconstructing power 
relations category stand out from the other two. Subsequently, intercoder 
agreement will be reported. 
Argumentative countering? 
For each of the three categories of counterpublic discourses, several subcategories 
were used to more accurately capture the content being articulated.87 With respect 
to argumentative countering, this study identified 9 such subcategories. In most 
cases, each subcategory served as one variable in the coding scheme, 88 and each 
dealing with a particular topic related to Islam that Facebook users discussed in the 
comment sections. The subcategories/variables had different numbers of values, 





87 Using (sub)categories identified by Toepfl & Piwoni (2015) as a starting point, subcategories 
were added, removed, and adjusted to fit with the material at hand where necessary. 




The 9 subcategories were identified because they (a) were relatively frequently 
addressed by commenters (discussed in relation with at least 10 of the posts) and 
(b) because they occasionally were met by comments that might be considered to 
have challenged the (perceived) consensus of the larger public sphere around Islam 
(i.e. counterpublic discourse). The subcategories are introduced in table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: The subcategories of argumentative countering 
 
Subcategories 
Islamic practices and traits associated with Islam 
Championing other countries 
General evaluation of Islam and/or Muslims 
Conversion to Islam 
Political labelling 
Handling of Islamists and jihadists 
Harassment of political opponents 
Religion in general 
Muslim immigration 
 
The first subcategory of argumentative countering coded commenters’ opinions to 
Islamic practices and traits typically associated with Islam. This included attitudes 
towards fundamental traits of Islam, such as mosques and the Quran, but also 
attitudes towards more fringe phenomena, like wearing face veils and not shaking 
hands with members of the opposite sex (subcategory: Islamic practices and traits 
associated with Islam). Two variables were used in relation with this subcategory. 
The first variable simply noted which Islamic practice(s) was discussed in the 
comment, while the second noted the actual attitude the commenter expressed 
towards the practice. Based on the studied material, the following values were used 




with Islam should be banned, it should be banned in certain areas, it should be 
criticised but not banned, and it should be accepted/tolerated. 
The second subcategory of argumentative countering considered whether 
commenters explicitly89 supported other countries because of their 
policies/discourse on Islam (subcategory: championing other countries). The 
subcategory also specified which country this pertained to. 
The third subcategory considered whether the commenters gave a general 
evaluation of Islam and/or Muslims (subcategory: general evaluation of Islam and/or 
Muslims). The values coded for this variable were negative, positive and 
neutral/nuanced. Negative comments featured negative essentialist/generalising 
descriptions of Islam and/or Muslims, e.g. “Islam stands for violence and war” and 
“Unfortunately Muslims are unable to integrate into Western society”. Positive 
comments featured positive essentialist/generalising views of Islam and/or Muslims, 
such as “Islam stands for peace” and “Muslims are wonderful people”. 
Neutral/nuanced comments emphasised that there are different interpretations of 
Islam, for instance stating: “Remember that most Muslims do not use a face veil,  
this is typically only practiced by women who are advocates of Salafism”, and “I have 
only met one Muslim who did not want to shake my hand”. 
The fourth subcategory of argumentative countering dealt with conversion to Islam 
(subcategory: conversion to Islam). The subcategory/variable had the following 




89 Only the comments that explicitly mentioned another country, for instance by uttering “Go on, 
Denmark!” or “We can learn a lot from Austria”, used flag emojis of the other country, or that 
directly stated that their home country should implement the same policy as in the other country, 
were coded as championing another country. For instance, if a Swedish or Norwegian comment 
simply stated “great” when responding to a post reporting that face veils would be banned in 
Denmark, it would not be coded as championing Denmark. Correspondingly, if a Danish comment 
stated “great” below a Norwegian post reporting that Norway had banned face veils in teaching 




great/unproblematic, and conversion to Islam is challenging (but not deeply 
problematic/idiotic). 
The fifth subcategory considered whether comments used political labels to brand 
political opponents in a certain way (subcategory: political labelling). Examples of 
the values coded for this variable are Nazi/fascist/racist, Islamist/terrorist, and 
communist/socialist. Political labels used about those already described as Islamists 
or Jihadists in the news posts were not coded as engaging in political labelling of 
political opponents (see the next subcategory for views on Islamists and jihadists). In 
other words, for this variable, the Islamist/terrorist label was only coded when 
commenters used them to describe people that the news media had not already 
described as an Islamist or terrorist. 
As was mentioned above, the sixth subcategory of argumentative countering 
focused on commenters’ views on (how to handle) Islamists and jihadists 
(subcategory: handling of Islamists and jihadists). Commenters’ views ranged from 
wanting members of ISIS to be extrajudicially killed to expressing that jihadists 
should face no punishment for their actions. In between these fringe positions were 
comments arguing that Islamists and/or jihadists should be deported or lose their 
citizenship, that they should be imprisoned, and that people who had travelled from 
Scandinavia to ISIS territory should not be allowed to return, among other views. 
The seventh subcategory considered whether commenters had an attitude towards 
physical and verbal harassment of political opponents (subcategory: harassment of 
political opponents). For the comments that dealt with this topic, the following 
values were coded: Physical and verbal harassment of political opponents is 
acceptable towards Muslims, it is acceptable towards people on the far right, or it is 
(always) unacceptable. Comments expressing that Islamists or Jihadists should be 





Unlike subcategory four, which focused on general evaluations of Islam and 
Muslims, the eight subcategory focused on commenters’ attitudes towards religion 
more generally (subcategory: religion in general). The comments found within this 
subcategory ranged from those describing religion as a highly destructive force to 
comments that emphasised the importance of religious freedom. The most religion- 
sceptic commenters even argued that religion should be banned or completely 
removed from public space. 
The ninth, and final, subcategory of argumentative countering focused on 
commenters’ attitudes to Muslim immigration (subcategory: Muslim immigration). 
Commenters’ standpoints here ranged from wanting Norway/Sweden/Denmark to 
ban Muslim immigration to arguing for completely open borders, although there 
were also several commenters who expressed more moderate attitudes. 
We have now been presented to 9 subcategories of arguments that the commenters 
expressed their views on relatively frequently, occasionally engaging in discourse 
that may be considered to have challenged the sphere of legitimate controversy 
around Islam, i.e. argumentative countering. 
We will now consider how a second category of counterpublic discourse, namely 
strengthening a sense of collective identity (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, p. 471), was 
operationalised in this study. 
Strengthening identity among likeminded individuals 
The strengthening identity category was reformulated from Toepfl & Piwoni’s (2015) 
study to consider all publics operating within the comment sections’ efforts to 
strengthen a sense of collective identity, rather than only those associated with a 
subordinate (counter)public. The main reason for this is, as was described above, 
the unfeasibility in this study related to resolutely classifying comments as either a 
part of a mainstream- or a counter-public. Furthermore, it was found that both 




Islam strengthened a sense of collective identity among likeminded individuals, 
which made it interesting to code this characteristic also in relation with more 
moderate/mainstream comments. 
Comments strengthened a sense of collective identity among likeminded individuals 
in 5 ways (see table 4.4), and all could in theory be coded for both neutral, anti- 
Islam and pro-Islam Facebook users. The values coded for the 
subcategories/variables were typically “yes” or “no”, i.e. the subcategory was either 
present or not present in the comment. 








One way that commenters strengthened a sense of collective identity with 
likeminded individuals was to express emotions, for instance by using words like 
“great”, “tragic”, “horrible”, or other emotional markers such as exclamation marks, 
emojis, and caps lock (subcategory: emotional content). Clearly sarcastic and ironic 
comments and comments using swear words were also coded as emotional. 
A second way commenters strengthened a sense of collective identity was by 
mocking or using derogatory characteristics about others, for instance political 
opponents and Muslims (subcategory: impolite tone). Clear-cut examples are “What 
an idiotic pig”, “She is completely braindead”, “He is such a Nazi”. Comments 
commanding that people “go home to their country” were also coded as impolite. 




ridiculed someone or used derogatory characteristics about political opponents 
and/or Muslims. 
A third way commenters strengthened a sense of collective identity was by 
identifying with or showing committed support for political parties and politicians 
(subcategory: political identification). Examples were commenters saying, “The New 
Right has my vote”, “Go on, Christian Tybring Gjedde!”, and “The Centre Party 
<3”).90 Comments that showed some support for a politician or political party, e.g. “I 
will not vote for the party, but the SD unfortunately makes some good points”, were 
not coded as having engaged in political identification. Two variables were used in 
relation with this subcategory. The first variable coded whether a commenter 
engaged in political identification (“yes” or “no”), while the second coded what type 
of political party or politician the commenter supported (e.g. radical right populist, 
conservative, socialist). 
A fourth way in which commenters strengthened a sense of collective identity 
among likeminded individuals was by expressing an urgent need for taking action 
against Islam, Muslims, or immigration to avoid a societal collapse (subcategory: 
alarmism). Commenters expressing that they had given up on a solution to such 
problems (e.g. because they considered it inevitable that Muslims will take over 
society) were also considered to be engaging in alarmist rhetoric. Alarmism was also 
expressed by Islam-friendly commenters. As one commenter put it: “…A new great 
war is imminent. We need a new 1945 to get rid of the extreme Right’s madness 
[here replying to a post about chancellor of Austria Sebastian Kurz]. History has 
been forgotten and is about to repeat itself”. As is illustrated in this example, the 
Islam/Muslim-sympathetic commenters that engaged in alarmist rhetoric 







state because of a fixation on restricting Muslims’ freedom, or that Muslims in the 
country would be given the same treatment as Jews during the 1930s and 1940s. 
The fifth, and final, subcategory of strengthening identity considered whether 
commenters used words like “we”, “us”, “our”, or “ours” to indicate a sense of 
personal belonging to a continent, nation, religion, organisation or other community 
(subcategory: personal identification). This included comments like “Islam is not 
compatible with our values” and “Why are there so many who are prejudiced 
against us Muslims? Ask yourself, what has a Muslim ever done to you?”. In other 
words, commenters with diametrically opposed views on Islam were also found 
within this subcategory. 
We have now considered how the five subcategories of strengthening a sense of 
collective identity were operationalised. In the following subsection, we will explain 
the subcategories of the third feature of counterpublic discourses, namely 
deconstruction of power relations. 
Deconstructing power relations 
Deconstruction of power relations took place in comments that set themselves off 
from a superordinate public sphere, which they explicitly deconstructed as being 
mainstream, dominant, biased, and/or censoring. As such, this category stands out 
from how the other two categories of counterpublic discursive patterns are 
operationalised, as all the comments coded within this category are undoubtedly 
counterdiscursive. As we will see, these comments directly targeted superordinate 
publics like the political establishment, the mainstream media, and the criminal 
justice system for their handling of Islam. As demonstrated in table 4.5 below, 5 
subcategories of deconstructing power relations were coded. Each subcategory 
corresponded to one variable in the coding scheme. The values coded were either 










Criminal justice system 
Other actors 
Unspecified actors 
One way the commenters deconstructed power relations was by criticising the 
political establishment (subcategory: political establishment). Anti-Islamist/anti- 
Islam/anti-Muslim commenters did this by claiming that politicians are naïve or 
cowardly in their handling of Islam-related issues. For a comment to be coded as 
targeting the political establishment, it was not enough to criticise a small number 
of parties;91 it had to either target all established parties/politicians or support a 
radical party/politician that the commenter considered to be in a position outside 
the establishment. An example of the former was a sarcastic Swedish commenter 
who criticised politicians for not handling the spread of Islamism in Swedish 
suburbs: “Welcome to the new exciting Sweden!! Nice work politicians! You must be 
incredibly satisfied with the way things have become.” An example of the latter type 
was a Danish commenter praising the efforts of the leader of the radical right 
populist party The New Right, Pernille Vermund, for her proposal to stop Muslims 
from applying for asylum in Denmark: “Where others are silent, Pernille dares to 
speak her mind (thumbs up).” Criticism of the EU establishment for e.g. facilitating 
Muslim immigration was also coded within this subcategory. In contrast to the 
Islam-sceptic comments within this subcategory, Islam-sympathetic comments 
typically criticised the political establishment for treating Muslims in a discriminating 
 
 




manner and/or creating unfounded fears around Muslims/immigration. As one 
Danish commenter wrote in response to a post showing a clip from a televised 
debate: “The politicians are smart… [When they are asked a question] they at once 
shift the focus to something that does not exist; ‘Swedish conditions’…”. 
Another way that commenters deconstructed power relations was by criticising 
established news media for being biased and not reporting crucial facts about Islam 
(subcategory: mainstream media). For a comment to be coded within the 
subcategory, it was not enough to disagree with the news media on just one case; 
the criticism had to be more systematic. Moreover, it was not enough to criticise 
just one outlet, although exceptions were made if the commenter argued for 
boycotting the outlet or expressed systematic criticism of a state-financed public 
service broadcaster for how it reported on these issues. Otherwise, the comments 
coded within this subcategory criticised the mainstream media as a homogenous 
group, marked by bias and problematic reporting with respect to Islam. Both 
Islam/Muslim-sympathetic and Islam/Muslim-sceptic commenters were found 
within the subcategory. Typically, the former group targeted the media for causing 
prejudice against Islam and Muslims while the latter attacked the media for naïve 
reporting and for not showing Islam and Muslims’ “true” (violent, intolerant) 
character. 
A third way in which commenters deconstructed power relations was by targeting 
the criminal justice system (subcategory: criminal justice system). While in theory 
this subcategory could be coded in relation to comments expressing a positive 
attitude towards Islam, no such comments were found. Rather, these comments 
typically criticised law enforcement and/or the judiciary system for being too lenient 
towards Muslims or radical Islamists, sometimes claiming that they give special 
treatment to Muslims or radical Islamists over non-Muslims and ethnic 




fanatical racists than Muslims, but they are protected in every way and are not 
charged nor sentenced for their fanaticism. But that happens with us Danes if we as 
much as look at them...”. 
A fourth subcategory was used to account for comments that criticised other actors 
than the political establishment, mainstream media, and criminal justice system 
(subcategory: other actors). Comments placed within this subcategory featured 
criticism of powerful technology companies such as Facebook and Google for 
allegedly silencing oppositional points of view, as well as condemnation of the 
academic elite for being detached from reality. One example is a Norwegian 
commenter expressing frustration with Facebook for limiting their freedom of 
speech: “…I get NAUSEATED and feel CONTEMPT for everyone who are so 
cowardly…I would draw [the prophet] Muhammed every single day if I could, but 
the greatest problem is that one will just be deplatformed”. 
 
Furthermore, a fifth way counterpublic-minded commenters deconstructed power 
relations was by targeting political correctness or naivety, without specifying which 
actor(s) were at fault for these phenomena (subcategory: unspecified actor). These 
commenters often criticised their country (Norway/Sweden/Denmark) or Europe for 
its naïve or politically correct approach to Islam but did not specify whether this 
pertained to politicians, media outlets, the justice system, or others. As one Swedish 
commenter who criticised Sweden’s approach to Islam wrote, “I have almost given 
up commenting due to Sweden’s servility. It will require great change for Sweden to 
stand tall again”. In contrast to anti-Islam/anti-Muslim commenters, pro-Islam/pro- 
Muslim commenters within this subcategory claimed that there is no room for 
positive attitudes towards Islam and/or Muslims in today’s debate climate. 
We have now considered the (sub)categories used to analyse the comments. Before 









Popularity cues Not calculated 
Argumentative countering 0.81 
…Islamic practice/trait 0.89 
……Attitude towards Islamic 
practice/trait 
0.84 
…Championing other countries 0.76 
…General evaluation of 
Islam/Muslims 
0.61 
…Conversion to Islam 0.9 
…Political labelling 0.77 
…Harassment of political 
opponents 
0.95 
…Handling of Islamists/jihadists 0.72 
…General evaluation of religion 0.67 
…Muslim immigration 0.88 
Strengthening identity 0.7 
…Emotional content 0.73 
…Impolite tone 0.65 
…Political identification 0.8 
……Political party type 0.8 
…Alarmism 0.75 
Deconstruction of power 
relations 
0.81 
…Political establishment 0.71 
…Mainstream media 0.89 
…Criminal justice system 0.89 
…Other actors Not calculated 




As displayed in table 4.6, satisfactory intercoder agreement (0.60+) was reached for 
all variables. The lowest reliability score for a variable (0.61) was received by the 
general evaluation of Islam/Muslims subcategory. Although satisfactory agreement 
was reached also for this subcategory, it occasionally proved challenging to agree on 
what constituted a general evaluation of Islam and Muslims. Within the 
deconstruction of power relations category, criticism of other actors could not be 
calculated, as there were no such comments coded among the ones randomly 
selected for the reliability test. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has focused on describing data selection and the methodological 
approach of the study. The 5 most followed news outlets on Facebook from each of 
the three Scandinavian countries were selected, i.e. a total of 15 outlets. The 
selection includes public service broadcasters, hybrid broadcasters, tabloids, and 
broadsheets. A set of search words associated with Islam was used to identify 
relevant posts published in the last seven months of 2018. In addition to all the 
identified posts (N=602), around 10% of the original comments, i.e. comments 
replying directly to the posts (N=6797), were analysed using quantitative content 
analysis. Some of the variables examined in the analysis are considered in both the 
posts and the comments, but others are specific to each arena. Sentiment (towards 
Islam) and popularity cues are analysed in both posts and comments. Only posts 
(and their associated articles) are coded for their genre, theme, and source, while 
only comments are analysed for various characteristics related to counterpublic 
discursive patterns. 
In the following three chapters, the results are presented and discussed, starting 




Chapter 5: Facebook Posts—Items Published by the Established 
News Media 
The Facebook posts and their associated articles represent the most powerful 
subpublic analysed in this study. With the mainstream news media’s mass audience 
and high consumption among the countries’ elites, this subpublic may be considered 
as having considerable impact on the formation of political will (Toepfl & Piwoni, p. 
470). In this chapter, the genres, themes, sources, and sentiment (towards Islam) 
that characterise this public in the three Scandinavian countries are compared. 
We saw in Chapter 2 that longitudinal studies of media as well as political discourse 
on Islam (and immigration) have found that Islam has risen higher on the political 
agenda in recent decades, especially in Denmark (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019; 
Lövheim, Lindberg, et al., 2018; Lundby et al., 2018). The data used in this study 
does not allow for generalisation of the findings with respect to frequency, since it 
studies a limited time period. That said, here the Danish news media were also 
found to post the highest number of items about Islam. 
Table 5.1: Number of Facebook posts about Islam by country, (number of unique 
posts) 
 Norway Sweden Denmark Total 
Number of posts 140 (124) 224 (157) 238 (203) 602 (484) 
Using the selected criteria outlined in Chapter 4, 602 posts were found, and there 
were 484 unique items. As seen in table 5.1, the Norwegian news media were 
found to publish clearly fewer posts about Islam than the Swedish and Danish 
outlets. The gap between Norway and Sweden was exacerbated by the Swedish 
outlets having a higher number of Facebook pages, which they often used to repost 
items. Duplicate items can, however, only to some degree account for the 
difference in the number of Facebook posts between the countries. The selected 




were unique items), 224 Swedish posts (157 unique items), and 238 Danish posts 
(203 unique items). 
Genres 
Scholars have noted that journalism to an increasing degree is marked by debate 
and interpretation (e.g. Mathisen & Morlandstø, 2016). This has also been the case 
in Scandinavian coverage of Islam. Lundby et al. (2018) found that the proportion of 
debate items about Islam rose from only 2% in Norwegian and Swedish newspapers 
in 1988, to 12% and 27%, respectively, in 2008, while Denmark had an increase 
from 25% to 57% in the same period. Moreover, a shift from news to debate has 
been observed in Scandinavian newspaper coverage of immigration (Hovden & 
Mjelde 2019). It was therefore expected that debate items also would be highly 
prevalent in the items posted by the established news media on Facebook. 
Table 5.2: Genres in the Facebook posts by country, percent (N=602)92 
 
 Norway (140) Sweden (224) Denmark (238) Total (602) 
News 64 (89) 76 (170) 89 (213) 78 (472) 
Debate 34 (47) 24 (54) 10 (24) 21 (125) 
Comedy 3 (4) 0 (0) 0 (1) 1 (5) 
As displayed by table 5.2, however, the clearly most common genre was news: 78% 
of the total number of posts and their associated articles were news items, 21% 
were debate items, and 1% were comedy items. A possible explanation for the 
dominance of news items found in this study is that the outlets use Facebook to 
keep people returning for the latest headlines and news, while they “save” the 
debate genre for the print edition to increase its value in a time when reading of 
print news is declining. Also, it should be noted that the studied media are in fact 
news media. Moreover, although seemingly low compared to studies on related 
topics (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019; Lundby et al., 2018), the fact that one fifth of items 
 





were debate items is relatively high compared with what is the case in news media 
generally (see e.g. Mathisen & Morlandstø, 2019; Nossen, 2010). 
At the same time, there were differences between the countries. Table 5.2 shows 
that the Swedish, and, particularly, the Norwegian media, tended to post debate 
items on their Facebook pages more frequently than the Danish ones. Whereas one 
third (34%) and one quarter (24%) of posts were debate items on the Norwegian 
and Swedish pages, respectively, only one in ten Danish posts were debate items. 
This finding is somewhat surprising given that it does not reflect the general 
newspaper coverage of Islam in Denmark, which Lundby et al.’s (2018) study 
indicate to a larger degree than the other Scandinavian countries has been 
increasingly marked by debate items. That said, Lundby et al. (2018) looked at print 
versions, which may contain more debate content than the online version of the 
same newspaper. Investigating whether these national differences pertain to Islam 
specifically or whether Danish news media generally post fewer debate items on 
their Facebook pages is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Regardless, it is worth mentioning that this does not suggest that the Danish media 
to a lesser degree facilitated the involvement of Facebook users in the discussions. 
As will be presented in more detail in Chapter 7, posting a debate item did not 
result in higher engagement from the audience. Furthermore, the Danish media, in 
line with social media logic (Haim et al., 2019), more frequently than the Norwegian 
and Swedish media added a question directed at its Facebook followers along with 
the posts, which boosted user engagement (see more in Chapter 7). 
Themes 
A common finding in the existing literature on media representation of Islam and 
Muslims is that it tends to focus on negatively loaded themes (see e.g. Ahmed & 
Matthes, 2017). This finding, at least to some extent, seems to be true for the 




coded in the posts and associated articles. The 10 most prevalent ones are shown in 
the following figure. If one adds the presence of Islamism/Jihadism/war, crime, and 
honour culture, these were the main theme in one fourth of the studied Facebook 
posts. Out of these, however, only Islamism/Jihadism/war was a particularly salient 
theme. Crime was the seventh most common theme, while honour culture was not 
among the 10 most common ones. It was thus placed in the “other” category in the 
following figure. 
Figure 5.1: Prevalence of the 10 most common themes, percent (N=602) 
 
 
As illustrated by figure 5.1, there were three themes that stood out: (1) Islamism, 
Jihadism, and war; (2) the burka and niqab; and (3) discrimination and racism. 
These were the main themes in 20%, 19%, and 13% of posts, respectively. Then 
followed the hijab (7%) as the fourth most common main theme. Although there 
were national variations, the remaining themes were the main subject in less than 
4% of the total number of posts and consisted of such issues as 
spirituality/rituals/holidays, handshaking, crime, and fake news. 
The most prevalent theme category, Islamism/Jihadism/war, was most frequently 


















Danish posts (16%). This finding contradicts longitudinal research on Scandinavian 
media coverage, which shows that the (terrorist) threat associated with 
immigration has been substantially more explicit in the Danish newspapers than in 
the other Scandinavian countries (Hovden et al., 2019). At the same time, it is worth 
noting that even though the Islamism, Jihadism, and war category was highly 
prevalent in the material, these posts did not typically blame Islam or Muslims in 
general for these issues. Rather, the posts were focused on (members of) ISIS, 
human rights violations in countries marked by sharia law such as Iran and Pakistan, 
and revelations about (radical) Islamists in various (more or less) powerful positions 
in Scandinavian societies, such as politicians, imams, and school leaders. Court 
cases in Norway in 2018 against infamous radical Islamists Mullah Krekar and 
Mohyeldeen Mohammad contributed to making the category particularly 
prominent on the Norwegian Facebook pages. 
The burka/niqab was the second most salient theme in the posts. The high media 
focus on this relatively marginal phenomenon in the Scandinavian countries, i.e. 
women wearing face veils, can be explained by Denmark passing a law banning the 
use of face-covering clothing in public space during the studied period. Norway also 
implemented a ban against face-covering clothing in August 2018, but this only 
pertained to teaching situations and did not nearly cause the same controversy. The 
Danish ban gained a lot of attention on the studied Facebook pages as well as in the 
public sphere at large. It also got extensive international attention.93 Even though 
only between 100 and 200 people have been found to be wearing the niqab in 
Denmark (Warburg, Johansen, & Østergaard, 2013, p. 33), 29% of the Danish posts 
had face veils as a main theme. The Swedish outlets posted extensively on its 
neighbour countries’ bans, and face-covering clothing was the main theme of 14% 
 







Swedish posts, which was higher than the 9% of Norwegian posts that focused on 
face veils. 
Similarly to Hovden and Mjelde’s (2019) findings from their longitudinal study of 
discourse on immigration in Scandinavian newspapers, discrimination and racism 
was more common in the Swedish media’s Facebook posts (18%) than in the 
Norwegian (14%) and Danish (8%) posts. This suggests that, even though Swedish 
discourse in relation to Islam and immigration has changed since the refugee crisis, 
discrimination and racism remains a central focus of the debate. These posts 
typically featured Muslim sources sharing experiences of racism and discrimination. 
In addition, several Swedish news stories featured revelations about politicians 
(typically Sweden Democrats) who had made hateful and derogatory remarks 
against Muslims, often in online settings. 
As displayed in figure 5.1, the hijab was the fourth most common main theme,94 
being the main focus in 7% of posts. Particularly an article by the Swedish 
newspaper Göteborgs-Posten revealing that 27 out of 40 Swedish preschools were 
willing to control and force children to wear the headscarf served as a catalyst for 
Swedish posts about the subject.95 This story was covered on several of the selected 
news media’s Facebook pages and contributed to the hijab being a salient theme in 
particularly the Swedish posts (9%). All the politicians and journalists expressing 
their opinions on the case condemned the practice of forcing children to wear the 
headscarf. Overall, then, there was a considerable focus on Islamic clothing in the 
posts, considering also the massive focus on face veils. 
Sources 
The main source, typically the first source of a post, was coded for each post. In 
debate items, the author (of written items) and speaker (in video posts) were coded 
 






as the main source. 579 of the 602 posts and associated article texts had a source, 
and the results presented in this subsection are based on these items. In terms of 
the position/role of the source, the following values were coded: politicians, private 
citizens, civil servants, media professionals, cultural practitioners, 
experts/intellectuals, advocacy groups/demonstrators, religious 
leaders/representatives, NGOs, and “other”. Elite sources were highly prevalent in 
the material, and the findings in this respect mostly echoed existing literature, which 
has found evidence for elite-dominated representation (Berkowitz, 2009; Don & Lee, 
2014; Manning 2001). 
Figure 5.2: Prevalence of sources, percent (n=579) 
 
 
As shown in figure 5.2, politicians were the most represented source category in the 
material, appearing as the main source in one fourth of the total number of posts. 
Furthermore, other elite sources, such as civil servants, media professionals, and 
experts/intellectuals were widely represented. At the same time, private citizens 
(sources who represent their own views and do not speak on behalf of an 













second most represented of all the source categories. Ordinary people were 
occasionally also found in the advocacy groups/demonstrators category and, in 
some instances, also in the cultural practitioners category. Overall, then, elite voices 
dominated, but ordinary people’s perspectives were far from absent in the material. 
There were, however, differences between the countries. The main difference was 
that politicians were particularly prominent in the Swedish posts, being the main 
source in one third (34%) of Swedish items, compared to one fifth (22%) of Danish 
items and one seventh of Norwegian items (14%). In contrast, private citizens were 
relatively infrequently the main sources in Swedish posts (9%) compared to Danish 
(21%) and Norwegian (19%) post. There is, however, reason to believe that the 
Swedish September elections influenced these numbers substantially. After all, 
longitudinal studies of both media and political discourse have shown that Islam is 
higher on the agenda in Denmark than in Norway and Sweden (Lundby et al., 2018; 
Lövheim, Lindberg, et al., 2018). At the same time, the high prevalence of Swedish 
politician sources in posts about Islam may reflect the increased salience of the 
socio-cultural dimension in Swedish politics in recent years (Strömbäck et al., 2017). 
Given the prevalence of politician sources in the material, it is worth considering 
which type of politicians were represented. The results displayed the same pattern 
as identified by Hovden and Mjelde (2019, pp. 150–151), who found that social 
democratic parties have been the most common source among the party families in 
Scandinavian articles about immigration since the 1970s, but that the radical right 




Table 5.3: Top three most represented party families in each country, the number of 
posts with national politician sources (n=119)96 
 
Norway (17) Sweden (61) Denmark (41) 
Right-wing populist (8) Social democrat (21) Right-wing populist (21) 
Liberal (4) Right-wing populist (13) Conservative-liberal/agrarian97 (9) 
Social democrat (3) Christian democrat (10) Social democrat (4) 
Other (2) Other (17) Other (7) 
As shown in table 5.3, right-wing populist parties98 were the most commonly 
represented party-family in Norwegian and Danish Facebook posts, being the main 
source in around half of the posts, whereas in the Swedish posts the Social 
Democrats were the most represented party, being the main source in 
approximately one third of items. The right-wing populist Sweden Democrats was 
not represented to the same extent as its Scandinavian counterparts but was still 
the second most represented Swedish party. 
Until now, we have focused on the positions/roles of sources. We will now consider 
to what extent Muslims were represented as sources in the posts. For reference, 
previous studies have typically found that (ethnic and religious) minorities are 
systematically underrepresented as sources in media coverage (e.g. Hognestad & 
Lamark, 2017; Madsen, 2005; Rodriguez, 2018; Strand et al., 2018), i.e. that they are 
talked about rather than talked with (Jacobsen et al., 2013, p. 13). Researchers have, 
however, also found that minority voices have been heard to a substantial extent 





96 Only Scandinavian politician sources are considered here. Thus, the numbers do not align with 
those in figure 5.2, where non-Scandinavian politicians were also included. 
97 Venstre 
98 The New Right was included when coding these parties in addition to the Danish People’s Party, 
the Progress party, and the Sweden Democrats. The New Right had no parliamentary 
representation in the studied period but polled 2.4% in the 2019 elections and received 4 out of 




indicated in the table below, the findings in this study were more in line with the 
latter group of studies. 
Table 5.4: Muslim and non-Muslim sources, percent of posts with at least one source 
(n=579) 
 
Sources Norway (134) Sweden (216) Denmark (229) Total (579) 
Muslims 34 (46) 23 (49) 26 (59) 27 (154) 
Non-Muslims 57 (77) 64 (139) 67 (154) 64 (370) 
Unclear 8 (11) 13 (28) 7 (16) 9 (55) 
27% of the total number of posts with at least one source had Muslims as a main 
source. Muslims were the main source in 34% of Norwegian items, 26% of Danish 
items, and 23% of Swedish items. These numbers are high if you compare them to 
the proportion of the Scandinavian population that are Muslims.99 At the same 
time, it seems intuitive that news outlets want to hear the perspectives of those 
who adhere to Islam when covering the religion, although research suggests that 
this is not always the case (e.g. Jacobsen et al., 2013). 
While this is not shown in the table, Muslims primarily appeared in the posts and 
associated articles as private citizens but also commonly as cultural practitioners 
and religious leaders/representatives. Although there are exceptions, they relatively 
rarely appeared in elite roles, such as politicians, civil servants, and media 
professionals. The number of minorities in these positions are low in the 
Scandinavian societies as a whole. Thus, the relatively low presence of Muslims 
sources from these categories reflect that these positions generally are dominated 
by the majority populations (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014a, p. 39). 
It is worth noting that some research that has investigated the representation of 
Muslims in Western media have found that there seems to be a tendency to select 
 
99 Pew Research Center (2017) estimated that 5.4% of the Danish, 5.7% of the Norwegian, and 





the Muslim actors who are most vocal and visible, who differ more from the 
majority population than other Muslims, such as extremists, Salafists, imams, and 
representatives of Islamic organisations (Jacobsen et al., 2013, p. 13). At the same 
time, less vocal Muslims who practice their religion outside the religious institutions 
and who do not attract attention have been considered overlooked (Hervik, 2002; 
Hussain, 2000; Jacobsen et al., 2013). As previously noted, Muslims were found to 
often appear as religious representatives also in this study, and we saw in the 
sections on themes that Islamism/Jihadism/war and face veils were the two most 
common subjects in the news outlets’ posts. This is perhaps an indication that the 
Facebook posts emphasised perspectives that are relatively marginal among 
Scandinavian Muslims. 
To examine this notion, Muslim sources were coded into four categories. These 
categories in no way captured the complex views among adherents of Islam but 
were used to give a rough impression of the Muslim perspectives that the 
Scandinavian news media represented through their Facebook pages. The  
categories used were as follows: (1) liberal views, defined here as opposition to 
conservative or fundamentalist interpretations of Islam; (2) (radical) Islamist views, a 
category represented Islamists and (previous) supporters of ISIS; (3) conservative 
views, defined here as advocating marginal versions of Islam which may cause 
significant tension with the majority population (e.g. wear a niqab or refuse to shake 
hands with the opposite sex) but which are not described as Islamist in the post; and 
(4) undefined, Muslim perspectives that could not be placed into any of the previous 
categories. 
The undefined category was by far the most coded (81 of the total 154 posts with a 
Muslim as a main source), as there was often insufficient information to place 
someone within the other three categories. Then followed liberal Muslims as the 




posts), and conservative Muslims as the least represented category (19 posts). 
Excluding the undefined category, liberal Muslims were the most represented 
category in the Norwegian posts, whereas (radical) Islamist and conservative 
Muslims were represented the most in the Swedish and Danish posts. Thus, the 
results indicate that the Swedish and Danish news media’s Facebook posts to the 
largest extent let conservative Muslims and (radical) Islamists contribute to defining 
Islam, while the Norwegian media highlighted liberal Muslims’ voices. The relatively 
high presence of (radical) Islamists and conservative Muslims sources point to that 
the news outlet’s posts (in the Swedish and Danish cases) did indeed focus on 
Muslims that are more different from the majority population than other Muslims. 
Overall, (radical) Islamists were the main source in one sixth of Facebook posts that 
had Muslims as a main source. At the same time, it is worth stressing that (radical) 
Islamists were not represented through debate items; these deviant actors were not 
invited to give their opinion without being exposed and contextualised. This was 
also largely the case with conservative Muslims. Only one debate item (a video post 
from a radio debate with a Danish niqabi—where the hosts asked about, and 
subsequently strongly criticised, the niqabi’s views on homosexuality)—featured a 
conservative Muslim as the main source of a debate item.100 For reference, one third 
(9 out of 28) of the posts in which a liberal Muslim was a main source were debate 
items, suggesting that liberal Muslims were able to formulate their stances more 
unfiltered than what was the case with radical and conservative Muslims. 
Sentiment Towards Islam 
To analyse how the Scandinavian news outlets covered Islam in this study, the 
Facebook posts (and their associated article text) were coded as either negative, 
negatively loaded, positive, or neutral towards Islam. The negatively loaded 







discussed negatively charged themes, such as Islamism/Jihadism/war, honour 
culture, and crime (without linking these themes to Islam or Muslims in general). 
For reference, the voluminous academic literature that has studied how Islam and 
Muslims have been covered in the media has generally found that the coverage is 
overwhelmingly negative and serves to (re)produce stereotypes (Ahmed & Matthes, 
2017; Axner, 2015; Baker et al., 2013; Hussain 2000; Said, 1997), although studies 
have also found tendencies of more complex and positive media representations 
(Bleich et al., 2015; Carol & Koopmans, 2013; Vanparys et al., 2013). When it comes 
to differences between Scandinavian media discourses on Islam-related issues, we 
saw in Chapter 2 that these range from the largely negative Danish discourse to the 
more amicable Swedish discourse, with Norway in a position between the two 
(Hovden & Mjelde, 2019). This also reflects how political and public discourse in the 
three countries have dealt with these topics (Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012; 
Brochmann, 2018). At the same time, the sphere of consensus in Swedish debate 
regarding these issues has contracted substantially following the 2015 refugee crisis, 
and critical views of immigration and Islam that before were considered deviant 
have become legitimate. Several studies have also found that Swedish media 
coverage of Islam is negative (e.g. Axner, 2015; Hvitfelt, 1998). Based on these 
considerations, it was hypothesised that: 
H1: Danish posts (and their associated article texts) will cover Islam more negatively 
than Norwegian and Swedish posts (and their associated article texts) will. The 
Norwegian items will be more negative than the Swedish items, albeit the 
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Figure 5.3: Sentiment towards Islam by country, (N=602) 
 
 
          
    
          
    
          
    
          
    





As illustrated in figure 5.3, the findings showed that there among the total number 
of posts were almost twice as many positive (41%) as negative items (24%). As such, 
the established news media’s Facebook posts were largely positive towards Islam 
and Muslims, if one compares outright positive with outright negative items. If one 
adds the number of negative posts with the 20% of negatively loaded posts, 
however, the number of positive and negative posts were quite even. Depending on 
how one chooses to interpret these numbers, then, the established news media’s 
Facebook posts were either largely positive or mixed in how they represented Islam 
and Muslims. Either way, the findings were clearly more in line with studies that 
have found more complex and positive media representations of Islam and Muslims 
than studies that have found overtly negative depictions. 
Addressing hypothesis 1, the Danish news media published the largest proportion of 
posts that were explicitly negative towards Islam (27% of the Danish posts), which 
was in line with expectations based on previous research. Nonetheless, it was 
surprising that not more than 27% of the items were negative. Comparing the 




outlets posted around 0.7 negative item for every positive item, while the 
Norwegian and Swedish news outlets posted around 0.5 negative item for every 
positive item. In other words, all the three countries’ media covered Islam mainly in 
a positive way. Although the generalisability of these findings is limited by the fact 
that this is a study of a seven-month period, on one platform, the fact that Sweden 
was similar to Norway may be considered a testament to how much Swedish 
discourse on Islam and related topics has changed since the 2015 refugee crisis. 
If one adds the negatively loaded category with the negative category, the 
difference between the three countries is marginal. In fact, this would make the 
Danish posts the most positive and the Swedish items the least positive. Still, it is 
only the negative category where clear negativity of Islam or Muslims is expressed. 
As such, it can be argued that the fact that the Danish posts featured more of these 
than the Norwegian and Swedish posts does suggest that the Danish coverage was 
more negative. This is even though there were few debate items among the Danish 
posts, and that debate items tended to be more negative than news items.101 A 
qualitative assessment of the negative posts seems to confirm this notion; the 
negative Danish posts are harsher, more sensationalist, and more generalising 
towards Muslims and Islam than the negative Swedish and Norwegian posts are.102 
Still, support for hypothesis 1 was rather limited. While the Danish posts and 
associated articles most often were negative towards Islam, this finding can be 
nuanced by the fact that Danish posts relatively infrequently were marked by items 
 
101 The debate items featured 30% positive and 38% negative posts, while the news items featured 
22% positive and 41% negative posts. 










that were not negative towards Islam per se, but that dealt with negatively laden 
themes. Furthermore, Swedish posts proved to be comparatively less positive than 
expected, being very similar to Norwegian posts in terms of sentiment towards 
Islam. 
As such, while the socio-political contexts laid out in Chapter 2 pointed to three 
countries with substantially different debates around Islam and immigration, the 
differences between the countries in the immediate context of the commenters, i.e. 
the news media’s Facebook posts, was quite marginal. Another notable finding was 
that positive posts dominated. From the corrective action perspective, this may 
prompt Islam-critical commenters in all countries to write comments and to like and 
share content they endorse and deem relevant. This was already expected to be the 
case to a high degree in Sweden, and to some extent in Norway, but these results 
also suggest that Islam-critical Danes may feel there is plenty to “correct” about the 
Danish media coverage. 
At the same time, it should not be underestimated that the commenters operate 
within a larger context that is not restricted to the posts. As was described in the 
introduction to this dissertation, online communication is here not understood as 
something “out there” i.e. detached from reality, but considered to be operating 
within the socio-political and historical context of the overarching public sphere of a 
polity. In other words, the comment sections are expected to be influenced by 
discussions that go on more broadly in the public sphere—in addition to the 
immediate context (as well as the affordances provided by the platform). This is 
further addressed in Chapter 6, when the results from the analysis of the comment 
sections are presented. First, though, we will consider how the various news media 




Comparing News Media Types 
As we saw in Chapter 4, four different news media types were included in the study: 
(1) traditional state-funded public service broadcasters (PSBs); (2) tabloids; (3) 
broadsheets; and (4) hybrid broadcasters (HSBs), which are financed by advertising 
and/or subscriptions whilst also retaining certain public service responsibilities 
(Lund & Berg, 2009). Tabloids are generally characterised by their more 
sensationalist, emotional coverage, which has been noted to impact their portrayal 
of Islam and Muslims. For instance, Baker (2010), who compared British tabloid and 
broadsheet coverage of Islam from 1999–2005, found that tabloids tended to link 
Muslims to terrorism and extremism and focus on a small number of high-profile 
Muslim “villains”. It should be noted, though, that there are clear differences 
between the British tabloids and the Norwegian and Swedish ones, which have a 
tradition for “quality” reporting in areas such as political and cultural journalism. 
Denmark’s leading tabloids B.T. and Ekstra Bladet are, however, more like the 
German tabloid Bild and British The Sun (Hovden et al., 2018, p. 331). Hybrid 
broadcasters’ communication has also been characterised by scholars as having 
populist tendencies, both in the form of anti-elitism and through the exclusion of 
out-groups (e.g. immigrants, Muslims) (Strabac, Thorbjørnsrud, & Jenssen, 2012). It 
could thus be assumed that the tabloids and the HSBs would focus more on 





Table 5.5: Prevalence of themes—comparison of public service broadcasters (PSBs), 
tabloids, broadsheets, and hybrid broadcasters (HSBs), percent (N=602) 
 
Theme PBSs (151) Tabloids (301) Broadsheets (70) HSBs (80) 
Burka/niqab 19 (28) 17 (50) 19 (13) 28 (22) 
Islamism/Jihadism/war 22 (33) 16 (48) 24 (17) 29 (23) 
Discrimination/racism 9 (14) 16 (49) 17 (12) 6 (5) 
Hijab 9 (14) 8 (25) 3 (2) 0 
Spirituality/rituals/holidays 5 (8) 3 (10) 0 5 (4) 
Handshaking 3 (5) 3 (8) 6 (4) 4 (3) 
Crime 3 (5) 4 (11) 1 (1) 3 (2) 
Fake news 4 (6) 4 (11) 0 1 (1) 
Political parties 1 (1) 5 (15) 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Freedom of speech 3 (5) 2 (6) 6 (4) 3 (2) 
Honour culture 1 (2) 4 (12) 0 3 (2) 
Other 20 (30) 19 (56) 23 (16) 19 (15) 
Unexpectedly, as depicted in table 5.5, the tabloids had the lowest focus on 
Islamism/Jihadism/war (16%). They focused more on crime and honour culture than 
the PSBs and broadsheets did, but these were relatively infrequent themes 
compared to the Islamism/Jihadism/war category. The HSBs’ focus, however, was 
more in line with expectations, as Islamism/Jihadism/war was the main theme in as 
many as 29% of their posts. 
In terms of sentiment, the tabloids stood out with the least positive coverage of 
Islam, particularly compared to the PSBs and broadsheets. 
Table 5.6: Sentiment towards Islam—comparison of public service broadcasters 
(PSBs), tabloids, broadsheets, and hybrid broadcasters (HSBs), percent (N=602) 
 
Sentiment PSBs (151) Tabloids (301) Broadsheets (70) HSBs (80) 
Negative 15 (22) 30 (90) 17 (12) 23 (18) 
Positive 47 (71) 37 (112) 47 (33) 35 (28) 
Neutral 17 (26) 17 (50) 16 (11) 14 (11) 




As shown in table 5.6, while only 15% of PSBs’ posts and 17% of broadsheets’ posts 
were negative to Islam, the corresponding figure for tabloids was 30%. It should be 
noted, however, that the tabloids were also more often positive than negative. 
While this is not shown in the table, there was a difference between the Danish 
tabloids, on the one hand, and the Swedish and Norwegian tabloids, on the other. 
While the Danish tabloids’ posts and associated articles covered Islam mostly 
negatively (1.6 negative posts per positive post), the Swedish (0.6 negative post per 
positive post) and Norwegian tabloids (0.8 negative post per positive post) tended 
to portray Islam positively. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter has shown that the Scandinavian news media mainly covered Islam 
positively in their Facebook posts and associated articles in the studied period. This 
was especially the case with the Norwegian and Swedish media, which published 
twice as many positive as negative items. The Danish news media were the least 
positive but also posted more positive than negative items. The relatively marginal 
differences between the countries in this regard was surprising considering the 
socio-political and historical differences outlined in Chapter 2. Thus, the findings 
gave quite limited support for hypothesis 1 of the dissertation (i.e. that Danish posts 
and their associated article texts will cover Islam more negatively than Norwegian 
and Swedish posts and their associated article texts will. The Norwegian items will 
be more negative than the Swedish items, albeit the difference will be marginal). 
The posts mainly concentrated on three themes: (1) Islamism, Jihadism, and war; (2) 
face veils (i.e. the burka and niqab); and (3) discrimination and racism. The 
substantial focus on the burka and niqab was driven primarily by the Danish ban of 
face-covering clothing that occurred during the studied period, which led to 29% of 
the Danish posts discussing this topic. Much in line with the descriptions in Chapter 




We will in in the following chapter shift focus from the news outlets’ Facebook posts 




Chapter 6: Facebook Comments—Items Written by Ordinary 
Citizens 
This chapter analyses the comment sections beneath the established news media’s 
Facebook posts about Islam, in light of the wider sociopolitical context and findings 
from the analysis of the posts. The chapter is split into two parts. The first part 
focuses on the general sentiment that Scandinavian commenters expressed towards 
Islam, i.e. the percent of negative, positive, neutral, and anti-Islamist103 comments. 
It also considers how comment sentiment was related to the theme, source, and 
sentiment of the post to which the comments replied. Variations and similarities 
between how different news media types’ comment sections depict Islam are also 
briefly considered. In the second part, the chapter presents and discusses results 
from the categories of counterpublic discourses: deconstructing power relations, 
argumentative countering, and strengthening identity. Based on the findings from 
the three categories, an overall assessment is made that compares how prevalent 
(both Islam-sceptic and Islam-sympathetic) counterpublic discourses are in the three 
countries’ comment sections. 
Sentiment 
In line with the corrective action perspective, which predicts that citizens will 
attempt to “correct” perceived “wrongs” in the public sphere by taking online or 
offline action, it is assumed that the comments will show an almost diametrically 
opposed result from discourse on Islam in the public sphere at large. However, since 
Scandinavian research has shown that those who comment on news media’s 
comment sections are more negative to immigration than the average population 






103 This sentiment category was called anti-Islamist for brevity but also included opposition to 
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Muslims have found mainly negative depictions (Awan, 2016, McEnery et al., 2015; 
Oboler, 2016, Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016), it was predicted that: 
H2: All countries’ comment sections will have more negative than positive 
comments about Islam. In line with the corrective action perspective, the Swedish 
comment sections will have the highest number of negative comments compared 
to positive comments, the Danish comment sections will have the lowest number of 
negative compared to positive comments, and the Norwegian comment sections 
will be found between the Swedish and Danish ones. 
Figure 6.1: Commenters' attitude towards Islam, (N=6797) 
 
 
          
    
          
    
          
    
          
    




As displayed in figure 6.1, 45% of the total amount of comments were negative 
towards Islam or Muslims, 19% were anti-Islamist (but not negative towards Islam or 
Muslims in general), 27% of comments were positive towards Islam or Muslims, and 
8% were neutral. As such, the results showed that the sentiment expressed in the 
comment sections varied fundamentally from the mainly positive posts published by 
the news outlets. The overall results were to some extent consistent for all the three 




47% of the Danish were negative, and all the countries had significantly fewer 
positive than negative comments. Thus, the first part of hypothesis 2 was confirmed. 
The two most substantial differences between the countries were found in relation 
to the frequency of anti-Islamist and positive comments. Addressing the difference 
related to anti-Islamist comments first, these constituted a higher proportion of 
comments in Norway and Sweden than in Denmark (29% of Norwegian comments, 
25% of Swedish comments, and 14% of Danish comment). This difference can, 
however, be explained by the fact that Danish commenters had a lower proportion 
of posts dealing with negatively loaded themes to which they could reply than 
Norwegian and Swedish commenters did (see figure 5.1). 
More interestingly, the percent of positive comments was clearly higher in the 
Danish comment sections (32%) than in the Swedish comment sections (23%), and, 
particularly, the Norwegian comment sections (18%). As such, the pattern in the 
comments was different from the established news media’s posts and the context 
outlined in Chapter 2. For every positive comment in the respective countries’ 
comment sections, there were 2.5 negative Norwegian comments, 1.9 negative 
Swedish comments, and 1.5 negative Danish comments. In contrast, the previous 
chapter showed that for every positive post published by the mass media outlets 
from the three countries—there were 0.5 negative Norwegian posts, 0.5 negative 
Swedish posts, and 0.7 negative Danish posts. The corrective action perspective, 
which predicts that perceived “wrongs” in the public sphere will prompt individuals 
to “correct” these through both offline and online practices, was, however, not fully 
consistent with these findings. While the Danish comment sections were as 
predicted marked by negative attitudes towards Islam to the lowest degree, the 
Norwegian comments were, against expectations, substantially more negative than 




From a corrective action point of view, one may have expected the Swedish 
comments to be more negative than the Norwegian ones, given the milder and 
more amicable Swedish debate climate around Islam, immigration, and integration. 
It is nevertheless clear that the spheres of opinion (Hallin, 1986) have been 
redefined in Sweden since the 2015 refugee crisis, perhaps leading to that 
individuals critical of how the Swedish public sphere has dealt with Islam feel they 
have less to correct in the current debate climate. Furthermore, because the 
immediate mass media context of the Norwegian commenters was equally positive 
to Islam as the immediate mass media context of the Swedish commenters was, 
Norwegian Facebook users critical towards Islam may also have been highly 
incentivised to take corrective action. 
As we shall see in the following subsection, there were, however, substantial 
differences in commenters’ attitudes depending on the theme that was discussed. 
Themes 
In the previous chapter we saw that the most prominent themes in the posts 
published by the established news media were Islamism, Jihadism, and war; the 
burka and niqab; discrimination and racism; the hijab; and spirituality, rituals, and 
holidays (see figure 5.1). But what sentiment did the commenters express towards 
posts focusing on the various themes, and did this vary between the countries? This 
subsection focuses on the themes that received at least 2% of the total number of 
analysed comments (N=6797), i.e. at least 136 comments. 12 themes met this 
criterion. Most of these themes were also among the most prevalent themes in the 
established news media’s posts, but the themes food, honour culture, conversion, 
and immigration/deportation were added to the list, suggesting that commenters 
were more interested in these topics than the editorial news media were. Posts 
about political parties and fake news, however, were seemingly of less interest 




outlets focused on, posts about these themes received less than 2% of the 
comments and are therefore not shown in the following figure. 
Figure 6.2: Commenters' attitude towards Islam when responding to the most 
commented themes (N=6797) 
 
 
A central finding was that none of the 12 most commented themes received more 
positive than negative comments. This included posts about discrimination and 
racism, which were framed overwhelmingly sympathetically towards Muslims by the 
news media but were not met with the same support by the commenters. As 
illustrated by the length of the red bars in figure 6.2, the themes that commenters 
were the most negative towards were not surprisingly relatively marginal practices 
among Muslims in Scandinavia, like refusing to shake hands with the opposite sex 
(71% negative comments) and wearing the burqa or niqab (66% negative 
comments). For instance, strong opposition was expressed when a Swedish court 
ruled that a Muslim woman was to be economically compensated by the firm that 
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interviewers’ hand.104 Posts with spirituality/rituals/holidays as a main theme also 
received a high number of negative comments (61%). This category included replies 
to posts about circumcision and Muslim prison inmates requesting to be given 
special treatment to carry out fasting. These cases were given an overwhelmingly 
negative response, which contributed to the high percentage of negative comments 
in relation to this theme. Other posts related to spirituality, e.g. a DR post about a 
Danish imam explaining the need for more hospital imams, were met more 
positively. 
As illustrated by the length of the blue bars in figure 6.2, the posts that were met by 
the highest percentage of positive comments in relation to Islam focused on 
immigration and deportation (47% positive comments), discrimination and racism 
(40% positive comments), and freedom of speech (37% positive comments). The fact 
that posts about immigration and deportation were met by a relatively high number 
of positive comments was somewhat surprising but can likely be explained by the 
nature of these posts. Of the few posts that had immigration/deportation as a main 
theme, a majority described (members of) Norwegian and Danish radical right 
populist parties advocating for a complete stop in Muslim immigration.105 The 
radical character of this message split the commenters into two equally big camps: 
one consisting of those completely disagreeing and another consisting of those 
agreeing whole-heartedly. It is plausible that more moderate calls for restrictions to 
















Not surprisingly, the anti-Islamism/anti-Jihadism/anti-war/anti-honour culture/anti- 
crime category (referred to as anti-Islamism for brevity) was most often coded in 
relation with comments replying to posts about these themes. The established news 
media’s posts about Islamism, Jihadism, and war received 77% comments that 
expressed a negative attitude towards these phenomena but did not criticise Islam 
or Muslims in general. Out of the comments replying to posts about honour culture, 
49% were anti-honour culture without criticising Islam or Muslims, and 14% of 
replies to posts about crime were anti-crime, without criticising Islam or Muslims. 
The themes Islamism/Jihadism/war and honour culture were also the ones that 
received the lowest percentage of neutral comments, indicating that commenters 
were particularly willing to express a clear opinion on these issues. However, this did 
not, at least in the case of replies to posts about Islamism, Jihadism, and war, entail 
an inclination to blame Islam or Muslims in general for these phenomena: only 12% 
of comments replying to posts that focused on this theme category were negative 
towards Islam or Muslims. 
We have now seen how the 12 most commented themes were responded to by 
Scandinavian Facebook users. The following table displays comparisons between 
how Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish commenters engaged with the most common 
themes. 
Table 6.1: Ratio of negative to positive comments about Islam in relation to the top 5 
most commented themes—comparison by country, (n=negative-positive comments) 
 
 Norway Sweden Denmark 
Burka/niqab 4.8 (164-34) 5 (333-68) 2 (701-358) 
Islamism/Jihadism/war 2.5 (43-17) 1.1 (39-37) 1.7 (70-42) 
Discrimination/racism 1.4 (53-37) 0.6 (82-135) 1.8 (209-118) 
Hijab 2.2 (39-18) 4.8 (67-14) 1 (105-102) 




As depicted in table 6.1, there were some substantial differences between the 
countries. For instance, while Norwegian and Swedish commenters wrote around 5 
negative comments for every positive comment about the burka and niqab, the 
Danish commenters wrote “only” twice as many negative as positive comments 
about the subject. This is interesting given that Denmark has the strictest policy with 
respect to face-covering clothing, having banned it from public space altogether, 
while Norway has banned it only in teaching situations, and Sweden has no such 
national ban. Since these policies largely reflect the different national discourses on 
the burka and niqab in the Scandinavian countries, the attitudes in the comment 
sections showed a different pattern than the general public spheres. 
The other type of Islamic clothing that was heavily discussed in the comment 
sections, namely the hijab, also showed a different pattern from the wider 
Scandinavian public spheres. In the Danish comment sections, there were barely 
more negative than positive replies to posts about the hijab (1.03 negative-positive 
ratio, rounded to 1 in the table). In comparison, there were more than twice as 
many negative as positive comments about the hijab in the Norwegian comment 
sections, and 4.8 negative comments per positive comment in the Swedish case. It is 
worth highlighting that the theme category hijab included posts about children 
wearing the hijab, and that these posts typically received more negative comments 
than posts about adults wearing the hijab did. Especially posts describing the 
Göteborgs-Posten revelation that 27 out of 40 Swedish pre-schools would be willing 
to force children to wear the hijab if their parents requested it prompted many 
negative Swedish comments. 
Posts about handshaking, in this context referring to the practice of some Muslims 
choosing not to shake hands with members of the opposite sex, was criticised 
heavily in the comment sections in all the three countries. There were, however, 




made in the respective countries’ comment sections, there were 2.5 negative Danish 
comments, 5.9 negative Norwegian comments, and 6.8 negative Swedish 
comments. This is even though Denmark is the only of the three countries that has 
passed legislation that requires applicants for naturalisation to shake hands before 
becoming a citizen.106 As such, this was similar to the cases with different types of 
Islamic clothing: Denmark has the most Islam-critical discourse (and laws), but the 
Norwegian and Swedish commenters more regularly responded negatively to the 
practice than the Danish commenters did. 
Thus, corrective action is again a relevant perspective. Norwegian and Swedish 
commenters who want laws requiring new citizens to shake hands and stopping 
Muslims from wearing face veils have a stronger incentive to voice their opinions on 
these matters than the Danish commenters do. While Danish politicians have 
already passed laws that have taken care of these concerns for Islam-critical Danes, 
this has not been the case in Norway and Sweden. Thus, Islam-critical commenters 
in the Norwegian and Swedish comment sections could see a clearer benefit in 
expressing their opinion on such issues, hoping to convince others that their stance 
is the correct one. Unlike posts about face veils, the hijab, and handshaking, though, 
the remaining themes found among the 5 most commented subjects reflected 
differences in discourse outlined in Chapter 2 to a high degree. 
As seen in table 6.1, posts about Islamism/Jihadism/war and discrimination/racism 
typically received the most negative comments from Norwegian and Danish 
commenters, respectively. While we saw in figure 6.2 that posts about 
Islamism/Jihadism/war were overwhelmingly met with comments criticising these 
phenomena rather than Islam or Muslims in general, some also attributed blame to 
Islam and Muslims for these phenomena, especially in the Norwegian case. In the 
 
106 The requirement was passed into law at the very end of the analysed period and put into effect 





Norwegian case, there were for every comment that denied a link between Islamic 
doctrine or most Muslims and Islamism/Jihadism/war 2.6 comments that argued 
that such a link exists. The Danish commenters followed with a negative-positive 
ratio of 1.7, while Swedish commenters were mixed between negative and positive 
attitudes (1.1 negative-positive ratio). As such, responses to this theme reflected the 
national differences surrounding discourse on Islam to a larger degree than 
discussions around Islamic clothing and handshaking, although the idea of Islam and 
immigration as a threat to security is more prominent in the Danish public sphere 
than in the Norwegian public sphere (see Chapter 2). 
With respect to replies to posts about discrimination and racism, the comment 
sections can be considered to have mirrored the differences in national public 
discourse to a large degree. As the context chapter and the analysis of established 
news media’s posts have shown, Sweden has to a higher degree than the other two 
countries problematised discrimination and racism against Muslims and immigrants. 
As displayed in table 6.1, for every positive comment about Muslims or Islam below 
posts about discrimination and racism in the respective countries’ comment 
sections, there were 1.8 negative Danish comments, 1.4 negative Norwegian 
comments, and 0.6 negative Swedish comments (meaning more Swedish comments 
were positive than negative towards Islam or Muslims when discussing 
discrimination and racism). 
Sources 
In addition to considering the link between the posts’ theme and comment 
sentiment, it was examined whether it mattered for the comments’ sentiment 
whether the main source in the post was a Muslim. The results showed that this did 
not play a role in the comments’ sentiment towards Islam. Comments did, however, 
vary considerably based on the perspective of the Muslim source. When a Muslim 
source expressed a liberal view, e.g. advocated for gay rights or gender equality, 




In contrast, when a source expressed a conservative Muslim view, e.g. advocated for 
the right to wear the niqab or the right not the shake another person’s hand, 
commenters expressed overwhelmingly negative responses (62% negative, 18% 
positive comments). This indicates that while many commenters show support or 
tolerance for liberal interpretations of Islam, the same does not apply to more 
conservative interpretations. This was also indicated in table 6.1, which signalled 
that commenters were particularly negative to relatively marginal practices in 
Scandinavia like wearing the burka or niqab and choosing to not shake hands with 
the opposite sex. Furthermore, when (radical) Islamists were the main source, 
commenters overwhelmingly criticised Islamism and Jihadism rather than Islam or 
Muslims in general. 
Looking closer at the most prominent source category in terms of position/role, 
namely politicians (see figure 5.2), the results showed that comments replying to 
posts with radical right populists as a main source received a nearly equal number of 
positive and negative comments towards Islam, indicating quite polarised opinions 
about these parties’ rhetoric and policies in the comment sections. It was somewhat 
surprising that these comments did not more frequently express negativity towards 
Islam or Muslims, given the overall largely negative sentiments towards Islam found 
in the comment sections. A possible explanation is that the radical right politicians’ 
rhetoric or policy proposals in some cases were considered too radical, leading to a 
backlash from many commenters. Examples were The New Right’s proposal to make 
it impossible for people from countries with a substantial Muslim population to 
obtain citizenship in Denmark and a local Sweden Democrats proposal to ban Islamic 
clothing—but not other religious clothing—in municipal workplaces. Radical policies 





In comparison, there were for instance several posts where members of the Swedish 
Liberal Party argued for a less radical proposal in the form of banning hijab use 
among children in pre-schools, which was widely supported in the comment 
sections. Also different from posts with radical right populist sources, posts with 
social democratic politicians as the main source received nearly twice as many 
negative as positive comments about Islam. These politicians were, especially in the 
Swedish comment sections, often accused of not taking challenges with the 
integration of (Muslim) immigrants seriously. 
Link between post sentiment and comment sentiment 
We have seen that unlike the largely positive Facebook items published by the 
established news media (see figure 5.3), the ordinary citizens in the comment 
sections voiced mostly negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims (see figure 
6.1). But did a post’s sentiment towards Islam impact the sentiment expressed by 
commenters replying to that post, and if so, to what degree? 
The results displayed a limited link between post and comment sentiment. Negative, 
positive, and neutral posts about Islam alike were met by a majority of negative 
comments. Thus, on the one hand the impact of post sentiment was weak in the 
sense that the dominant negative attitude found in the comment sections 
manifested regardless of the sentiment of the post. On the other hand, negative 
posts received the largest proportion of negative comments (57%), positive posts 
received the largest proportion of positive comments (37%), and neutral posts 
received the largest proportion of neutral comments (17%). In addition, negative 
loaded posts (which discussed themes like Islamism/Jihadism/war, honour culture, 
and crime), logically enough, received the largest proportion of comments criticising 
these phenomena (without criticising Islam or Muslims in general) (80%). Thus, the 
post sentiment seems to have influenced replies to some extent, although negative 




Comparing news media types 
In the previous chapter we saw that the tabloids’ posts (and associated articles) 
were less positive towards Islam and Muslims than the public service broadcasters 
and broadsheets were, while hybrid broadcasters were found in a position between 
the PSBs and broadsheets, on one hand, and tabloids, on the other (see table 5.6). 
Previous research has shown that the content of comments varies according to the 
profile of the news outlet to which they respond (Su et al., 2018; Toepfl & Piwoni, 
2015). It could thus be expected that the tabloids, and to some extent the hybrid 
broadcasters, which covered Islam less positively in their posts, would also receive 
the highest proportion of negative comments. 
Table 6.2: Commenters’ sentiment towards Islam by media type, percent (N=6797) 
 
Sentiment PSBs (1502) Tabloids (3531) Broadsheets (409) HSBs (1355) 
Negative 36 (546) 52 (1834) 31 (126) 43 (581) 
Positive 39 (588) 24 (840) 39 (159) 19 (254) 
Neutral 5 (118) 9 (305) 12 (48) 6 (78) 
Anti-Islamist 17 (250) 16 (552) 19 (76) 33 (442) 
As table 6.2 reflects, this was the case to a large degree. Commenters replying to 
tabloids’ and HSBs’ posts were largely negative towards Islam, whereas commenters 
replying to PSBs and broadsheets’ posts were in fact somewhat more positive than 
negative. While more than half of comments (52%) written in response to tabloid’s 
posts and 43% of comments to HSBs posts expressed a negative sentiment towards 
Islam, the corresponding figures were 36% and 31% for PSBs and broadsheets, 
respectively. This suggests that, in terms of attitudes towards Islam and Muslims, 
quite different audiences operate in the comment sections of the various news 
outlets. 
Looking at individual outlets that stood out, the Danish broadsheet Politiken’s posts 
received twice as many positive as negative comments and was the only outlet 




positive than negative towards Islam. At the other end of the spectrum were 
comments replying to the HSBs TV4 (SWE) and TV2 (NOR) and the tabloids VG 
(NOR), Dagbladet (NOR), and Ekstra Bladet (DK), which overwhelmingly displayed 
sceptical attitudes towards Islam. 
Counterpublic Discourses 
The presented results have until now shown that the news media’s Facebook posts 
generally covered Islam and Muslims positively (see figure 5.3), while the Facebook 
users commenting on these stories were largely negative towards Islam and 
Muslims (see figure 6.1). Figure 6.1 also showed that Denmark, the Scandinavian 
country whose general public sphere is marked by Islam-critical discourse to the 
highest degree, had the lowest proportion of negative compared to positive 
comments, while the less Islam-critical Norwegian and Swedish public spheres, were 
marked by higher numbers of negative compared to positive comments. Still, we 
have yet to operationalise the theoretical framework (outlined in Chapter 3) in the 
analysis of the comments to see more explicitly how and to what extent the 
comment sections were utilised by Facebook users to challenge larger and more 
powerful publics. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, the theoretical framework led to the identification of four 
distinct subpublics operating within the comment sections: (1) a counterdiscursive 
anti-Islamist, anti-Islam, and anti-Muslim subpublic; (2) a counterdiscursive 
subpublic marked by friendly attitudes towards Muslims and Islam; (3) a subpublic 
engaging in mainstream discourse and expressing moderate opinions found closer 
to the middle of Hallin’s concentric spheres; and there was also semblance of a (4) 
counterdiscursive Islamist and conservative Islamic subpublic sphere. We will in the 




were present in the analysed comment sections.107 To do so, this chapter presents 
and discusses the results relating to the three characteristics of counterpublic 
discursive patterns of deconstructing power relations, argumentative countering, 
and strengthening a sense of collective identity (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, p. 471), 
which were introduced in Chapter 3 and elaborated in Chapter 4. 
Deconstructing power relations 
Deconstruction of power relations is key to understanding the relative prevalence of 
different subpublics in the comment sections, as comments with this trait explicitly 
targeted a superordinate public, which they criticised for being mainstream, 
dominant, censoring, and/or biased against a (perceived) subordinate public. As 
such, these comments were unmistakably counterdiscursive in character. The 
following table shows the extent to which the commenters in this study 
deconstructed power relations, and in which ways they did so. 
Table 6.3: Percent of comments deconstructing power relations (N=6797)108 
 
 Norway (1207) Sweden (1710) Denmark (3880) 
 Anti-Islam Pro-Islam Anti-Islam Pro-Islam Anti-Islam Pro-Islam 
Deconstructing power 
relations 
5 (61) 0 (4) 7 (122) 1 (10) 3 (112) 3 (101) 
Mainstream media 1 (17) 0 (3) 1 (12) 0 (4) 0 (17) 1 (32) 
Political establishment 1 (9) 0 (1) 2 (40) 0 (1) 1 (23) 1 (49) 
Criminal justice system 1 (13) 0 0 (4) 0 (1) 2 (59) 0 (7) 
Other actors 0 (6) 0 0 (5) 0 0 (4) 0 
Unspecified actor 2 (21) 0 4 (76) 0 (6) 0 (17) 1 (28) 
 
107 The Islamist/conservative Islamic subpublic sphere is not given further attention due to its 
highly marginal presence in the comment sections. 
108 If one adds the number of comments that targeted mainstream media, political establishment, 
criminal justice system, other actors, and unspecified actors, one may get a higher number than 
the total number of comments that deconstructed power relations. The reason for this is that a 
commenter could deconstruct power relations in multiple ways, for instance both by criticising the 
mainstream media and the political establishment. This also goes for the other categories of 
counterpublic discursive patterns presented below, i.e. a comment could engage with several 




As displayed in table 6.3, there was a marked difference between the Norwegian 
and Swedish commenters, on the one hand, and the Danish commenters, on the 
other. In Norway and Sweden, 5% and 7% of the comments deconstructed power 
relations from an anti-Islam perspective,109 while close to zero comments (0% and 
1%, respectively) did so from an Islam-sympathetic viewpoint. In Denmark, the 
comments that deconstructed power relations were evenly spread between those 
negative and those positive towards Islam, each group constituting 3% of the total 
number of Danish comments. As such, these results provided support for hypothesis 
3 of this dissertation, which was theoretically informed by the corrective action 
perspective: 
H3: Islam-critical counterpublic discourses will be most prevalent in the Swedish 
comment sections, the least prevalent in the Danish comment sections, while the 
Norwegian comment sections will be found between these. Correspondingly, Islam- 
positive counterpublic discourses will be most prevalent in the Danish comment 
sections and the least prevalent in the Swedish comment sections, with Norway 
again expected to be in a middle position. 
The only part of hypothesis 3 that was not confirmed was that there would be more 
Norwegian than Swedish commenters sympathetic towards Islam and/or Muslims 
that engaged in counterpublic discourses. As we saw in table 6.3, Norway and 
Sweden had very few such comments, indicating that the Islam/Muslim-sympathetic 
counterpublic was highly marginal in these countries’ comment sections. Only in the 
Danish comment sections was there a noticeable counterpublic that targeted power 
relations for discriminating Islam, Muslims, and those sympathetic towards Muslims. 
It can be argued, of course, that 3%, and 5% and 7% for that matter, indicate a quite 
low permeation of explicitly counterdiscursive items in the studied comment 
sections. In other words, it was undoubtedly the mainstream subpublic that 
 




dominated the comment sections. It belongs to the story, though, that few of the 
posts that commenters replied to directly discussed the mainstream media, political 
establishment, or the criminal justice system, meaning that the posts generally did 
not actively facilitate for Facebook users to publish comments that targeted power 
relations. Furthermore, the coding of these variables was quite restrictive. 
Comments that did not engage in comprehensive criticism, e.g. because they only 
criticised one political party or one news outlet, rather than the entire political 
establishment or all mainstream media, were not considered to have deconstructed 
power relations. Had such comments also been included in this category, the 
number of comments deconstructing power relations would have been significantly 
higher.110 
With respect to understanding the differences between the countries demonstrated 
in table 6.3, a relevant study, which was also mentioned in relation with the 
formulation of the hypotheses (see Chapter 2), was carried out by Heft et al. (2019). 
They pointed to the inclusiveness of established media towards right-wing actors 
and opinions as well as the electoral success of radical right populist parties as key 
factors influencing the demand for right-wing alternative news sites. In Sweden, 
where right-wing alternative news outlets are popular, established media have been 
unaccommodating towards radical right attitudes, and radical right populist parties 
have (until recently) had low success and been largely shunned by the other parties. 
In Denmark, where right-wing alternative news media are relatively unpopular, 
established media have been largely inclusive of far-right positions and actors, and 
radical right populist parties have had great electoral success and influence (Heft et 
al., 2019). In Norway, where the Progress Party has not been shunned like the 
Sweden Democrats has in Sweden but also not had the same influence on discourse 
 
 
110 Because the prevalence of these comments was not systematically analysed, it is unclear 
whether considering these comments as an expression of deconstructing power relations would 




as the Danish People’s Party, right-wing alternative media are less popular than in 
Sweden but more popular than in Denmark (Reuters Institute, 2019). 
As such, the demand for right-wing alternative media seems to align with the 
prevalence of comments deconstructing power relations from an Islam-negative 
perspective in the established news media’s comment sections identified in this 
study (relatively low among Islam-negative Danes, relatively high among Islam- 
negative Swedes, with Norwegians in a position between the two). The corrective 
action perspective may therefore be highly relevant for understanding the results: In 
Sweden, where Islam-critical actors and opinions have been considered deviant, the 
comments engaged in deconstruction of power relations from an anti-Islamic point 
of view to the largest extent (7%). In Denmark, where such opinions have been 
mainstream since the mid-1990s (Andersen et al., 2009; Heinze, 2018; Rydgren, 
2010), only 3% of comments did the same. In Norway, where the debate climate 
around Islam and immigration has been in a position between Sweden and Denmark 
(Brochmann & Hagelund, 2012; Hovden & Mjelde, 2019; Lövheim, Lindberg, et al., 
2018), the percent of comments deconstructing power relations from an anti-Islam 
viewpoint (5%) is exactly in the middle of the figures from Sweden and Denmark. 
Still, that there was an even percentage of anti-Islam and pro-Islam comments that 
deconstructed power relations in the Danish outlets’ comment sections does not, at 
least on the surface, align with the theory of corrective action. As we have seen, 
though, the Danish news outlets’ posts studied in this dissertation covered Islam 
more positively than expected (see figure 5.3), meaning that the immediate mass 
media context of the commenters may have played a role in incentivising Islam- 
critical Danes to take corrective action. Furthermore, since the focus here is on 
counterpublic-minded individuals’ perceived exclusion rather than exclusion per se 
(Asen, 2000; Brouwer, 2006; Warner, 2002), and many who identify as right-wing, 




marginalised and censored (Holt, 2018; Løvlie et al., 2018a; Moe et al., 2017; 
Nygaard, 2019; Thorbjørnsrud, 2017), the prevalence of anti-Islamic comments 
deconstructing power relations in also the Danish comment sections cannot be 
considered a major surprise. 
This subsection has considered comments that explicitly targeted superordinate 
publics—comments that undoubtedly were counterdiscursive in character. The 
following subsection considers to what extent commenters engaged in 
argumentative countering around Islam in the three countries’ comment sections. 
Argumentative countering 
While the commenters that deconstructed power relations explicitly articulated the 
perception that their opinions were marginalised or excluded from the larger public 
sphere, comments that engaged in argumentative countering typically did not do 
so.111 Thus, it was necessary to consider more “objectively” whether these 
comments can be said to have engaged in counterpublic discourses. Given the many 
nuances and different contexts involved with studying discourse on Islam in the 
three Scandinavian countries, identifying objectively how the spheres of opinion is 
defined in an exact manner is an extremely challenging, if not impossible, task. 
Therefore, rather than firmly classifying comments as either part of a mainstream or 
counterpublic, I will towards the end of the subsection give an overall evaluation of 
whether the findings from this category seems to reflect or oppose the results 
presented in relation with the deconstruction of power relations category. 
As we saw in Chapter 4 (table 4.3), comments were classified according to the 
arguments they expressed in relation with nine subcategories/topics: (1) Islamic 
practices/traits associated with Islam, (2) whether they championed other countries’ 
policies/discourse on Islam, (3) Islam and Muslims in general, (4) conversion to 
 
 
111 An exception was if the comment both engaged in argumentative countering and 




Islam, (5) political labelling, (6) harassment of political opponents and Muslims, (7) 
handling of Islamists/jihadists, (8) religion in general, and (9) Muslim immigration. 
We will in this subsection discuss to what extent, and in which ways, the 
Scandinavian commenters can be considered to have engaged in counterdiscursive 
speech in relation with these topics. First, though, we consider the extent to which 
each subcategory was represented in the material. 
Table 6.4: Percent of comments engaging with the subcategories of argumentative 
countering (N=6797) 
 
 Norway (1207) Sweden (1710) Denmark (3880) Total (6797) 
Argumentative 
countering? 
80 (966) 86 (1473) 82 (3188) 83 (5627) 
Islamic practices/traits 
associated with Islam 
40 (484) 54 (929) 54 (2113) 52 (3526) 
Handling of Islamists/ 
jihadists 
29 (345) 23 (386) 15 (570) 19 (1301) 
General evaluation of 
Islam/Muslims 
9 (108) 6 (111) 8 (312) 8 (531) 
Harassment of political 
opponents 
1 (7) 9 (152) 7 (281) 6 (440) 
Religion in general 5 (65) 6 (111) 2 (60) 3 (236) 
Conversion to Islam 3 (38) 4 (67) 3 (130) 3 (235) 
Muslim immigration 2 (24) 2 (30) 4 (145) 3 (199) 
Political labelling 2 (27) 3 (46) 3 (115) 3 (188) 
Championing other 
countries 
1 (17) 5 (91) 1 (39) 2 (148) 
 
As table 6.4 shows, the vast majority of comments (83%) engaged with at least one 
of the subcategories/topics of argumentative countering. It should be reiterated 
that this does here not mean that 83% of comments engaged in counterdiscursive 
speech. Given that this category did not firmly classify comments as either 




countering to illustrate that these comments not necessarily expressed 
counterpublic discourses. As we will see, however, all nine subcategories did feature 
some comments that can be considered counterdiscursive, as they seemed to 
challenge the bounds of mainstream discourse in various ways. 
Not surprisingly given the major focus on face veils and Islamism/terrorism/war in 
the news media’s posts (see figure 5.1), it was found that the two subcategories of 
argumentative countering that commenters most often engaged with was Islamic 
practices/traits associated with Islam and handling of Islamists/jihadists. As 
illustrated in table 6.4, more than half of the comments (52%) discussed Islamic 
practices/traits associated with Islam and nearly one fifth (19%) gave their view on 
how to deal with Islamists and jihadists. The Islamic practice subcategory was the 
most prominent in all the three countries, but Islamic practices were higher on the 
agenda of Swedish and Danish commenters (54% of all comments) than among 
Norwegian commenters (40%). Given this subcategory’s prominence, it will be given 
the most attention in this subsection. 
We observed already in figure 6.2 that Scandinavian commenters were highly 
negative towards certain practices associated with Islam, for instance the wearing of 
face veils, but how did commenters view this and other practices in more detail? Did 
commenters want legislation that made Islamic practices completely forbidden, did 
they want bans in specific areas of society, or did they consider a ban to be 
unnecessary? Not least, how did Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish commenters 
compare in this regard? The following table focuses on the two most frequently 
discussed Islamic practices/traits associated with Islam in the comment sections, 
namely the burka/niqab and the hijab, while the “other” category comprises all 




Table 6.5: Attitude towards the three most commented-upon Islamic practices/traits 
associated with Islam, percent (n=3445)112 
 



















Complete ban 45 (94) 65 (311) 57 (775) 5 (5) 7 (9) 3 (9) 7 (11) 12 (32) 27 (118) 
Limited ban 35 (72) 6 (29) 2 (21) 23 (24) 18 (34) 17 (49) 59 (91) 50 (136) 33 (143) 
Criticism 2 (4) 10 (45) 4 (50) 34 (36) 45 (61) 21 (58) 12 (18) 4 (12) 9 (41) 
Acceptance 16 (34) 14 (64) 29 (391) 33 (35) 20 (28) 51 (143) 17 (26) 19 (51) 24 (106) 
Unclear 2 (4) 5 (26) 10 (132) 6 (8) 9 (12) 4 (22) 5 (7) 16 (43) 6 (25) 
 
As shown in table 6.5, the dominant negative attitude found in the comment 
sections was also clearly manifested when considering in more detail how 
commenters wanted to handle certain Islamic practices. Of interest from a 
counterpublic perspective, the Swedish Facebook users, whom Chapter 2 described 
as operating within the most Islam/Muslim-sympathetic public sphere in the 
Scandinavian context, published the highest proportion of comments that sought a 
complete ban of face veils (65%). They also published the lowest proportion of 
comments that expressed acceptance/tolerance of face veils, although there was 
only a small difference between Norwegian and Swedish commenters (16% and 
14%, respectively). The Danish commenters, whom Chapter 2 described as 
operating within the most Islam-hostile public sphere in Scandinavia, had the 
highest percentage of comments that expressed acceptance/tolerance of face veils 
(29%). Norwegian commenters were compared to the Swedish and Danish 







112 Comments that expressed an opinion on two or more Islamic practices are not included in this 




ban category was also more prevalent than the limited ban opinion in the 
Norwegian comment sections (45% versus 35%).113 
Given that 65% of Swedish comments discussing the burka and niqab argued for a 
complete ban of face veils, and that Sweden has no national law regulating the use 
of burka and niqab, does this mean that these comments engaged in counterpublic 
discourses? Similarly, do the 45% of Norwegian comments arguing for a complete 
ban of face veils indicate that 45% of Norwegian comments discussing this theme 
were counterdiscursive? This depends on where one draws the line for what can be 
considered counterdiscursive argumentation and on what information one chooses 
to emphasise. If only the immediate context of the commenters (i.e. the 602 posts 
analysed in this study) were to be taken into account, it would be found that to ban 
face veils in public space in Norway and Sweden is, with the exception of artist 
Tommy Körberg in the Swedish context, 114 only endorsed by the radical right 
populist parties FrP and the (previously) deviant SD. This is unlike Denmark where 
the news media reported that a clear majority in Parliament passed legislation 
banning face covering clothing. Based on the immediate context, then, these views 
may be considered somewhat radical in the Swedish and Norwegian public spheres, 
especially in Sweden, where no national ban exists. At the same time, if one 
broadens the scope to include more information, this view appears to be well within 





113 It is worth noting, though, that the posts to which the Facebook users replied may have 
influenced these results to some extent. Given that most Norwegian posts about face veils 
reported that the Norwegian Parliament had passed legislation to ban face covering clothing in 
teaching situations (but not in other situations), many comments wrote short concurring answers 
and were thus coded as expressing support for a limited ban. Most Swedish and Danish posts 
about the burka and niqab, were, unlike the Norwegian posts, mainly about the Danish ban of 
face-covering clothing from public space altogether, and therefore facilitated more directly for 






From 2002 to the studied year of 2018, Swedish elected officials introduced six bills 
in parliament with the aim to prohibit the use of the burka and niqab. Although five 
of these came from the Sweden Democrats, one of the anti-face veil bills was also 
introduced by the Centre Party (Frisk & Gillette, 2019, p. 471). Moreover, 
representatives from other mainstream parties as well as prominent social 
commentators and journalists have also expressed a wish to ban face veils from 
public space altogether, both in Sweden and in Norway.115 Thus, if one takes this 
information into account, arguing that face veils should be completely banned from 
public space does not seem like a very radical view. 
It is also worth considering the commenters’ views towards the hijab. As 
demonstrated in table 6.5, commenters were much less likely to argue for a ban of 
the hijab than what was the case with the burka and niqab, although criticism of the 
hijab was widespread. When commenters argued for banning the hijab, they 
typically concentrated on certain groups or spaces where it should be banned (e.g. 
for children in schools and in certain workplaces), i.e. a limited/partial ban. These 
viewpoints were also commonly expressed in the news media’s posts, meaning 
these comments cannot be considered to have engaged in argumentative 
countering. There was a small number of comments, though, that argued that the 
hijab should be completely banned from public space (4% of Norwegian comments, 
7% of Swedish comments, and 3% of Danish comments discussing the hijab). 
Commenters voicing this opinion seem to have engaged in argumentative 
countering in all three national contexts, both when considering the immediate and 
 
 









the broader context. In the immediate context, no post featured the opinion that 
hijabs should be completely banned from public space, and only actors in the 
deviant sphere/on the border of the sphere of legitimate controversy would argue 
that the hijab should be completely banned in any of the three Scandinavian 
countries. 
Interestingly, half of Danish comments (51%) showed acceptance/tolerance for the 
hijab, while the corresponding figures for the Norwegian and Swedish comments 
were 33% and 20%, respectively. As such, the comment section also on this topic 
showed a diametrically opposite pattern to the wider socio-political context around 
Islam, outlined in Chapter 2. Furthermore, as we saw above, Sweden had the 
highest portion of comments that wanted a complete ban of face veils. This 
highlights the potential relevance of the corrective action perspective for 
understanding some of the findings in this study. 
The other Islamic practices/traits often associated with Islam that the commenters 
discussed were refusal to shake hands with members of the opposite sex, Islamic 
private schools, halal food, circumcision, Islamic holidays, calls to prayer, mosques, 
and the Quran. As demonstrated in table 6.5, the Danish commenters were more 
eager to implement complete bans for these practices/traits than the Norwegian 
and Swedish commenters were. This can be explained by Danish Facebook users’ 
view of not shaking hands with members of the opposite sex, which was the third 
most discussed practice associated with Islam in the comment sections. While not 
shown in the table, 36% of Danish comments addressing this practice argued that 
shaking hands with a member of the opposite sex should be an absolute 
requirement to obtain a Danish citizenship. As was mentioned earlier in the 
dissertation, Denmark is the only of the three countries that has passed legislation 
that requires applicants for naturalisation to shake hands before becoming a citizen 




Furthermore, several Danish posts analysed in this study featured views from 
politicians who wanted such a ban (as well as views from politicians who opposed 
it). As such, this viewpoint is well within the sphere of legitimate controversy in the 
Danish public sphere. Norwegian and Swedish commenters largely concentrated on 
problems they saw with not shaking hands in more small-scale situations, such as in 
job interviews and when working as a schoolteacher, and thus argued more for 
partial bans. Similar viewpoints were also reflected in the Norwegian and Swedish 
news media’s posts, suggesting that Facebook users generally did not engage in 
argumentative countering in relation with this practice. 
The same cannot be said for the comments that argued that mosques, the Quran, 
and Islam altogether should be banned. These unmistakably deviant comments, 
which undoubtedly can be considered to have engaged in argumentative 
countering, were, however, marginal in all three countries’ comment sections (0.6% 
of the total number of Swedish comments, 0.3% of Danish comments, and 0.2% of 
Norwegian comments). As was discussed in Chapter 1, it is likely that moderation 
rules have stopped certain clearly deviant comments from being published or led to 
such comments being removed. Thus, they would not have been registered in the 
presented results. 
We will now consider the second most prevalent subcategory of argumentation, 
namely handling of Islamists/jihadists. As shown in the following table, the 




Table 6.6: Prevalence of arguments used in relation with the subcategory handling of 
Islamists/jihadists, percent of comments engaging with this subcategory (n=1301) 
 
 Norway (345) Sweden (386) Denmark (570) Total (1301) 
Not allow returns from ISIS 
territory 
6 (19) 3 (13) 53 (302) 26 (334) 
Deport/revoke citizenship 31 (108) 14 (55) 12 (69) 18 (232) 
Stop public support/funding 28 (97) 10 (38) 0 (2) 11 (137) 
Exclude from organisations 0 23 (88) 0 (2) 7 (90) 
Forgive/not punish 2 (6) 3 (10) 2 (11) 2 (27) 
Imprison 5 (18) 1 (4) 0 2 (22) 
Sentence to death/kill 
extrajudicially 
1 (3) 1 (5) 2 (13) 2 (21) 
Allow returns from ISIS 
territory and sentence 
0 0 2 (12) 1 (12) 
Equivalate with the USA/the 
West/Israel 
0 1 (3) 1 (7) 1 (10) 
Unspecified condemnation 19 (66) 36 (140) 25 (143) 27 (349) 
Unclear116 8 (28) 8 (30) 2 (9) 5 (67) 
 
As displayed in table 6.6, the most common viewpoints were that those who had 
travelled to ISIS territory in Syria should not be allowed to return to Scandinavia 
(26% of comments discussing Islamists/jihadists), that Islamists/jihadists should be 
deported and/or lose their citizenship (18%), and that Islamists/jihadists should not 
receive economic support or funding from the state (11%). It should also be noted 
that more than one quarter of comments addressing Islamists or jihadists (27%) 






116 The difference between the “unspecified condemnation” comments and the “unclear” 
comments was that while the former clearly criticised Islamists/jihadists, it could not be discerned 




The Swedish comment sections had the highest percentage of comments that 
condemned Islamists/jihadists without specifying what measure to take to address 
the problems they pose, Norwegian comments emphasised that Islamists/jihadists 
should be deported or lose their citizenship, while the Danish commenters primarily 
argued that members who had travelled to ISIS territory should be not allowed to 
return to Scandinavia.117 The most radical arguments, which had no or highly 
marginal support in the established news media’s posts, were that Islamists/jihadists 
should receive the death penalty or be killed extrajudicially (2%), that they should be 
forgiven for their (criminal) actions (2%), and that Islamists/jihadists are no worse 
than the West and/or Israel (1%). There were no major differences between the 
countries in this regard. As such, only a small percentage of what may be considered 
counterdiscursive arguments were found in the three countries’ comment sections 
in relation with this subcategory, some of which represented diametrically opposed 
views on how to handle Islamists and jihadists. 
The third most prevalent subcategory of argumentative countering, general 
evaluation of Islam/Muslims, was found in 8% of comments (see table 6.4). These 
comments were classified as either negative, neutral/nuanced, or positive. Negative 
comments gave negative essentialist/generalising descriptions of the religion of 
Islam and/or its adherents. This included, for instance, comments describing 
Islam/Muslims as inherently violent, intolerant, and incompatible with modern 
(Western) societies. Positive comments gave positive essentialist/generalising 
descriptions of Islam and/or Muslims, e.g. described Islam/Muslims as 
 
 
117 The character of the posts that discussed Islamists and jihadists substantially influenced how 
the commenters wrote about the topic. For instance, because relatively many Danish posts 
focused on a man who had travelled from Denmark to ISIS territory, numerous Danish comments 
focused on that ISIS fighters should not be allowed to return to the country. Similarly, because 
several Swedish posts reported that (radical) Islamists had infiltrated certain organisations in 
Swedish society (but few similar stories were found in the Norwegian and Danish posts), Swedish 
commenters were clearly more preoccupied with excluding Islamists from organisations than 




fundamentally peaceful, while neutral/nuanced comments stressed that Islam can 
be interpreted in several ways. 
Figure 6.3: General evaluation of Islam and/or Muslims (n=489) 
 
As depicted in figure 6.3,118 the Facebook users’ general evaluations of Islam and 
Muslims were mainly negative. If we look at the grey bars, which display the total 
number of comments within each group, it was found that 59% of comments were 
negative, 29% were neutral, and 12% were positive. In other words, the 
overwhelmingly negative attitude towards Islam found in the Scandinavian 
comment sections (see figure 6.1) was also clearly reflected in this subcategory. As 
indicated by the yellow bars in figure 6.3, the Swedish comments’ general 
assessments of Islam and Muslims were less often negative than the Norwegian and 
Danish comment sections were: Swedish commenters published the lowest number 
of negative comments (49%) and the highest number of neutral/nuanced (36%) and 






118 Unclear comments, i.e. comments that gave a general evaluation of Islam and/or Muslims but 
whose viewpoint could not be discerned, were not included in the figure. Thus, the number of 
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more negative towards Islam and/or Muslims in general than were the Norwegian 
comments (illustrated by the blue bars), but the difference was marginal. 
What do these results tell us about the counterpublicity found in the three 
countries’ comment sections? Chapter 2 described three quite different national 
public spheres around Islam: the Islam-hostile Danish public sphere, the ambivalent 
Norwegian public sphere, and the Islam-tolerant Swedish public sphere. Based on 
this model, it is apparent that it is particularly the Swedish commenters that engage 
in argumentative countering by depicting the religion of Islam and its adherents in a 
negative essentialising way. Although figure 6.3 showed that the Swedish 
commenters published the lowest proportion of such comments, these comments 
can be considered less legitimate in the Swedish context than in the Norwegian, 
and, particularly, the Danish context. As such, it is reasonable to view the Swedish 
commenters as those that engaged in anti-Islamic argumentative countering in 
relation with this subcategory in the clearest way. Correspondingly, the positive 
essentialist/generalising depictions in the Danish comment sections might be 
considered to challenge the dominant Islam-negative discourse found in the Danish 
public sphere. As such, both anti-and pro-Islam counterpublic discourses are 
arguably observed within this subcategory. As indicated in figure 6.3, though, it is 
primarily the anti-Islam counterpublic that influences the comment sections (see 
also table 6.3). 
If we consider the immediate context of the commenters, however, all the three 
countries’ posts were either generally positive or mixed in its coverage of Islam, 
depending on whether also the negatively loaded posts were considered negative 
(see figure 5.3). Thus, if we emphasise the immediate context of the comment 
sections, it may be a stretch to classify positive essentialising comments about Islam 
and Muslims as counterdiscursive, also in the Danish context. That said, few posts 




descriptions of the sort found in the comment sections (e.g. that Islam is inherently 
peaceful and that all Muslims are wonderful people), especially in the Danish posts. 
The same goes for the negative (essentialist/generalising) comments; these were 
typically much more radical than the posts that were classified as negative. An 
exception was the Danish posts, where the tabloids BT and Ekstra Bladet published 
several items where Islam and Muslims were described in a negative generalising 
manner.119 Given the explicitly negative character of several of the Danish tabloids’ 
posts, it seems more reasonable to view the Danish comments that described Islam 
and Muslims in a negative essentialising way as a reinforcement of an already Islam- 
sceptic public sphere than as a form of argumentative countering. It is worth 
remarking, though, that there is a considerable difference between the Danish 
tabloids and the other Danish media types’ coverage of Islam (see page 171). 
The Norwegian commenters’ immediate context was, similarly to the Swedish 
commenters, rarely marked by posts that depicted Islam and Muslims in a negative 
generalising way.120 Based on this information, it can to some extent be argued that 
also Norwegian commenters that described Islam and Muslims as e.g. inherently 
violent and intolerant engaged in argumentative countering. This is, however, not as 


















We will now consider the fourth most common subcategory of argumentation, 
namely harassment of political opponents. As shown in table 6.4, the topic was 
almost absent from the Norwegian comment sections but was addressed in 9% and 
7% of Swedish and Danish comments, respectively. The comments of this 
subcategory were classified into one of three groups: (1) harassment is acceptable 
towards Muslims, (2) harassment is acceptable towards people on the far right, or 
(3) harassment is (always) unacceptable. In addition, comments could be coded as 
“unclear” if they addressed harassment of political opponents without being clear 
on what they thought about such behaviour. The results are shown in the following 
table. Because there were only 7 Norwegian comments that engaged with this 
subcategory, the results from the Norwegian comment sections are not presented 
for this subcategory. 
Table 6.7: Attitude towards harassment of political opponents, percent(n=) 
 
Harassment is… Sweden (152) Denmark (281) 
Acceptable towards 
Muslims 
5 (8) 22 (62) 
Acceptable towards 
people on the far right 
0 1 (4) 
Unacceptable 80 (122) 42 (119) 
Unclear 14 (22) 34 (96) 
As displayed in table 6.7, the results indicate a considerable difference between the 
Swedish and Danish Facebook users. While 80% of Swedish comments discussing 
harassment of political opponents clearly expressed that this was unacceptable 
behaviour, this was true for only 42% of Danish comments. While 5% of Swedish 
comments discussing harassment condoned harassment of Muslims, the 
corresponding figure for the Danish comments was 22%. In the Danish case, these 
comments were primarily responses to posts describing women who had chosen to 




In the Swedish case, the few comments that found harassment of Muslims 
acceptable endorsed threats against mosques and supported politicians whom the 
tabloid Expressen revealed had posted hateful content about Muslims online. 
Comments endorsing harassment can clearly be placed in Hallin’s (1986) deviant 
sphere, in all the Scandinavian countries’ larger public spheres. As such, 
commenters who expressed this view undoubtedly engaged in argumentative 
countering. The number of Danish comments that accepted harassment of Muslims 
particularly stood out. Therefore, the results from this subcategory emphasise that, 
while the Danish public sphere generally can be considered quite Islam-sceptic (see 
Chapter 2), there are still signs of an active anti-Islamist/anti-Islam/anti-Muslim 
group of Danes who use the comment sections of established news media to further 
challenge the bounds of legitimate discourse. 
We have so far in this subsection been presented to the four most discussed 
subcategories of argumentative countering. With respect to the remaining 
subcategories, religion in general, conversion to Islam, Muslim immigration, political 
labelling, and championing other countries, these were found in 2–3% of the 
analysed comments (see table 6.4). As these topics were relatively infrequent 
compared to the other subcategories of argumentation, the presentation and 
discussion of the results from these subcategories will focus strictly on the 
comments that may be considered counterdiscursive.121 Differences and similarities 
between the countries are addressed when relevant. 
With respect to religion in general, this subcategory preoccupied Swedish and 
Norwegian commenters more than Danish ones (see table 6.4). The only claim that 
can be considered to constitute argumentative countering within this subsection, 
though, was expressed by Facebook users who contended that religion should be 
completely banned from public space. This was, however, a highly marginal 
 




argument, which was only found in 11 comments. This is 5% of the number of 
comments that voiced a view on religion in general but only 0,2% of the 6797 
comments analysed in this study. 
Regarding conversion to Islam, commenters seemed to relatively frequently 
challenge the immediate (and broader) context in which they operated compared 
with what was the case with religion in general. While none of the established news 
media’s posts about conversion portrayed converting to Islam as something crazy or 
idiotic,122 this viewpoint was widespread among the Facebook users who discussed 
conversion: around half of the comments that addressed the topic described 
converting to Islam as something deeply problematic/crazy/idiotic. This included 
comments denouncing the converts themselves as crazy and idiots, both by using 
text and through posting ridiculing pictures and GIFs. As such, with the sociopolitical 
context in mind, particularly the Swedish, and, to some extent, the Norwegian, 
comments engaging with this subcategory seem to have expressed counterpublic 
discourses. If we emphasise the relatively Islam-amicable immediate context of the 
studied comment sections (see figure 5.3), though, all three countries’ Facebook 
users expressing this view, also the Danish ones, can plausibly be considered to have 
engaged in argumentative countering in relation with this topic. It should be stated, 
though, that these radical comments did not amount to more than 2% of the total 
number of comments in the three countries’ comment sections. 
Comments discussing the subcategory Muslim immigration were, as already 
indicated in figure 6.2, split between two almost equal groups of comments: on the 
one side were the individuals that argued that Muslim immigration should be 
banned, and on the other side were those who rejected this view. The latter group 
 
122 Ekstra Bladet published a post in which they problematised conversion to Islam, with quite a 
sensationalist framing: https://ekstrabladet.dk/nyheder/samfund/jespers-13-aarige-datter- 
konverterede-til-islam-jeg-er-bange-for-folk-fordoemmer-hende/7178169 
The post did not, however, depict converting to Islam as something deeply problematic or crazy, 




did typically not specify how many (Muslim) immigrants Norway/Sweden/Denmark 
should admit, as they were primarily concerned with denouncing the idea that an 
entire religious group should be prohibited from migrating to the country. Only 2 
(Danish) comments out of the 6797 comments analysed in this study argued that 
their country should have completely open borders. Although none of the news 
media’s posts presented a view on Muslim immigration that was akin to something 
like open borders, the fact that there were only two such comments shows that 
Islam/Muslim-sympathetic counterpublic comments were virtually absent within 
this subcategory. 
The Islam/Muslim-sceptic counterpublic, however, seems to have been relatively 
active in the comment sections that discussed Muslim immigration.123 There were 
more Swedish and Danish comments that argued for than that argued against 
banning Muslim immigration, and there were only slightly more comments that 
opposed such a ban than that endorsed it in the Norwegian comment sections. 
Based on the sociopolitical context (outlined in Chapter 2), the Swedish and 
Norwegian commenters who advocated for banning Muslim immigration can be 
considered to have engaged in argumentative countering; the idea of completely 
blocking Muslims from migrating to the country is a contrast to the view of the 
Islam-amicable Sweden and ambivalent Norway. The Danish commenters who 
advocated for such a ban, though, seems to be more in line with the Islam-hostile 
Danish public sphere, which was described in Chapter 2. 
If we concentrate on the immediate context of the commenters, it was, as we have 
seen (e.g. in figure 5.3), quite positive towards Islam, suggesting perhaps that also 
the anti-Islam Danish Facebook users engaged in counterpublic discourses around 
the topic of immigration. Several of the posts that the Danish news media published 
 
 
123 In terms of absolute numbers, though, these comments were rare, at least in the Norwegian 




about Muslim immigration, however, quoted far right politicians from DF and The 
New Right arguing that Muslim immigration should be banned.124 Consequently, this 
argument seems to be placed firmly within the sphere of legitimate controversy 
(Hallin, 1986) in the Danish public sphere. 
The eight most common subcategory of argumentation, political labelling, was 
found in 3% of comments (see table 6.4). From a counterpublic perspective, the 
most interesting labels were those that went beyond legitimate discourse, which in 
this case especially applied to the set of labels racist/Nazi/fascist and 
Islamist/terrorist. The former set of labels were generally used by Islam-friendly 
commenters, whereas the latter was only used by those with anti-Islam attitudes. In 
all the three countries, the former set of labels was the most common of the all the 
political labels found in the comment sections, potentially indicating that the Islam- 
friendly counterpublic was more active than the Islam-sceptic counterpublic in 
relation with this subcategory: around half of the Norwegian (48%) and Danish 
comments (51%) that engaged in political labelling used at least one of the words 
racist, Nazi, or fascist to describe (the views of) a political opponent. Among the 
Swedish comments, this set of labels was used in more 78% of the comments 
engaging in political labeling.125 
Given the sociopolitical context, it is, however, not necessarily the case that 
branding someone a racist, Nazi, or fascist can be considered engaging in 










125 It is worth remarking, though, that in absolute numbers, these figures only amounted to a two- 




comment sections, these labels were typically used to describe radical right populist 
parties and their members. As we saw in Chapter 2, these parties have been 
included in the mainstream to widely different degrees in the Scandinavian 
countries. Furthermore, unlike in Norway and Denmark, the idea of structural racism 
has been ubiquitous in Swedish public discourse (Andersen, 2019; Dahl, 2019). 
Given this background, the Swedish commenters using these labels can hardly be 
seen as part of a counterpublic, unless they themselves perceive their opinions to be 
marginalised or excluded from the larger public sphere (Asen, 2000). In Norway and 
Denmark, where the radical right populist parties have been a part of the 
mainstream on a different level than in Sweden, these political labels, especially 
Nazi and fascist, are a lot more controversial. Facebook users labelling political 
opponents this way in the Norwegian and Danish comment sections can thus more 
plausibly be considered to express counterpublic discourse than Facebook users 
engaging in similar rhetoric in the Swedish comment sections. 
With respect to the subcategory championing other countries, i.e. comments that 
explicitly endorsed other countries for their policies or discourse around Islam, it 
was almost solely identified in Islam-critical and anti-Islamist comments. The only 
exceptions were three Danish comments that considered the Swedish debate 
climate refreshing and more reasonable than the Danish one. The analysis found 
that the most common “role model” for Norwegians and Swedes was Denmark, 
while Danes pointed to Austria and Switzerland.126 The commenters championed 
these countries for their tough approach towards radical Islamism and certain 




126 A bit surprisingly, few commenters pointed to Eastern European countries as role models. At 
the same time, none of the news media posts the commenters engaged with in this study wrote 
about these countries, meaning that there was no such content to which the commenters could 
reply. Conversely, several posts reported about events in the countries that were championed 




users engaged with this subcategory in 5% of comments, while the corresponding 
figure in the Norwegian and Danish comment sections was only 1% (see table 6.4). 
The fact that the Swedish commenters were more eager to champion other 
countries than the Norwegian and Danish commenters were, may imply that the 
(anti-Islamist/anti-Islam/anti-Muslim) Swedish commenters were the least happy 
with their own country’s policy and national public sphere, which would be an 
indication of a more active (Islam-sceptic) counterpublic sphere in the Swedish 
comment sections. Similarly, from the corrective action perspective, it is a signal 
that the Swedish commenters are more eager to “correct” certain wrongs around 
Islam and Islamism than the Norwegian and Danish commenters are. As we saw in 
table 6.3, the results from the deconstruction of power relations point in the same 
direction. In fact, if we look closer at the comments identified as championing other 
countries, we find that these were sometimes combined with deconstruction of 
power relations. As one Swedish commenter wrote: ”Once again, Denmark leads the 
way, while Swedish leftist politicians and mainstream media keep on whining.” As 
such, the Swedish commenters seem to have engaged in Islam-sceptic counterpublic 
discourse in relation to this subcategory to a higher degree than the Norwegian and 
Danish commenters did. 
We have now considered the nine subcategories of argumentation. Although there 
are differences between the subcategories, the overall picture is arguably that 
argumentative countering among those critical towards Islam is most common 
among Swedish commenters, followed by Norwegian commenters, and then Danish 
commenters. This is also in line with the findings from the deconstructing power 
relations category. This is not necessarily because the Swedish commenters engaged 
in the most Islam-negative argumentation and the Danish commenters engaged in 
the least Islam-negative argumentation, but rather because several of the Islam- 




Danish public sphere. For instance, while a substantial proportion of Danish 
comments described Islam and/or Muslims in a negative essentialist manner (see 
figure 6.3) and wanted a ban on Muslim immigration, these arguments can be 
considered more legitimate in the Danish context than in the Swedish and 
Norwegian contexts. This is seen clearly in the wider sociopolitical context (outlined 
in Chapter 2) and to some degree also reflected by the immediate context of the 
commenters (i.e. the news media’s posts). 
The Islam/Muslim-sympathetic counterpublic was generally marginally represented 
in the subcategories of argumentative countering, although there were some 
exceptions, especially in the Danish comment sections. This was for instance related 
to general evaluation of Islam/Muslims and political labelling. As was pointed out 
above, this is not necessarily because the Danish commenters’ arguments were 
more Islam/Muslim-friendly than the Norwegian and Swedish commenters’ 
arguments. It can be understood, however, by Islam/Muslim-friendly arguments’ 
less legitimate position in the Danish public sphere compared with the Swedish and 
Norwegian public spheres. 
Overall, then, although a clear percentage of comments that engaged in 
argumentative countering was not identified due to the infeasibility of decisively 
classifying certain arguments as either mainstream or counterdiscursive, it can be 
argued that the results from the argumentative countering category give further 
support to hypothesis 3, which was theoretically informed by the corrective action 
perspective: 
H3: Islam-critical counterpublic discourses will be most prevalent in the Swedish 
comment sections, the least prevalent in the Danish comment sections, while the 
Norwegian comment sections will be found between these. Correspondingly, Islam- 




sections and the least prevalent in the Swedish comment sections, with Norway 
again expected to be in a middle position. 
Again, though, the results do not really support the prediction that Islam-positive 
counterpublic discourses would be more prevalent in the Norwegian comment 
sections than in the Swedish comment sections. 
In the following subsection, we will consider the prevalence of the third, and last, 
category of counterpublic discourse, namely strengthening a sense of collective 
identity. 
Strenghtening identity 
The strengthening identity category coded all publics operating within the comment 
sections’ efforts to strengthen a sense of collective identity, rather than only those 
associated with a subordinate (counter)public. The main reason for this is, as has 
been described, the many nuances needed to be taken into account in this 
comparative study, making it challenging to decisively classify comments as either a 
part of a mainstream- or a counter-public. Furthermore, it was found that both 
commenters with radical views and commenters with moderate views towards 
Islam strengthened a sense of collective identity among likeminded individuals, 
which made it interesting to code this characteristic also in relation with more 
moderate/mainstream comments. As was the case with deconstruction of power 
relations and argumentative countering, though, the primary focus is on discussing 
the results in relation to the counterpublics operating in the comment sections, both 
in terms of prevalence and type (i.e. subcategory). 
Commenters strengthened a sense of collective identity among likeminded 
individuals in 5 ways. This involved publishing emotional content, writing in an 
impolite tone, expressing a sense of personal belonging to a community (personal 
identification), engaging in alarmist rhetoric, and identifying with a political party or 




“no”, i.e. the subcategory was either present or not present in the comment. The 
following table, which focuses on the comments that were coded as expressing a 
positive or negative sentiment towards Islam, shows the prevalence of the different 
subcategories in the studied comment sections. 
Table 6.8: Percent of positive and negative comments strengthening a sense of 
collective identity among likeminded individuals (N=6797) 
 













Strengthening identity 73 (160) 66 (355) 68 (267) 68 (507) 78 (954) 71 (1285) 
…Emotional content 70 (152) 61 (327) 65 (255) 63 (467) 75 (915) 67 (1208) 
…Impolite tone 6 (13) 11 (59) 5 (18) 9 (67) 11 (132) 18 (332) 
…Personal identification 13 (28) 9 (50) 11 (43) 9 (68) 11 (136) 12 (215) 
…Alarmism 0 (1) 2 (9) 2 (6) 3 (25) 2 (21) 3 (52) 
…Political identification 0 1 (4) 1 (2) 3 (19) 1 (7) 1 (21) 
 
As indicated in table 6.8, the strengthening identity category was highly prevalent in 
the material. In particular, Danish comments voicing a positive sentiment towards 
Islam were found to strengthen a sense of collective identity among likeminded 
individuals to a high degree (78% of positive Danish comments). Similarly, 
Norwegian comments that were positive towards Islam were also more frequently 
identified within this category (73%) than Norwegian negative comments (66%), 
whereas in the Swedish comment sections the two groups were equally represented 
(68%). It should be noted, however, that in terms of absolute numbers, comments 
expressing a negative sentiment towards Islam dominated every subcategory of 
strengthening identity. 
Emotional content was particularly widespread in the comment sections, especially 
in the positive comments. As emotional language is a common feature of comment 




only spurred on by the studied topic. That said, debates around Islam and 
immigration have been noted to be emotional, heated, and polarised (Brox, 2009; 
Eriksen, 2011; Hagelund, 2004a, 2004b; Stærk, 2011). From this perspective, it is 
certainly possible that these high numbers are related to the character of the 
debate around this particular topic. 
A more relevant focus here is, however, what the emotional content subcategory 
can tell us about the counterpublicity in the comment sections. In isolation, it seems 
to tell us very little, given that the subcategory was widespread in all comments.127 
At the same time, if we compare the comments that were clearly counterdiscursive, 
i.e. those coded as deconstructing power relations (see table 6.3), with those that 
did not target superordinate publics, we can see that the explicitly counterdiscursive 
comments stood out from the rest. Although not shown in the table above, it was 
found that 72% of the explicitly counterdiscursive comments and 66% of the rest of 
the comments were emotional. In particular, the positive and anti-Islamist 
comments that deconstructed power relations were found within this subcategory, 
as 77% of both types of comments featured emotional content. As such, the results 
indicate that counterpublic commenters were more emotional in their rhetoric than 
the mainstream commenters. Regardless of whether this is intentional or not, 
counterpublic-minded Facebook users’ widespread use of emotional content may 
contribute to strengthen a sense of collective identity. 
Despite moderation rules, impolite tone was the second most prevalent subcategory 
of strengthening a sense of identity. Comments using an impolite tone featured 
derogatory characteristics of political opponents and Muslims and included 
comments expressing the sentiment “go home where you belong”. As shown in 
table 6.8, Islam-negative commenters were generally more impolite than Islam- 
positive commenters. The Danish commenters expressing a negative sentiment 
 




towards Islam were especially impolite: 18% of Danish negative comments had an 
impolite tone, while the corresponding figures were 11% and 9% in the Norwegian 
and Swedish comments, respectively. How can these results be understood from a 
counterpublic perspective? 
As we saw in Chapter 2, the debate around Islam and related issues has been 
harsher in the Danish public sphere than in the Norwegian and Swedish public 
sphere. From this viewpoint, the findings relating to the impolite content 
subcategory reflect patterns from the countries’ general public spheres. At the same 
time, some of the Danish comments seem to be more aggressive than what would 
be accepted in larger and more powerful Danish publics. This especially pertains to 
comments on the tabloid Ekstra Bladet’s Facebook page, where commenters for 
instance verbally abused a Christian celebrity for marrying a Muslim. Looking at the 
immediate context of the Facebook users, no established news media published a 
post that cited insulting statements of this level without clearly distancing 
themselves from the statements. That said, most of the impolite comments 
expressed the sentiment that certain Muslims should “go home” or “go to where 
you come from”, which were primarily directed against niqabis who opposed the 
face veil ban. A similar sentiment was typically not found in the news media’s posts, 
but there were some exceptions in the Danish posts,128 signalling that such rhetoric 
is less marginal in the Danish than in the Norwegian and Swedish public spheres. 
Thus, while the impolite comments in the Norwegian and Swedish comment 












sociopolitical and the immediate context, this is more uncertain when it comes to 
many of the impolite Danish comments. 
With respect to the Islam-positive comments that had an impolite tone, these 
typically targeted far-right politicians’ (lack of) intelligence, for instance by calling 
them idiots. As displayed in table 6.8, this type of comments was more common in 
the Danish comment sections than in the Norwegian and Swedish comment 
sections. By engaging in such name-calling, these comments went beyond legitimate 
discourse in all the three contexts; none of established media’s posts reported 
similar characteristics about a politician. Hence, these comments can reasonably be 
considered counterdiscursive. Thus, as we have also seen in the previous categories 
of counterpublic discourses, the Islam/Muslim-sympathetic counterpublic seems to 
have been were more active in the Danish comment sections than in the Norwegian 
and Swedish comment sections. 
The third most common subcategory of strengthening identity was personal 
identification, which featured comments using words like “we”, “us”, “our”, or 
“ours” to signal a sense of personal belonging to a continent, nation, religion, 
organisation or other community. As indicated in table 6.8, this type of speech was 
represented in around 10% of comments in each country. Personal identification 
was slightly more common among Islam-positive than among Islam-negative 
comments in the Norwegian and Swedish comment sections, while the opposite was 
true for the Danish comment sections. 
Typically, the commenters in this subcategory expressed a sense of belonging to 
their nation, i.e. Norway/Sweden/Denmark, and occasionally also “the West”. The 
focus on the nation was especially common among Islam-negative commenters, 
who contrasted e.g. “our democracy” and “our progressive values” with Islamic 
practices like wearing face veils and headscarves. Although such comments have 




Chapter 2), the immediate context of the Facebook commenters show that a similar 
sentiment as expressed in these comments can be found in both Norwegian, 
Swedish, and Danish posts.129 As such, these comments generally seem to reflect 
mainstream rather than counter-discourse. Some commenters, however, did not 
only contrast “our democracy/values” with certain Islamic practices but also with 
the (alleged) intolerant character of Islam and Muslims altogether. These comments 
are less legitimate, and a similar discourse was, with a couple of Norwegian 
exceptions, only found in the Danish posts. 
In contrast to the Islam-negative Facebook users, commenters positive towards 
Islam emphasised that “our values” are compassion, tolerance, and freedom of 
religion, which they more or less explicitly contrasted with the rhetoric of far right 
politicians and various (proposed) bans of certain Islamic practices. Some of the 
Islam-positive comments in this subcategory were also written by Muslims who 
expressed belonging to a larger Muslim community, for instance writing about “our 
religion”. Similar discourses were found in several of the established news media’s 
posts and also these comments can thus be considered mainstream. 
 


















It is worth noting, however, that if one compares the explicitly counterdiscursive 
comments (i.e. comments deconstructing power relations) with all the other 
comments, there is a clear overweight of comments engaging in personal 
identification in the former group compared to the latter. While this is not shown in 
the table above, 24% of comments that deconstructed power relations expressed a 
sense of belonging to a (typically national) community, whereas the corresponding 
figure for comments that did not deconstruct power relations was 9%. As such, 
personal identification seems to be a more common characteristic among 
counterpublic commenters than among mainstream commenters. This is seen in 
comments criticising superordinate publics for being naïve towards Islam and 
Islamism and discriminatory towards “us” ethnic Norwegians/Swedes/Danes and 
non-Muslims. As a Danish commenter wrote when criticising the police force for 
being too lenient towards Muslims: “There are two sets of rules: one for Muslims 
and then another for the rest of us.” As such, there seems to be a perception among 
some of the counterpublic-minded commenters that they are part of a sort of 
marginalised majority. Together with the use of emotional and impolite language, 
this may contribute to strengthen a sense of collective identity among these 
Facebook users. 
We have now considered the three most common subcategories of strengthening a 
sense of collective identity. As illustrated in table 6.8, the remaining subcategories, 
alarmism and political identification, were relatively rare in the studied comment 
sections. Both subcategories were typically more common among Islam-sceptic than 
Islam-friendly comments, but the difference between positive and negative 
comments did not exceed 2 percentage points in any of the three countries. 
When it comes to alarmism and differences between the countries, the Islam- 
positive Norwegian commenters virtually never engaged in alarmist rhetoric, while 




comments typically voiced concerns that Sweden/Denmark would strip Muslims of 
all their rights and potentially give them the same treatment as Jews had received in 
the 1930s and 40s. Also the Swedish and Danish Islam-negative comments were 
(marginally) more alarmist than the Norwegian ones. 
It is worth adding that several Danish Islam-negative alarmist commenters often 
used alarmist rhetoric when discussing Sweden, e.g. by calling the country 
“Swedistan”, referring to the country’s (allegedly) failed immigration and integration 
policies. Furthermore, if we consider anti-Islamist comments, which are not included 
in the table above, the Swedish comments are substantially more alarmist than the 
Norwegian and Danish comments: 8% of Swedish anti-Islamist comments were 
coded as alarmist, while alarmist rhetoric was nearly nonexistent in the Norwegian 
and Danish anti-Islamist comments. 
What do these findings tell us about the counterpublicity in the comment sections? 
A common trait shared by both anti- and pro-Islam alarmist commenters was the 
perception that there was a need for drastic change, which involved a more or less 
direct critique of the current status quo. For this reason, almost one third (32%) of 
alarmist comments deconstructed power relations. As such, a substantial proportion 
of these comments explicitly engaged in counterpublic discourse. There were, 
however, also alarmist comments that seem to have reflected content posted by the 
established news media. For instance, several Swedish posts described a dire need 
to deal with the spread of radical Islamism in the country,130 a sentiment that was 













As noted above, the final way in which counterpublic-minded commenters 
strengthened a sense of collective identity was by identifying with or indicating 
committed support for a political party or politician, i.e. political identification. This 
subcategory was marginal in the comment sections, and this applied to all three 
countries. Political identification was the least rare in the Swedish comment 
sections, where 3% of Islam-negative comments showed committed support for the 
radical right populist Sweden Democrats. Given the isolated and stigmatised role of 
the SD in mainstream Swedish public spheres until quite recently (see Chapter 2), 
these comments can arguably be considered counterdiscursive. Thus, although the 
subcategory was quite marginal, it is another indication of the anti-Islamist/anti- 
Islam/anti-Muslim counterpublic being more prevalent in the Swedish comment 
sections than in the Norwegian and Danish comment sections. 
Overall, the strengthening identity category reflected the findings from the two 
other characteristics of counterpublic discourses, deconstructing power relations 
and argumentative countering. In particular, this manifested in relation with the 
impolite tone subcategory. Although Danish commenters who are negative towards 
Islam were more often impolite than Islam-negative Norwegian and Swedish 
commenters, similar impolite language as found in the comment sections was 
identified in the Danish news media’s posts, unlike in the Norwegian and Swedish 
posts. As such, many of the comments that this study has coded as impolite seem to 
be somewhat legitimate in the Danish context, whereas they appear illegitimate in 
the Norwegian and Swedish contexts. Thus, these comments are arguably 
mainstream in the Danish public sphere and counterdiscursive in the Norwegian and 
Swedish public spheres. While the Islam-negative Norwegian commenters were 
more often impolite than the Islam-negative Swedish commenters, the Swedish 
commenters more often engaged in alarmist rhetoric and (radical) political 




seem to be permeated by Islam-negative counterpublic discourses to a larger extent 
than the other countries’ comment sections. 
 
When it comes to Islam/Muslim-sympathetic counterpublic discourses, this was, like 
with the anti-Islam counterpublic discourses, in particular found within the impolite 
subcategory. The Danish Islam-positive commenters stood out with 11% of their 
comments being impolite in a way that was not represented in established news 
media’s posts, corresponding figures for Norwegian and Swedish commenters being 
6% and 5%, respectively. Furthermore, unlike the Islam-positive Norwegian 
comments, there were signs of alarmist rhetoric among the Danish (and Swedish) 
Islam-positive comments. As such, also the findings from the strengthening identity 
category indicated that the Islam/Muslim-sympathetic counterpublic was more 
prevalent in the Danish comment sections than in the Norwegian and Swedish 
comment sections. 
As such, hypothesis 3,131 which was theoretically informed by the corrective action 
perspective, generally has solid support after the three categories of counterpublic 
discourses have been considered. Contrary to expectations, though, the results do 
not support that the Islam/Muslim-sympathetic counterpublic was more active in 
the Norwegian than in the Swedish comment sections. 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter 6 has described that, in contrast to the established news media’s posts, the 
Scandinavian commenters express a largely negative attitude towards Islam. In 
terms of sentiment, the Danish comment sections are the least negative towards 
Islam, while the Norwegian comment sections are the most negative. The Danish 
 
 
131 H3: Islam-critical counterpublic discourses will be most prevalent in the Swedish comment 
sections, the least prevalent in the Danish comment sections, while the Norwegian comment 
sections will be found between these. Correspondingly, Islam-positive counterpublic discourses 
will be most prevalent in the Danish comment sections and the least prevalent in the Swedish 




commenters also appear to be the least inclined to engage in anti-Islam 
counterpublic discourses, while in the normally less Islam-critical Swedish and 
Norwegian public spheres, the comment sections are to a higher degree permeated 
by anti-Islam counterdiscursive comments. Furthermore, while pro-Islam 
counterpublic discourses seem to be relatively rare in the Swedish and Norwegian 
comment sections, they constitute a noticeable proportion of the Danish comments. 
These findings are most clearly presented in relation with the deconstruction of 
power relations category, which firmly classified comments as counterdiscursive or 
mainstream: 7% of Swedish comments, 5% of Norwegian comments, and 3% of 
Danish comments targeted power relations from an Islam-sceptic viewpoint. 
Virtually no comments deconstructed power relations from a pro-Islam perspective 
in the Norwegian and Swedish comment sections, whereas 3% did so in the Danish 
comment sections. The researcher generally did not find it reasonable to decisively 
sort comments as either counterdiscursive or mainstream in the argumentative 
countering and strengthening identity categories, as several nuances, related both 
to the wider sociopolitical context and the immediate context, had to be taken into 
account. That said, the results from these two categories of counterpublic 
discourses seem to reflect the findings from the deconstruction of power relations 
category: there is a more active anti-Islam counterpublic sphere in the Swedish 
comment sections than in the Norwegian, and, particularly, the Danish comment 
sections, and there is a more prevalent pro-Islam counterpublic sphere in the Danish 
comment sections than in the other countries’ comment sections. 
As such, there is evidence that may suggest that the different national contexts 
incentivise commenters to engage in counterpublic discourses to different extents. 
In the public sphere marked to the greatest extent by hostility towards Islam and 
Muslims (Denmark), Islam-negative individuals may perceive that there is 




Sweden and Norway. This is, for instance, indicated by the relatively high number of 
Swedish and Norwegian comments arguing for stricter laws to regulate wearing the 
burka and niqab, a practice that has already been banned in Denmark. The 
corrective action perspective, which has been applied to account for some of the 
results, is, however, not apt for explaining all the findings. For instance, while from 
the corrective action perspective, one may have expected the Swedish comment 
sections to be marked by a higher degree of negativity than the Norwegian 
comment sections (due to the more Islam-and immigrant amicable Swedish public 
discourse), this prediction did not find support in the results (see figure 6.1). This 
can perhaps partially be explained by the influence of the immediate context of the 
commenters, as the three countries’ posts were found to be relatively similar in 
their depiction of Islam (see also Chapter 5). 
We will now shift focus from the substance of the studied items to the popularity 








Chapter 7: Popularity Cues 
As this dissertation analyses sentiment towards Islam and Muslims on Facebook, 
considering popularity cues serves a potentially important purpose. As noted in 
Chapter 1, popularity cues are (mainly) used to assign relevance or endorsement to 
an online item. As such, they can provide additional insights on what type of content 
about Islam is popular and how this differs according to sentiment, theme, country, 
and other factors. Furthermore, given that popularity cues may affect audience’s 
political perceptions, behaviours, and attitudes (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018, p. 210), it 
is highly relevant to analyse what items are assigned relevance and endorsement 
and which items are not. It should be noted that during the spring of 2016 Facebook 
launched an expansion to the “Like” button to include also the reactions “Love”, 
“Haha”, “Wow”, “Sad”, and “Angry”. These may make it clearer what attitude 
Facebook users try to express when using Facebook reactions and could be 
considered interesting as it “at least potentially allows for further insights into the 
emotional investments by media users into the news they engage with” (Larsson, 
2018, p. 329). At the same time, it can be challenging to interpret their meaning. For 
instance, users may apply the “Haha” button both to laugh with and laugh at 
someone or something, and they may use the “Angry” button to show both support 
and opposition. In this chapter, these newer reactions were discussed if they stood 
out in some way, but the main focus was on the more established like, share, and 
comment functions. 
The chapter is split into two parts. The first part focuses on the popularity cues 
assigned to the posts and the second focuses on the popularity cues assigned to the 
comments. In the first subsection of the chapter, it is considered how post format 
(i.e. video versus text) and how the post was presented (in terms of grammatical 
features) correlated with the number of popularity cues. Then, it is examined to 




emphasis is however on comparing the countries, more specifically related to how 
posts with different sentiment to Islam is reacted to in the three cases. Similarly, the 
second part of the chapter considers the number of likes given to positive and 
negative comments to Islam in the three countries. It also compares the number of 
popularity cues assigned to counterpublic comments and mainstream comments. 
Popularity Cues and Posts 
Format and presentation 
While we shall see that content more specifically related to Islam may have 
impacted the number of popularity cues posts received, also the format and 
presentation of the posts may have played a role. There were only 6 among the total 
number of posts (N=602) that received more than 1000 shares, and four of these 
were video posts (three of which were from TV or radio debates and one that was a 
skit performed by a comedian). This was even though only one ninth of the posts 
were video items; most posts featured a picture, a headline, a brief description of a 
story, and a link to an article on the news media’s website. As such, the more visual 
character of the video items, which has been shown in studies of visual 
communication to both increase audience’s attention towards a message (Graber, 
1990) and contribute to forming political opinions (Maurer & Reinemann, 2015), 
may have made them stand out from the pack. 
Looking at the median value, however, video posts received fewer interactions than 
non-video posts did. While video posts received a median number of 25 shares, 133 
comments, and 143 likes, the corresponding figures for non-video posts were 28, 
206.5, and 152. A possible explanation is that all the posts contained pictures, which 
similarly to the videos may have contained vivid depictions of a story. Since no in- 
depth analysis was made of the pictures used by the outlets, it is difficult to say 
something certain about how the visual characteristics influenced the popularity 
cues. It is worth noting that the only form of interaction that video posts received 




to Facebook users having more sympathetic feelings for the case or individual(s) in 
focus. 
Another important aspect having to do with the type of post, was that 46 of the 602 
posts were accompanied by a question where the news outlets asked the Facebook 
users directly what their opinion was on the issue described in the post, in line with 
social media logic (Haim et al., 2019). For example, Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet in 
one of its posts wrote: “German minister serves blood sausage for conference about 
Islam. Is that okay?”, before linking to an article on its website.132 Similarly, Danish 
tabloid B.T. in a post asked its audience: “No more fried pork as national dish due to 
consideration for Muslims?”.133 This strategy of using engaging features like 
question marks, which was mainly used by the Danish news media, seems to have 
boosted the number of interactions considerably. Posts featuring such questions 
received a median number of 43 shares, 543.5 comments, and 336.5 likes. Other 
posts received a median number of 26 shares, 192 comments, and 143.5 likes. As 
such, there were more factors than simply how Islam was described that influenced 
the number of interactions with the posts. I have here mentioned two: type of post 
(i.e. whether it was a video post or had another format) and presentation of the 
post (i.e. whether the post was accompanied by a question that served to stimulate 
the number of interactions). 
Genres 
As we saw in chapter 5, as many as 78% of the posts were news items, while 21% 
were debate posts (see table 5.2). As was briefly noted then, posting debate items 
about Islam did not lead to increased engagement from the Facebook users. Rather, 











kind compared to debate items about Islam. While news items received a median 
number of 32 shares, 239 comments, and 158 likes, the corresponding figures for 
debate items were 19, 112.5, and 123. 
The finding is interesting given that the debate genre more typically facilitates the 
expression of a clear opinion, which one could expect might trigger interaction with 
a post. At the same time, news factors (Galtung & Ruge, 1965) such as 
unexpectedness and negativity may have increased the newsworthiness of news 
items, prompting users to like and share them (Weber, 2014). The relatively high 
median number of “Angry” reactions to news items (42.5) compared to debate 
items (5) that was found in this study is perhaps an indication of this. Another, 
simpler (potential) explanation is that the news outlets sometimes publish debate 
items only on their Facebook debate page, which tends to be followed by fewer 
users than the main page where they usually post the news items. 
Themes 
Studies of news factors have shown that stories evoking negative emotions may 
increase sharing and commenting activity among the audience (Kümpel, Karnowski, 
& Keyling, 2015; Weber, 2014). In the extension of this, Larsson (2018) in his study 
of newer popularity cues on Facebook showed that Angry reactions seem to 
increase the willingness to share or comment on the posts reacted upon (whereas 
the opposite is true for the typically more positive Love, Wow, and Haha reactions). 
From this perspective, it was expected that especially posts about Islamism, 
Jihadism, and war would be shared extensively. How do these insights fit with the 
responses to the most popular themes in the Scandinavian news outlets’ posts? The 
following table shows the median number of popularity cues assigned to posts 




Table 7.1: Median number of Facebook interactions—comparison of the 5 most 
common themes in the posts (n=377)134 
 






Shares 29 35 21 25 29.5 
Comments 174 408 162 136 338.5 
Likes 81 392 81.5 184 232.5 
“Angry” 85 37 22.5 22 43 
“Sad” 4 4 6.5 4 7 
“Love” 1 37 3 7 11.5 
“Haha” 6 30 12 5 28 
“Wow” 5 7 4 4 2.5 
 
As demonstrated in table 7.1, the Islamism/Jihadism/war category stood out with a 
high median number of Angry reactions. Still, it was only the third most shared 
theme among the top five most prevalent themes in the news media’s posts. Posts 
about the burka and niqab received the highest number of shares, likes, and 
comments. While this is not shown in the table, posts describing the 
implementation of laws prohibiting face-covering clothing in Denmark and Norway 
received several thousand interactions—mostly likes—in all three countries, as 
Swedish outlets also posted about the bans. Posts that focused on discrimination 
and racism against Muslims, however, were shared relatively rarely, which is in line 
with research that has found that sad content is shared to a lower extent than 
content that evokes high-arousal positive (awe) or negative (anger or anxiety) 
emotions (Berger & Milkman, 2012). Posts about the hijab were only the fourth 
most shared out of the five most prominent themes in the Facebook posts. This 
theme category still received the second highest median number of likes, although 
not nearly as many as posts about face-covering clothing did. Posts about 
spirituality, rituals, and holidays were only beaten by posts about the burka and 
 




niqab in terms of the shares, comments, and likes they received, suggesting that 
these posts were assigned high relevance and endorsement by Facebook users 
(Porten-Cheé et al., 2018). 
Sentiment towards Islam 
We saw in the previous chapter that Facebook users’ comments were largely 
negative towards Islam. This was expected, as the most active individuals in online 
arenas, as well as those who discuss in news outlets’ online comment sections, have 
been noted to be more critical of immigration than the general population (Enjolras 
et al., 2013). Furthermore, given how anti-Islamic actors like radical right populist 
parties and alternative right-wing media have been shown to be highly successful in 
creating engagement online, it was hypothesised that: 
H4a: Negative posts about Islam will receive many more popularity cues than 
positive posts will. The hypothesis is considered to have strong support if negative 
posts have 1.5+ times as many shares and likes as positive posts do. 
The following table confirms the hypothesis, as the median number of shares and 
likes for negative compared to positive posts was above 1.5 times higher. 
Table 7.2: Median number of Facebook interactions with negative, positive, neutral, 
and negatively loaded posts about Islam (N=602) 
 
Popularity cues Negative Positive Neutral Negatively loaded 
Shares 39 22 25 30.5 
Comments 306 184 209.5 143 
Likes 290 143 122.5 89 
“Angry” 43 16 12 89 
“Sad” 6 3 2.5 4 
“Love” 9 10 3 1 
“Haha” 15 15 15 6 




While the median number of shares for negative posts about Islam was 39, the 
number was only 22 for positive posts. Furthermore, posts that focused on 
negatively loaded themes, such as Islamism/Jihadism/war, honour culture, and 
crime (but did not involve a negative coverage of Islam or Muslims in general), also 
received a relatively high median number of shares (30.5), indicating that (both 
more and less explicitly) negative posts were assigned higher relevance by the users 
than positive and neutral posts were. The negative posts were also liked much more 
often than the other categories of posts, signalling a higher endorsement of content 
that portrays Islam and/or Muslims negatively. Posts with negatively laden themes, 
on the other hand, received the lowest endorsement, which is understandable due 
to these posts focusing on topics such as Jihadism and honour culture. 
The newer forms of Facebook reactions were typically more evenly spread on the 
different categories. Except for the “Angry” reaction, they were also relatively rarely 
used, in line with general reaction patterns on Facebook (Larsson, 2018). 
Unsurprisingly, the negatively loaded category, which featured posts about 
troubling themes, typically received the highest number of “Angry” reactions. As 
demonstrated by table 7.2, negative posts also received substantially more “Angry” 
reactions than positive and neutral posts did. On the one hand, this could indicate 
that users were angry because they thought that the negative content was 
unjustified, or, on the other hand, that they were angry because they supported 
negative content describing something provoking, e.g. pre-school employees 
agreeing to force children to wear the hijab. The latter explanation seems more 
plausible given the mainly negative attitudes expressed in the comment sections 
and the fact that negative posts were shared and liked more often than positive and 
neutral posts. 
Comparing the countries 
This subsection focuses on the relative popularity of negative versus positive items 




highlighted. Still, it is worth noting that there were substantial differences in relation 
to the number of popularity cues received by the three countries’ posts. Danish 
posts were typically shared more than three times as often as Norwegian posts, 
liked more than four times as often as Norwegian posts and commented on more 
than twice as often as Swedish posts. Moreover, Danish posts typically received the 
most of all newer forms of reactions and stood out particularly with high numbers of 
“Angry”, “Love”, and “Haha” reactions. It can also be added that the median number 
of “Angry” reactions was only 4 in the Norwegian posts, whereas it was 30.5 and 57 
in the Swedish and Danish posts, potentially indicating that Facebook users from 
Sweden and Denmark were angrier when engaging with the Facebook posts. 
When it comes to comparing the number of interactions with negative and positive 
posts in the three cases, the study hypothesised that: 
H4b: In line with the corrective action perspective, Swedish Islam-negative posts 
will receive the highest number of likes and shares relative to the number of likes 
and shares received by Islam-positive posts, while Danish Islam-negative items will 
receive the lowest number of likes and shares relative to the likes and shares 
received by Islam-positive items. Norway will be found between the two in terms 




Table 7.3: Median number of Facebook interactions with negative and positive posts 
about Islam—comparison of Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish posts (n=386)135 
 
 Norway Sweden Denmark 
Popularity cues Neg. posts Pos. posts Neg. posts Pos. posts Neg. posts Pos. posts 
Shares 29 6 47 19 40 47 
Comments 221 37.5 169 87 489 440 
Likes 242 84.5 235 76 328 330.5 
“Angry” 20 2 34 16 83 32.5 
“Sad” 3 1 4 2 11 4 
“Love” 12 4 4 3 21 32 
“Haha” 7 5 5 12 40 28.5 
“Wow” 4 1 4 3 7 7 
As depicted in table 7.3, while the Danish posts undoubtedly generated the most 
Facebook interactions in total, these tended to be more evenly distributed between 
negative and positive posts than in the Norwegian and Swedish cases, where 
interactions were largely concentrated on the negative posts. As such, the analysis 
of the attitudes expressed in the comments, which found that for every positive 
comment in each country there were 2.5 negative comments in the Norwegian case, 
1.9 negative comments in the Swedish case, and 1.5 negative comments in the 
Danish case (see subsection Sentiment in Chapter 6), was generally mirrored in 
Facebook users’ assigning of popularity cues. For instance, while negative 
Norwegian posts received a median number of 29 shares, positive Norwegian posts 
received a median number of 6 shares. Similarly, the corresponding figures in the 
Swedish case were 47 and 19 shares. The Danish posts stood out as the negative 
posts typically received 7 fewer shares than the positive posts did. 
Support for hypothesis 4b was substantial in the sense that Danish Facebook users, 
once again, proved to be less negative to Islam, and that both Norwegian and 
 
135 Only posts that covered Islam negatively or positively are considered here. Neutral and 




Swedish outlets had clearly more interactions on their negative posts relative to 
their positive posts. Still, Norway was once again found to be more negative than 
Sweden in terms of ratio between negative and positive items, at least when it 
comes to the number of shares, which went against expectations. While negative 
Norwegian posts received 4.8 shares and 2.9 likes for every share and like that 
positive Norwegian posts received, the corresponding figures were 2.5 and 3.1 in 
the Swedish case. Overall, then, only partial support was found for hypothesis 4b. 
Addressing some of the newer forms of Facebook reactions, these seemed to 
support the pattern found in the more established interaction forms represented by 
shares and likes. For instance, as depicted in table 7.3, while the Norwegian outlets’ 
Islam-negative posts received more Love reactions than their Islam-positive posts 
did, the opposite was true for the Danish outlets.136 Other reactions, such as Angry 
and Haha, are more difficult to discern whether are mostly used to express support 
or opposition. For instance, the Haha Reaction was only in the Swedish case used 
more often when responding to positive posts, which may indicate either ridicule or 
support of such content. Given the relatively negative comments and the fact that a 
vast majority of Swedish shares and likes were used when responding to stories 
describing Islam negatively, it is, however, more likely that they were used with the 
purpose of laughing at, rather than laughing with, Islam-sympathetic actors and 
cases. For example, a post where a Swedish woman said she was “pissed off” 
because she considered it culturally insensitive that costume stores were selling 
burka costumes for Halloween137 received 754 Haha reactions. 
While not shown in the previous table, looking closer at the top ten most popular 
posts from each country in terms of likes plus shares shows that seven of the Danish 
 
 







posts portray Islam positively, while three posts portray Islam negatively. Among the 
top 10 posts, the three most popular ones are positive. The most popular Danish 
post, receiving 8000 likes and 2707 shares, was a video excerpt from a televised 
debate where a private citizen criticised anti-Islamic politicians for their harsh 
language and tone around Islam. The second most popular item was a post with an 
associated article describing that the organisation Muslims for Peace (Muslimer For 
Fred) for the seventh year in a row would pick up garbage in the City Hall Square of 
Copenhagen after the 2018 New Year’s Eve celebration.138 The third most popular 
post was a video excerpt from a radio studio where the guest, Preben Wilhjelm, a 
previous communist/socialist member of Parliament, called the ban of face-covering 
clothing “ridiculous”. 
Unlike in the Danish case, where most of the highly liked and shared posts covered 
Islam positively, five out of the ten most popular Swedish posts depicted Islam 
negatively, while only one post covered Islam positively. The rest of the most 
popular posts either focused on negatively loaded themes or covered Islam 
neutrally. Interestingly, all three of the most popular Swedish posts focused on the 
burka and niqab. The most popular post (and its associated article), which received 
5900 likes and 692 shares, described artist Tommy Körberg’s views on face veils. 
Körberg argued that wearing this clothing amounts to “pure harassment of women” 
and urged people to adapt to the Swedish way of life.139 The second most popular 
Swedish post and associated article described that Norway had passed a ban on 















video from a news show) described that Denmark had passed a ban on face- 
covering clothing.141 All these three posts were coded as depicting Islam negatively. 
Among the ten most popular Norwegian posts, there were four that covered Islam 
negatively, three that covered Islam positively, two negatively loaded posts and one 
neutral post. Again, the burka and niqab was a central focus in the most liked plus 
shared posts. The most popular post was, however, a video skit performed by 
comedian Robert Stoltenberg. In the skit, Stoltenberg played an imam who through 
simultaneously having all kinds of jobs in addition to his job as an imam gave a priest 
highly peculiar advice on how to attract people to his church. The post received 
2900 likes and 3648 shares. The second and third most popular items were both 
posts with associated articles that announced that the Norwegian Parliament had 
voted to ban face-covering clothing in teaching situations.142 
Popularity Cues and Comments 
We now turn our attention from popularity cues assigned to the news outlets’ posts 
to popularity cues assigned to the comments. Since the comment sections reach 
fewer readers than the established news media’s posts, the number of popularity 
cues were generally lower. In fact, only the “like” had a median value of more than 0 
when considering all the comments. The focus in this part of the chapter is therefore 




















Sentiment—comparing the countries 
We have seen that the established news media’s posts about Islam were met 
differently with respect to popularity cues in the three countries: while likes and 
shares were mostly given to negative posts about Islam in the Norwegian and 
Swedish cases, Danish negative and positive posts received more equal numbers of 
these popularity cues (see table 7.3). It was assumed that this also would be the 
case with the comments: 
H4c: In line with the corrective action perspective, Swedish Islam-negative 
comments will receive the highest number of likes relative to the number of likes 
received by Islam-positive comments, while Danish Islam-negative comments will 
receive the lowest number of likes relative to the likes received by Islam-positive 
comments. Norway will be found between the two in terms of the ratio of likes on 
negative and positive comments. 
Table 7.4: Median number of likes given to comments expressing different sentiment 
towards Islam (N=6797) 
 
 Norway Sweden Denmark Total 
Negative 6 4 3 4 
Positive 7 4 3 4 
Neutral 3 3 1 2 
Anti-Islamist 3 4 4 3 
 
As shown in table 7.4, however, comments expressing negative and positive 
sentiment towards Islam were endorsed to the same extent, except for a slight 
difference in the Norwegian comments, where actually the positive comments 
received more likes than the negative comments. This was surprising given the 
previously presented results showing both that the Norwegian and Swedish 
Facebook users wrote many more negative than positive comments (see figure 6.1), 
and that they overwhelmingly endorsed and assigned relevance to negative posts 




comments were nonetheless largely in line with the even distribution of likes and 
shares that the Danish posts received (see table 7.3). Overall, though, hypothesis 4c 
was rejected. 
A possible explanation is that there were more Islam-sympathetic than Islam-critical 
“lurkers”, i.e. people who read and “liked” the comments but did not comment or 
react to the post. Liking a comment will compared to commenting on and liking a 
post be less visible to one’s Facebook friends. Thus, such activity is more discreet 
and comfortable if people want to stay apolitical within their friend network 
(Halpern & Gibbs, 2013). There is, however, no obvious reason why this should 
influence those positively inclined to Islam or Muslims more than those who are 
sceptical of Islam or Muslims. The spiral of silence theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1993) 
might be relevant here: some individuals may not want to express opinions or 
openly endorse content that they perceive to deviate from the typical discourse in 
the comment sections of mainstream news outlets’ Facebook pages—which 
(especially in the cases of Norway and Sweden) is dominated by Islam-critical 
opinions to a high extent. This might lead those with sympathetic views to Islam or 
Muslims to refrain from taking online action that may have a relatively high 
threshold, such as posting a comment, and correspondingly leading to them settling 
with liking a comment published by someone else instead. From another view, it 
may just be that those critical of Islam, which as we have seen have been especially 
active in reacting to posts and writing comments in the Norwegian and Swedish 
cases, may consider liking comments a less important activity. 
It is worth noting that the results indicated that taking a clear stance on Islam, 
regardless of whether it was positive or negative, led to higher endorsement from 
readers than in the case of neutral or anti-Islamist comments, albeit the difference 
was relatively small. As can be seen in table 7.4, negative and positive comments 




anti-Islamist comments were 2 and 3. This gap was most visible in the Norwegian 
case, where the negative and positive comments typically received 6 and 7 likes, 
respectively, while neutral and anti-Islamist comments typically received 3 and 4 
likes. 
Counterpublic discourses 
As we have just seen, the comments that took a clear stance on Islam, both in the 
form of positive and negative comments, were the most endorsed in terms of the 
number of likes they received (see table 7.4). In this subsection, we consider 
whether this also was the case with comments that challenged the larger public 
sphere, i.e. engaged in counterpublic discourse. We here focus on the comments 
that deconstructed power relations, because these comments explicitly criticised 
superordinate publics within their national public sphere, indicating a clear feeling 
of marginalisation or exclusion from these publics on the part of the commenter. It 
was predicted that: 
H4d: In line with viewing comment sections as providing substantial affordances for 
counterpublic-minded individuals to challenge mainstream-minded individuals, 
counterdiscursive comments will receive a higher number of likes than mainstream 
comments will. Particularly comments engaging in anti-Islam counterpublic 
discourse will receive many likes. 
Table 7.5: Median number of likes—comparison of comments deconstructing power 
relations from an anti-Islam/anti-Islamist viewpoint, comments deconstructing 
power relations from a pro-Islam viewpoint, and other comments (N=6797) 
 
 Anti-Islam/anti-Islamist 
deconstruction of power 
relations 
Pro-Islam 




Likes 7 7 3 
As depicted in table 7.5, the results indicate that comments engaging in 




than other comments. A possible explanation for this is that counterpublic-minded 
commenters, who otherwise feel marginalised, may see more of a benefit in using 
social media platforms such as Facebook to spread their ideology. Since popularity 
cues may influence the way people perceive content (Porten-Cheé et al., 2018), 
liking content can function both to bolster support from individuals that already 
endorse counterpublic ideas, as well as to influence the opinion of mainstream- 
oriented individuals. 
Because we have previously seen that there were more Islam-negative comments 
than there were Islam-positive comments, both in terms of sentiment (see figure 
6.1) and in the manifestation of counterpublic discourses (see table 6.3), one might 
have expected that Facebook users with negative attitudes would be more active in 
liking such content than positive commenters would. Surprisingly, the pro-Islam 
counterdiscursive comments and Islam-negative counterdiscursive comments were 
endorsed to an equal extent. Thus, only the first part of the hypothesis was 
supported (i.e. counterdiscursive comments will be endorsed through a higher 
number of likes than mainstream comments will). The latter part of the hypothesis 
(i.e. particularly comments engaging in anti-Islam counterpublic discourse will 
receive many likes) was rejected. 
Chapter Summary 
While the popularity cues assigned to the mainstream news outlets’ posts point to 
relatively high activity among those negative towards Islam in the Norwegian and 
Swedish cases, Danish positive and negative posts received quite equal numbers of 
popularity cues. In particular, Norwegian posts that covered Islam negatively stood 
out with a high number of likes and shares (relative to the numbers generated by 
positive posts). As such, the assigned endorsement and relevance of posts through 
popularity cues largely reflected the sentiment in the comments described in 
Chapter 6: the Norwegian Facebook users were the most negative, followed by the 




comes to the number of likes given to comments, negative content about Islam did 
not tend to generate more likes than positive content did in any of the three 
countries. 
In line with expectations of the strong incentive for counterpublic-minded 
individuals to use the comment sections not only to write but also to like content to 
sway opinions of mainstream audiences, both pro-Islam counterpublic discursive 
and anti-Islam counterpublic discursive comments were liked to a higher extent than 
mainstream comments. Surprisingly, pro-Islam counterpublic-minded Facebook 
users were equally active as anti-Islam counterpublic-minded Facebook users in 
assigning endorsement through the number of likes to comments that explicitly 








Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
This dissertation has had two overarching objectives: First, the dissertation has 
sought to contribute to existing literature on Scandinavian discourse on Islam by 
comparing Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish content on Facebook, a central arena 
for news as well as public debate. Second, it has aimed to contribute to existing 
literature on counterpublics by analysing to what extent (both Islam-sceptic and 
Islam-sympathetic) counterpublic discourses appear in mainstream news outlets’ 
comment sections on Facebook. This concluding chapter summarises the main 
findings and discusses their wider implications. It also describes some limitations of 
the study and suggests potential directions for future research. 
Research question 1 of the dissertation asked: To what extent do Norwegian, 
Swedish, and Danish news outlets’ Facebook posts and their associated articles 
about Islam differ (with respect to genre, theme, sources, and sentiment), and how 
can differences, or the lack of such, be explained? It was hypothesised that Danish 
posts (and their associated article texts) would cover Islam more negatively than 
Norwegian and Swedish posts (and their associated article texts) would, and that the 
Norwegian items would be more negative than the Swedish items, albeit that the 
difference would be marginal. 
In light of the wider sociopolitical context outlined in Chapter 2, it was surprising to 
find that the three Scandinavian countries’ Facebook posts generally covered Islam 
positively (or had an even mix of positive and negative items, depending on the 
emphasis one puts on what I called “negatively loaded” posts). In other words, the 
relatively striking differences between the three countries’ public, political, and 
media discourse on Islam (and related topics such as immigration and integration), 
which are typically accepted in public debate and existing research, was not 




might indicate that the differences between the Scandinavian public spheres around 
this issue are not as significant as the existing literature has indicated. 
At the same time, there has been a substantial redefinition of the spheres of opinion 
(Hallin, 1986) in the Swedish public sphere in recent years, especially after the 2015 
refugee crisis. That the Swedish news media’s Facebook posts were not clearly more 
positive in their depiction of Islam than the Norwegian and Danish news media’s 
posts were, can perhaps best be understood in light of this development. Thus, the 
fact that this study focused on data from 2018 may to some extent explain why the 
results diverge from comparative studies that have based their analysis on data 
from before 2015. 
Furthermore, although the results show a relatively small difference between the 
countries’ Facebook posts in terms of sentiment towards Islam, it is worth 
remarking that the Danish tabloids’ depiction of Islam and Muslims stand out as 
considerably more negative, both quantitively and qualitatively, than the Norwegian 
and Swedish tabloids’ coverage. As such, also the findings in this study suggest that 
some Danish news media cover Islam and Muslims more negatively than Norwegian 
and Swedish news media do, albeit this only applies to the Danish tabloids’ 
coverage. 
Research question 2 asked: to what extent do comments on Norwegian, Swedish, 
and Danish news outlets’ Facebook pages differ with respect to the sentiment they 
express towards Islam, and how can differences, or the lack of such, be explained? 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that “All countries’ comment sections will have more 
negative than positive comments about Islam. In line with the corrective action 
perspective, the Swedish comment sections will have the highest number of 
negative comments compared to positive comments, the Danish comment sections 
will have the lowest number of negative compared to positive comments, and the 




The results showed that the commenters were largely negative towards Islam, in all 
three countries: while 45% of the studied comments were found to be negative, 
27% were positive. As such, the first part of hypothesis 2 was confirmed. The second 
part of hypothesis 2, however, was rejected: although it was correctly predicted that 
the Danish comments would be the least negative towards Islam, the Norwegian 
comments were, against expectations, more negative than the Swedish comments. 
The corrective action perspective does therefore not seem useful in relation with 
these particular results. At the same time, the general negative sentiment towards 
Islam identified in the comments, which displays a contrast to the established news 
media’s mainly positive posts, is perhaps an indication of commenters being 
motivated to correct for what they considered to be an overly Islam-positive media 
discourse. Thus, the findings illustrate a need to go beyond mainstream actors’ 
online communication to grasp how Islam (and other topics on the political agenda) 
is discussed in the online realm. This was also clearly indicated in relation with 
research question 3. 
Research question 3 asked: To what extent are comment sections on Norwegian, 
Swedish, and Danish news outlets’ Facebook pages permeated by counterpublic 
discourses around Islam, and how can differences, or the lack of such, be explained? 
Theoretically informed by the corrective action perspective, hypothesis 3 predicted 
that “Islam-critical counterpublic discourses will be most prevalent in the Swedish 
comment sections, the least prevalent in the Danish comment sections, while the 
Norwegian comment sections will be found between these. Correspondingly, it is 
predicted that Islam-positive counterpublic discourses will be most prevalent in the 
Danish comment sections and the least prevalent in the Swedish comment sections, 
with Norway again expected to be in a middle position.” The results showed that 7% 
of Swedish comments, 5% of Norwegian comments, and 3% of Danish comments 
deconstructed power relations from an anti-Islamist/anti-Islam/anti-Muslim 




Muslim perspective were virtually absent from the Norwegian and Swedish 
comment sections, a noticeable, yet small, portion of Danish comments (3%) was 
found within this category. As such, hypothesis 3 was largely confirmed, with the 
exception that the Norwegian comment sections did not feature a more active 
pro/Islam/pro-Muslim counterpublic than the Swedish comment sections. 
While 7%, 5%, and 3% may be considered a quite low permeation of counterpublic 
discourses, it should be kept in mind that these figures only included comments 
where Facebook users voiced an explicit perception of marginalisation or exclusion. 
These comments are of high interest from a counterpublic perspective because they 
are unmistakably counterdiscursive in character: they directly target superordinate 
publics, such as the mainstream media, the political establishment, and the criminal 
justice system. Thus, they could be resolutely classified as counterdiscursive and 
were central in answering research question 3. 
At the same time, it is not sufficient to only consider those who explicitly express a 
sense of marginalisation or exclusion as an expression of counterpublic discourse. 
Within the subcategories of argumentative countering and strengthening identity, 
we find other comments that also reasonably may be viewed as counterdiscursive, 
but where the commenter did not necessarily143 explicitly voice a sense of 
marginalisation or exclusion from more powerful public spheres. Within the 
argumentative countering category, this applies to for instance comments 
legitimising harassment of Muslims and political opponents, comments denouncing 
converts to Islam as insane and idiotic, comments labelling others as fascists and 
Nazis, and comments arguing for a complete ban of Muslim immigration. Similarly, 




143 Because a comment could engage in several types of counterpublic discursive patterns, it is, 
however, possible that these commenters both targeted power relations, engaged in 




tone, engaged in alarmist rhetoric, and identified with a (previously deviant) political 
party can be considered to have challenged the bounds of mainstream discourse. 
As we saw in Chapter 6, the results from the argumentative countering and 
strengthening identity categories largely reflected the findings from the 
deconstructing power relations category: anti-Islamist/anti-Islam/anti-Muslim 
counterpublic comments were represented to the highest extent in the country 
historically marked by a large sphere of consensus around Islam and immigration 
(Sweden) and to the lowest extent in the country marked by a small sphere of 
consensus around Islam and immigration (Denmark). The country whose spheres of 
opinion around Islam and immigration have been in a middle position (Norway), was 
found between Sweden and Denmark in terms of the prevalence of anti- 
Islamist/anti-Islam/anti-Muslim counterdiscursive comments. Moreover, the 
country whose general public sphere to the largest extent has been marked by anti- 
Islam discourse (Denmark), had the highest proportion of comments engaging in 
counterpublic discursive patterns from an Islam/Muslim-sympathetic viewpoint. 
From this perspective, the study indicates that citizens are particularly incentivised 
to use the online realm to engage in counterpublic discourses in national contexts 
where they have reason to feel that there is a lot to “correct” for. If established 
news media and political actors do not adequately represent viewpoints held by a 
substantial proportion of citizens, it may prompt these citizens to take advantage of 
online platforms to disseminate alternative ideas and perspectives. An implication of 
this is that it is crucial to evaluate the wider sociopolitical context in which 
counterpublics operate to understand their prevalence in the public sphere. 
At the same time, this study highlights the relevance of considering the immediate 
context of counterpublics—in addition to the wider sociopolitical context. As 
explained by Toepfl & Piwoni (2015), comment sections allow counterpublic-minded 




may be more influential than in more secluded online spaces. Furthermore, this 
study has shown how an immediate context may differ from (certain assumptions 
about) a broader sociopolitical context (which is illustrated by the rejection of 
hypothesis 1), thereby influencing what can be considered mainstream and 
counterdiscursive speech around a given topic. 
The fourth, and final, research question asked: to what extent do popularity cues 
correlate with different Facebook posts and comments about Islam, and how can 
correlations, or the lack of such, be explained? Several hypotheses were formulated 
in relation with this research question. Hypothesis 4a predicted that negative posts 
about Islam would receive many more popularity cues than positive posts. This 
hypothesis was confirmed, as posts that depicted Islam negatively received more 
than 1.5 times the number of shares and likes as posts that covered Islam positively. 
In other words, the generally Islam-negative attitude that the Facebook users 
displayed in the comments was also reflected in their assigning of endorsement and 
relevance through popularity cues to the news media’s posts. 
Hypothesis 4b also focused on popularity cues assigned to the established media’s 
Facebook posts and predicted that, “In line with the corrective action perspective, 
Swedish Islam-negative posts will receive the highest number of likes and shares 
relative to the number of likes and shares received by Islam-positive posts, while 
Danish Islam-negative items will receive the lowest number of likes and shares 
relative to the likes and shares received by Islam-positive items. Norway will be 
found between the two in terms of the ratio of popularity cues on negative and 
positive items.” Support for hypothesis 4b was considerable in the sense that 
Danish Facebook users, once again, proved to be less negative towards Islam, and 
that both Norwegian and Swedish outlets had clearly more interactions on their 
negative posts relative to their positive posts. Still, Norway was once again found to 




items, at least in terms of the number of shares, which went against expectations. 
Overall, then, only partial support was found for hypothesis 4b. 
The final hypotheses, 4c and 4d, focused on popularity cues assigned to the 
comments. 4c predicted that, in line with the corrective action perspective, Swedish 
Islam-negative comments would receive the highest number of likes relative to the 
number of likes received by Islam-positive comments, while Danish Islam-negative 
comments would receive the lowest number of likes relative to the likes received by 
Islam-positive comments. It was projected that Norway would be found between 
the two in terms of the ratio of likes on negative and positive comments. Contrary to 
expectations, Islam-negative and Islam-positive comments received an equal 
number of likes,144 and there were only marginal differences between the countries. 
As such, hypothesis 4c was rejected. 
Hypothesis 4d focused on the popularity cues assigned to explicitly 
counterdiscursive comments versus other comments and projected that, “In line 
with viewing comment sections as providing substantial affordances for 
counterpublic-minded individuals to challenge mainstream-minded individuals, 
counterdiscursive comments will receive a higher number of likes than mainstream 
comments will. Particularly comments engaging in anti-Islam counterpublic 
discourse will receive many likes.” The results confirmed the first part of hypothesis 
4d, as comments that deconstructed power relations tended to receive more than 
twice as many likes as other comments. Against expectations, pro-Islam comments 
that deconstructed power relations received just as many likes as anti-Islam 
comments that deconstructed power relations. As such, the latter part of hypothesis 
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We have now summarised and discussed some of the main findings in this study. 
What are some other wider implications of this dissertation’s findings for research 
on counterpublics? Addressing the theoretical literature on counterpublics, the 
results indicate a gap from Frasers’ (1990) influential description of subaltern 
counterpublics, constituted by members of historically subordinated social groups: 
“women, workers, peoples of color, and gays and lesbians” (Fraser, 1990, p. 67). In 
light of the finding of a prominent anti-Islam counterpublic sphere operating in the 
comment sections, it is worth reflecting on the implications that the existence of 
right-wing/anti-immigrant/anti-Islam collectives have for the literature on 
counterpublics, which has generally been marked by a normative focus on 
progressive and left-wing collectives. 
Luckily, significant contributions have already been made to account for such 
phenomena. A useful approach that has been highlighted in this dissertation is the 
relational perspective. That is, rather than focusing on exclusion per se, scholars 
have emphasised the perception of exclusion from the wider public sphere (Asen, 
2000; Brouwer, 2006; Warner, 2002). This is most clearly seen in this study in 
relation to the deconstructing power relations category. This opens for the potential 
of viewing groups from the far-left to the far-right to be engaging in counterpublic 
discourses, as long as these consider themselves as correctives to an excluding 
mainstream public sphere (Neumayer, 2013). Maintaining that counterpublics are 
self-perceived correctives that may emanate from any ideology, rather than 
assuming that they always have a progressive agenda, may thus be important to 
broaden the scope of research on counterpublics. 
Fraser (1990) herself specifies that counterpublics are not “necessarily virtuous; 
some of them, alas, are explicitly anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian; and even 
those with democratic and egalitarian intentions are not always above practicing 




seemingly does not have radical right-wing collectives in mind (as she refers to 
women, workers, peoples of colour, and LGBTQ people), she notes that “insofar as 
subaltern counterpublics emerge in response to exclusions within dominant publics, 
they help expand discursive space” (p. 67). As this study has indicated, right-wing 
counterpublic-minded individuals may, similarly to progressive collectives, 
contribute to expanding discursive space (at least for like-minded individuals). This 
has been particularly true after the advent of Web 2.0, marked by the interactive 
potential of new media and online technologies. Promisingly, more scholarly 
attention has been paid to far-right counterpublics in recent years (see Cammaerts, 
2009; Holm, 2019; Kaiser & Rauchleisch, 2019; Neumayer, 2013; Toepfl & Piwoni, 
2015, 2018; Törnberg & Wahlström, 2018). Given the continued success of far-right 
parties and issues like migration and climate change being on top of the political 
agenda internationally, such research remains highly relevant. 
By examining counterpublic discourses around Islam as they appear in comment 
sections in three national contexts, the dissertation has provided empirical evidence 
for how such discourses also permeate online spaces in near proximity to 
mainstream publics (see also Chan, 2018; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, 2018). This occurs 
even though Facebook comment sections may be substantially moderated, meaning 
most deviant comments would have been deleted before being collected for 
analysis in this study. Studying more secluded online arenas, e.g. right-wing 
alternative news sites, would likely show more extensive engagement in 
counterpublic discourses. At the same time, comment sections hosted by 
established news media are beneficial for counterpublic-minded individuals who 
may not be content with staying within their own echo chamber and who seeks to 
directly challenge mainstream-minded individuals. As pointed out by Downey and 
Fenton (2003, pp. 193–198), a degree of interaction with dominant publics may be 




Given the substantial empirical evidence showing that reader comments (and 
popularity cues) can affect news audiences’ perception of a topic, case, and the 
perceived quality of an article (Lee, 2012; Lee & Jang, 2010; von Sikorski, 2016; von 
Sikorski & Hänelt, 2016), the prevalence of counterpublic discourses in such arenas 
are of potentially high importance. At the same time, even with comment sections’ 
spatial proximity to established media content, it is hard to measure whether 
counterdiscursive comments actually have any effect with respect to what 
viewpoints can and cannot be discussed legitimately in the larger public sphere. To 
the extent that such wide-ranging effects exist, they may be slow and indirect. It can 
also be argued that the potential effects of counterdiscursive reader comments 
cannot fully be understood without considering that they constitute only one arena 
in a larger (online) sphere in which counterpublic-minded individuals operate, 
constituted by blogs, forums, alternative news sites and social networks. Put 
together, these spaces afford those who feel marginalised from the wider public 
sphere a substantial potential to contest—and influence—the boundaries of public 
discourse. This applies not only to historically disadvantaged groups but also to 
groups typically associated with privilege and access to powerful arenas in the public 
sphere. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This dissertation is not without limitations. It focused on a seven-month period 
influenced by some period-specific events, particularly the Danish ban of face- 
covering clothing. Future research should aim to study longer, or several, time 
periods to examine how (Scandinavian) news outlets and ordinary citizens discuss 
Islam on Facebook, as well as on other arenas. An interesting line of inquiry would 
also be to compare the content that news outlets choose to publish about Islam on 
Facebook and the content about Islam they only publish on their main websites. In 




different news about Islam than those who mainly access news through the news 
outlets’ main website? If this is the case, why? 
 
Also, the analysis of the comment sections in this study focused on original 
comments, i.e. commenters’ replies to posts rather than commenters’ replies to 
other commenters. Future research should take into consideration also these 
comments to see whether this affects the sentiment expressed towards Islam and 
the prevalence of counterpublic discourses. Another limitation is that the study did 
not map who wrote the comments, so there is a chance that some highly active 
commenters have impacted the results to a certain extent. It would be potentially 
interesting in the future to examine more qualitatively how counterpublic-minded 
individuals’ comments are met by other commenters, and how counterpublic- 
minded commenters articulate their counterpublicity in direct discussion with 
mainstream-minded individuals in such a setting. 
Another limitation is that this study did not provide a clear figure for the exact 
prevalence of counterpublic discourses around Islam in the Scandinavian countries. 
Only comments where the Facebook users explicitly expressed a perception of being 
marginalised or excluded from a superordinate public sphere (deconstructing power 
relations) were firmly classified as an expression of counterpublic discourse (cf. 
Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). At the same time, the different contexts and many nuances 
that had to be taken into account in this study called for a more cautious approach 
with respect to the categories argumentative countering and strengthening identity. 
This approach served to acknowledge the reality of the fuzzy and shifting borders of 
the spheres of opinion in these debates. 
Finally, this dissertation has studied counterpublic discourses as they operate in 
three (generally) similar national contexts. Future research should aim to do more 
comparative studies of counterdiscourses to see how these permeate the online 




could benefit from the insights of researchers from different countries and would 
ideally be undertaken by a collaborative, cross-national team of scholars. At the 
same time, one should be aware of potential challenges associated with comparing 
counterpublics in different countries. For the results to be valid, it may be crucial to 






Aalberg, T., & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). Introduction: Comprehending populist 
political communication. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & 
C. H. de Vreese (Eds.), Populist political communication in Europe (pp. 3–11). 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Reinemann, C., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. H. (Eds.). (2017). 
Populist political communication in Europe. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Ahmed, S., & Matthes, J. (2017). Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 
2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis. International Communication Gazette, 79(3), 
219–244. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048516656305 
Allern, S., & Pollack, E. (2019). Journalism as a public good: A Scandinavian 
perspective. Journalism, 20(11), 1423–1439. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884917730945 
Andersen, I. (2019). Personal emotions, experiences and attacks: Immigration 
debate in Scandinavian comment sections. Javnost - The Public, 26(2), 194– 
209. https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2019.1588001 
Andersen, J., Larsen, J. E., & Møller, I. H. (2009). The exclusion and marginalisation of 
immigrants in the Danish welfare society: Dilemmas and challenges. 
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 29(5/6), 274–286. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/01443330910965804 
Anderson, C. W., & Revers, M. (2018). From counter-power to counter-Pepe: The 
vagaries of participatory epistemology in a digital Age. Media and 
Communication, 6(4), 24–35. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v6i4.1492 
Andersson, U. (2018). Polariserat förtroende för nyhetsrapportering om brottslighet 
och invandring [Polarised confidence in news reporting on crime and 
immigration]. In L. Truedson (Ed.), Fejk, filter och faktaresistens – hotar 





Andersson, U., & Weibull, L. (2017). Litar vi på medierna? [Do we trust the media?]. 
In U. Andersson, J. Ohlsson, H. Oscarsson, & M. Oskarson (Eds.), Larmar och 
gör sig till (pp. 97–112). Gothenburg: The SOM Institute. 
Arkhede, S., Bergström, A., & Ohlsson, J. (2017). Det demokratiska samtalet [The 
democratic conversation] (SOM Publication 2017:29). Retrieved from 
https://som.gu.se/digitalAssets/1655/1655333_29-det-demokratiska- 
samtalet-2016.pdf 
Art, D. (2011). Inside the radical right: The development of anti-immigrant parties in 
Western Europe. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Asen, R. (2000). Seeking the “counter” in counterpublics. Communication Theory, 
10(4), 424–446. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2000.tb00201.x 
Asen, R. (2016). Communication is the public. Communication and the Public, 1(1), 
4–8. https://doi.org/10.1177/2057047315617765 
Awan, I. (2016). Virtual Islamophobia. The eight faces of anti-Muslim trolls on 
Twitter. In I. Awan (Ed.), Islamophobia in cyberspace: Hate crimes go viral (pp. 
23–40). London: Routledge. 
Axner, M. (2015). Representationer, stereotyper och nyhetsvärdering: Rapport från 
medieanalys om representationer av muslimer i svenska nyheter 
[Representations, stereotypes and news value: Report from a media analysis 
of representations of Muslims in Swedish news] (DO Publication 2015:1). 
Retrieved from https://www.do.se/globalassets/publikationer/rapport- 
representationer-stereotyper-nyhetsvardering2.pdf 
Bächler, C. M., & Hopmann, D. N. (2017). Denmark: The rise of the Danish People’s 
Party. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. de Vreese 





Baker, P. (2010). Representations of Islam in British broadsheet and tabloid 
newspapers 1999-2005. Journal of Language and Politics, 9(2), 310–338. 
https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.9.2.07bak 
Baker, P., Gabrielatos, C., & McEnery, T. (2013). Discourse analysis and media 
attitudes: The representation of Islam in the British press. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bale, T., Green-Pedersen, C., Krouwel, A., Luther, K. R., & Sitter, N. (2010). If you 
can’t beat them, join them? Explaining social democratic responses to the 
challenge from the populist radical right in Western Europe. Political Studies, 
58(3), 410–426. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00783.x 
Banerjee, M., Capozzoli, M., McSweeney, L., & Sinha, D. (1999). Beyond kappa: A 
review of interrater agreement measures. The Canadian Journal of Statistics, 
27(1), 3–23. https://doi.org/10.2307/3315487 
Bangstad, S. (2015). The racism that dares not speak its name: Rethinking neo- 
nationalism and neo-racism. Intersections: East European Journal of Society 
and Politics, 1(1), 49–65. https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v1i1.26 
Barnidge, M., & Rojas, H. (2014). Hostile media perceptions, presumed media 
influence, and political talk: Expanding the corrective action hypothesis. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 26(2), 135–156. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edt032 
Benson, R. (2013). Shaping immigration news: A French-American comparison. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Benson, R., & Hallin, D. C. (2007). How states, markets and globalization shape the 
news: The French and US national press, 1965-97. European Journal of 
Communication, 22(1), 27–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323107073746 
Berg, I. (2011). Nettdebatt og demokrati: Styring eller anarki? [Online debate and 
democracy: Control or anarchy?]. (Master's thesis, University of Oslo). 




Berger, J., & Milkman, K. L. (2012). What makes online content viral?. Journal of 
marketing research, 49(2), 192–205. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmr.10.0353 
Bergström, A., & Wadbring, I. (2015). Beneficial yet crappy: Journalists and 
audiences on obstacles and opportunities in reader comments. European 
Journal of Communication, 30(2), 137–151. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323114559378 
Berkowitz, D. A. (2009). Reporters and their sources. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen, & T. 
Hanitzsch (Eds.), The handbook of journalism studies (pp. 102–115). New York, 
NY: Routledge. 
Binns, A. (2012). DON’T FEED THE TROLLS! Managing troublemakers in magazines’ 
online communities. Journalism Practice, 6(4), 547–562. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2011.648988 
Bjørklund, T. (1999). Et lokalvalg i perspektiv: Valget i 1995 i lys av sosiale og 
politiske endringer [A local election in perspective: The 1995 election in light 
of social and political changes]. Oslo: Tano Aschehoug. 
Bjørklund, T. (2004). Norsk populisme fra Ottar Brox til Carl I. Hagen [Norwegian 
populism from Ottar Brox to Carl I. Hagen]. Nytt norsk tidsskrift, 21(3–4), 410– 
419. Retrieved from https://www.idunn.no/nnt 
Bleich, E., Stonebraker, H., Nisar, H., & Abdelhamid, R. (2015). Media portrayals of 
minorities: Muslims in British newspaper headlines, 2001–2012. Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(6), 942–962. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2014.1002200 
Boberg, S., Schatto-Eckrodt, M., Frischlich, L., & Quandt, T. (2018). The moral 
gatekeeper? Moderation and deletion of user-generated content in a leading 
news forum. Media and Communication, 6(4), 58–69. 
https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v6i4.1493 
Boczkowski, P. J., & Mitchelstein, E. (2012). How users take advantage of different 




commenting. Human Communication Research, 38(1), 1–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2011.01418.x 
Boe, C., & Hervik, P. (2008). Integration through insult? In. E. Eide, R. Kunelius, & A. 
Phillips (Eds.), Transnational media events: The Mohammed cartoons and the 
imagined clash of civilizations (pp. 213–234). Gothenburg: Nordicom. 
Borevi, K., Jensen, K. K., & Mouritsen, P. (2017). The civic turn of immigrant 
integration policies in the Scandinavian welfare states. Comparative Migration 
Studies, 5(9), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-017-0052-4 
Boyd, D. (2008). Taken out of context: American teen sociality in networked publics. 
(Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley). Retrieved from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344756 
Breese, E. B. (2011). Mapping the variety of public spheres. Communication Theory, 
21(2), 130–149. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2011.01379.x 
Brekke, J.-P., & Mohn, F. A. (2018). Holdninger til innvandring og integrering i Norge: 
Integreringsbarometeret 2018 [Attitudes towards immigration and integration 




Brochmann, G. (2018). Innvandring og velferdspolitikk. Skandinavisk uro 
[Immigration and welfare policy. Scandinavian unease]. In S. E. Omdal (Ed.), 
Skandinavisk uro: Norske, svenske og danske tilstander (pp. 83–102). Oslo: 
Forlaget Press. 
Brochmann, G., & Hagelund, A. (2012). Immigration policy and the Scandinavian 
welfare state 1945-2010. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Brouwer, D. C. (2006). Communication as counterpublic. In G. J. Sheperd, J. St. John, 
& T. Striphas (Eds.), Communication as ...: Perspectives on theory (pp. 195– 




Brox, O. (2009). Polarisering i norsk islamismedebatt [Polarisation in Norwegian 
Islamism debate]. Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, 26(1), 67–73. Retrieved from 
https://www.idunn.no/nnt 
Brüggemann, M., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Humprecht, E., & Castro, L. (2014). Hallin 
and Mancini revisited: Four empirical types of Western media systems. 
Journal of Communication, 64(6), 1037–1065. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12127 
Burkal, R., & Veledar, A. (2018). Hatefulle ytringer i offentlig debatt på nett [Hate 
speech in online public debate]. Oslo: Gender Equality and Anti-Discrimination 
Ombud. Retrieved from 
https://www.ldo.no/globalassets/_ldo_2019/arkiv/publikasjonsarkiv/fb-og- 
hatytring/ldo-fb_rapporten_2018.pdf 
Cammaerts, B. (2009). Radical pluralism and free speech in online public spaces: The 
case of North Belgian extreme right discourses. International Journal of 
Cultural Studies, 12(6), 555–575. https://doi.org/10.1177/1367877909342479 
Carol, S., & Koopmans, R. (2013). Dynamics of contestation over Islamic religious 
rights in Western Europe. Ethnicities, 13(2), 165–190. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796812470893 
Chan, M. (2018). Networked counterpublics and discursive contestation in the 
agonistic public sphere: Political jamming a police force Facebook page. Asian 
Journal of Communication, 28(6), 561-578. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2018.1466343 
Copsey, N., Dack, J., Littler, M., & Feldman, M. (2013). Anti-Muslim hate crime and 
the far right. Teesside University: Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post- 
Fascist Studies. Retrieved from 
http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/11111/1/11111_littler.pdf 
Corrado, A., & Firestone, C. M. (Eds.). (1996). Elections in cyberspace: Towards a new 




Dahl, J. M. R. (2019). From the club stage to the national scene: How mass media 
interpreted two comedians as important immigrant voices. Javnost - The 
Public, 26(2), 210–224. https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2019.1587700 
Dahlberg, L. (2001). Democracy via cyberspace: Mapping the rhetorics and practices 
of three prominent camps. New Media & Society, 3(2), 157–177. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/14614440122226038 
Dahlberg, L. (2007). Rethinking the fragmentation of the cyberpublic: From 
consensus to contestation. New Media & Society, 9(5), 827–847. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444807081228 
Dahlberg, L. (2011). Re-constructing digital democracy: An outline of four 
“positions.” New Media & Society, 13(6), 855–872. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444810389569 
Dahlström, C., & Esaiasson, P. (2013). The immigration issue and anti-immigrant 
party success in Sweden 1970-2006: A deviant case analysis. Party Politics, 
19(2), 343–364. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068811407600 
Davidson, D., & Letherby, G. (2014). Griefwork online: Perinatal loss, lifecourse 
disruption and online support. Human Fertility, 17(3), 214–217. 
https://doi.org/10.3109/14647273.2014.945498 
Demker, M. (2009). Generösare attityd till flyktingmottagande i Sverige [More 
generous attitudes towards reception of refugees in Sweden]. In S. Holmberg, 
& L. Weibull (Eds.), Svensk höst (pp. 49–57). Gothenburg: SOM Institute. 
Demker, M. (2018). Oförändrat motstånd mot flyktingmottagning men stärkt hotbild 
kring religion och svensk kultur [Unchanged opposition to refugee reception 
but strong threat perception surrounding religion and Swedish culture]. In U. 
Andersson, A. Carlander, E. Lindgren, & M. Oskarson (Eds.), Sprickor i fasaden 




Diakopoulos, N., & Naaman, M. (2011). Towards quality discourse in online news 
comments. In Proceedings of the ACM 2011 conference on computer 
supported cooperative work (pp. 133–142). New York, NY: ACM. 
Don, Z. M., & Lee, C. (2014). Representing immigrants as illegals, threats and victims 
in Malaysia: Elite voices in the media. Discourse & Society, 25(6), 687–705. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926514536837 
Douai, A., & Nofal, H. K. (2012). Commenting in the online Arab public sphere: 
Debating the Swiss minaret ban and the “Ground Zero Mosque” online. 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 17(3), 266–282. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2012.01573.x 
Downey, J., & Fenton, N. (2003). New media, counter publicity and the public 
sphere. New Media & Society, 5(2), 185–202. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444803005002003 
Duncan, G. T. (1996). Is my research ethical?. ACM Communications, 39(12), 67–68. 
Retrieved from https://dl.acm.org/ 
Duncan, M., Pelled, A., Wise, D., Ghosh, S., Shan, Y., Zheng, M., & McLeod, D. (2020). 
Staying silent and speaking out in online comment sections: The influence of 
spiral of silence and corrective action in reaction to news. Computers in 
Human Behaviour, 102, 192–205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.08.026 
Eckert, S., & Chadha, K. (2013). Muslim bloggers in Germany: An emerging 
counterpublic. Media, Culture & Society, 35(8), 926–242. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443713501930 
Eide, E. (2010). Strategic essentialism and ethnification: Hand in glove?. Nordicom 
Review, 31(2), 63–78. Retrieved from 
https://www.nordicom.gu.se/sv/publikationer/nordicom-review 
Eide, E., Kjølstad, M., & Naper, A. (2013). After the 22 July terror in Norway: Media 
debates on freedom of expression and multiculturalism. Nordic Journal of 




Eide, E., & Nikunen, K. (2011). Introduction: Change of climate. In E. Eide, & K. 
Nikunen (Eds.), Media in motion: Cultural complexity and migration in the 
Nordic region (pp. 1–18). Farnham: Ashgate. 
Eide, M. (1995). Populærjournalistikk på norsk: Historiske noter om avisschizofreni 
[Popular journalism in Norway: Historical notes on newspaper schizophrenia]. 
Norsk medietidsskrift, 2(1), 43–56. Retrieved from https://www.idunn.no/nmt 
Eley, G. (1992). Nations, publics, and political cultures: Placing Habermas in the 
nineteenth century. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), Habermas and the public sphere (pp. 
289–339). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Elgesem, D. (2015). Consent and information – ethical considerations when 
conducting research on social media. In H. Fossheim, & H. Ingierd (Eds.), 
Internet research ethics (pp. 14–34). Cappelen Damm Akademisk. 
Elgvin, O., & Rogstad, J. (2017). Religious threats and institutional change in 
Norwegian mass media. In F. Engelstad, H. Larsen, J. Rogstad, & K. Steen- 
Johnsen (Eds.), Institutional change in the public sphere: Views on the Nordic 
model (pp. 161–178). Warsaw/Berlin: De Gruyter Open. 
Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Büchel, F. (2017). Populism and social media: How 
politicians spread a fragmented ideology. Information, Communication & 
Society, 20(8), 1109–1126. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697  
Enjolras, B., Karlsen, R., Steen-Johnsen, K., & Wollebæk, D. (2013). Liker – liker ikke: 
Sosiale medier, samfunnsengasjement og offentlighet [Likes or no likes: Social 
media, social engagement and the public sphere]. Oslo: Cappelen Damm 
akademisk. 
Enstad, J. D., & Ravndal, J. A. (2015, 2 November). Hvorfor er det så mye mer 
høyreekstrem vold i Sverige? [Why is there so much more right-wing 





Eriksen, T. H. (2011). Fra misforståelse til irrelevans? – Noen refleksjoner om 
antropologien og mediene [From misunderstanding to irrelevance? – Some 
reflections on anthropology and the media]. Norsk antropologisk tidsskrift, 
22(3/4), 257–266. Retrieved from https://www.idunn.no/nat 
Erjavec, K., & Kovačič, M. P. (2012). “You don’t understand, this is a new war!” 
Analysis of hate speech in news web sites’ comments. Mass Communication 
and Society, 15(6), 899–920. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2011.619679 
Ernst, J., Schmitt, J. B., Rieger, D., Beier, A. K., Vorderer, P., Bente, G., & Roth, H.-J. 
(2017). Hate beneath the counter speech? A qualitative content analysis of 
user comments on YouTube related to counter speech videos. Journal for 
Deradicalization, 10, 1–49. Retrieved from 
http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press. 
Every, D. (2013). 'Shame on you’: The language, practice and consequences of 
shame and shaming in asylum seeker advocacy. Discourse & 
Society, 24(6), 667–686. https://doi.org/10.1177/0957926513486223 
Fangen, K., & Vaage, M. (2018). “The immigration problem” and Norwegian right- 
wing politicians. New Political Science, 40(3), 459–476. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2018.1487145 
Farmer, F. (2013). After the public turn: Composition, counterpublics, and the citizen 
bricoleur. Boulder, CO: Utah University Press. 
Felski, R. (1989). Beyond feminist aesthetics: Feminist literature and social change. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Ferrer-Conill, R., & Tandoc, E. C. (2018). The audience-oriented editor. Making sense 





Figenschou, T. U., & Beyer, A. (2014a). Elitene, minoritetene og mediene: 
Definisjonsmakt i norsk innvandringsdebatt [Elites, minorities and the media: 
Primary definers in the Norwegian immigration debate]. Tidsskrift for 
samfunnsforskning, 55(1), 23–51. Retrieved from https://www.idunn.no/tfs 
Figenschou, T. U., & Beyer, A. (2014b). The limits of the debate: How the Oslo terror 
shook the Norwegian immigration debate. The International Journal of 
Press/Politics, 19(4), 430–452. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161214542954 
Figenschou, T. U., & Ihlebæk, K. A. (2019). Challenging journalistic authority. 
Journalism Studies, 20(9), 1221–1237. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2018.1500868 
Figenschou, T. U., & Thorbjørnsrud, K. (2017). Disruptive media events: Managing 
mediated dissent in the aftermath of terror. Journalism Practice, 11(8), 942– 
959. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2016.1220258 
Fonn, B. K., Orgeret, K. S., & Simonsen, A. H. (2012). Marginalisering og 
normalisering i norske kvinneblader [Marginalisation and normalisation in 
Norwegian women’s magazines]. In K. S. Orgeret (Ed.), Norske medier: 
Journalistikk, politikk og kultur (pp. 297–321). Kristiansand: Cappelen Damm 
Undervisning. 
Fossheim, H., & Ingierd, H. (Eds.). (2015). Internet research ethics. Cappelen Damm 
Akademisk. 
Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of 
actually existing democracy. Social Text, 25/26, 56–80. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/466240 
Fraser, N. (1992). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique of 
actually existing democracy. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), Habermas and the public 




Freelon, D. (2015). Discourse architecture, ideology, and democratic norms in online 
political discussion. New Media & Society, 17(5), 772–791. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444813513259 
Frischlich, L., Boberg, S., & Quandt, T. (2019). Comment sections as targets of dark 
participation? Journalists’ evaluation and moderation of deviant user 
comments. Journalism Studies, 20(14), 2014–2033. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2018.1556320 
Frisk, S., & Gillette, M. B. (2019). Sweden’s burka ban: Policy proposals, 
problematisations, and the production of Swedishness. NORA - Nordic Journal 
of Feminist and Gender Research, 27(4), 271–284. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08038740.2019.1668847 
Furseth, I. (Ed.). (2018). Religious complexity in the public sphere: Comparing Nordic 
countries. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Furseth, I., Ahlin, L., Ketola, K., Leis-Peters, A., & Sigurvinsson, B. R. (2018). Changing 
religious landscapes in the Nordic countries. In I. Furseth (Ed.), Religious 
complexity in the public sphere: Comparing Nordic countries (pp. 31–80). 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gaasholt, Ø., & Togeby, L. (1995). I syv sind: Danskernes holdninger til flygtninge og 
indvandrere [A state of doubt: Danish attitudes towards refugees and 
immigrants]. Århus: Politica. 
Gabrielsen, C. K. (2012, 11 September). Disse mistet livet på oppdrag i Afghanistan 
[These lost their lives while deployed in Afghanistan]. TV2. Retrieved from 
https://www.tv2.no 
Galtung, J., & Ruge, M. (1965). The structure of foreign news. Journal of Peace 
Research, 2(1), 64–91. https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336500200104 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. (2017). Refugee policy as ‘negative nation branding’: The 




foreign policy yearbook 2017 (pp. 99–125). Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 
International Studies. 
Gardiner, B., Mansfield, M., Anderson, I., Holder, J., Louter, D., & Ulmanu, M. (2016, 
12 April). The dark side of Guardian comments. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
theguardian.co.uk. 
Gebhard, C. (2017). Scandinavian defence and alliance policies: Different together. 
In P. Nedergaard, & A. Wivel (Eds.), Routledge handbook on Scandinavian 
politics (pp. 254–268). London: Routledge. 
Geiger, R. S. (2016). Bot-based collective blocklists in Twitter: The counterpublic 
moderation of harassment in a networked public space. Information, 
Communication & Society, 19(6), 787–803. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1153700 
Gelber, K., & McNamara, L. (2016). Evidencing the harms of hate speech. Social 
Identities, 22(3), 324–341. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2015.1128810 
Golder, S., Ahmed, S., Norman, G., & Booth, A. (2017). Attitudes toward the ethics of 
research using social media: A systematic review. Journal of Medical Internet 
Research, 19(6), e195. https://doi.org/10.2196/jmir.7082 
Graber, D. A. (1990). Seeing is remembering. How visuals contribute to learning 
from television news. Journal of Communication, 40(3), 134–156. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1990.tb02275.x 
Green-Pedersen, C., & Krogstrup, J. (2008). Immigration as a political issue in 
Denmark and Sweden. European Journal of Political Research, 47(5), 610–634. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2008.00777.x 
Gripsrud. J. (2019). Comparing public discourse on immigration in Scandinavia: Some 
background notes and preliminary results. Javnost - The Public, 26(2), 121– 
137. https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2019.1600834 
Gullestad, M. (2002). Det norske sett med nye øyne [Fresh perspectives on 




Habermas, J. (1962/1989). The structural transformation of the public sphere (T. 
Berger., & F. Lawrence, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Habermas, J. (1992). Further reflections on the public sphere. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), 
Habermas and the Public Sphere (pp. 421–461). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory 
of law and democracy (W. Rehg, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. 
Habermas, J. (2006). Political communication in media society: Does democracy still 
enjoy an epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical 
research. Communication Theory, 16(4), 411–426. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2006.00280.x 
Hagelund, A. (2002). Problematizing culture: Discourses on integration in Norway. 
Journal of International Migration and Integration, 3(3–4), 401–415. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-002-1022-7 
Hagelund, A. (2003a). The Importance of being decent. Political discourse on 
immigration in Norway 1970-2002. Oslo: Unipax. 
Hagelund, A. (2003b). A matter of decency? The Progress Party in Norwegian 
immigration politics. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 29(1), 47–65. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183032000076713 
Hagelund, A. (2004a). Anstendighetens utside: «Rasisme» i norsk 
innvandringspolitisk diskurs [The constitutive outside of decency: “Racism” in 
Norwegian immigration political discourse]. Tidsskrift for 
samfunnsforskning, 45(1), 3–29. Retrieved from https://www.idunn.no/tfs 
Hagelund, A. (2004b). Mot en god debatt? Retorikk om retorikk i debatten om 
debatten [Towards a good debate? Rhetoric about rhetoric in the debate 





Hagen, A. L. (2015). Meningers mot – netthat og ytringsfrihet i Norge [The courage 
of opinions—online hate and freedom of speech in Norway]. Oslo: Cappelen 
Damm Akademisk. 
Hågvar, Y. B. (2019). News media’s rhetoric on Facebook. Journalism Practice, 13(7), 
853–872. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2019.1577163 
Haim, M., Karlsson, M., Ferrer-Conill, R., Kammer, A., Elgesem, D., & Sjøvaag, H. 
(2019). Comparing Scandinavian media logics on Facebook. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Hallin, D. C. (1986). The “uncensored war”: The media and Vietnam. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three models of media 
and politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Halpern, D., & Gibbs, J. (2013). Social media as a catalyst for online deliberation? 
Exploring the affordances of Facebook and YouTube for political expression. 
Computers in Human Behavior, 29(3), 1159–1168. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2012.10.008 
Hambraeus, U. (2018, 5 May). SD behåller greppet om invandringsfrågan [SD 
maintains the issue ownership on immigration]. SVT. Retrieved from 
https://www.svt.se 
Hansen, M. (1993). Foreword. In O. Negt, & A. Kluge, Public sphere and experience: 
Toward an analysis of the bourgeois and proletarian public sphere (pp. ix-xli). 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Hård af Segerstad, Y., Howes, C., Kasperowski, D., & Kullenberg, C. (2016). Studying 
closed communities online: Digital methods and ethical considerations 
beyond informed consent and pseudonymity. In M. Zimmer, & K. Kinder- 
Kurlanda (Eds.), Internet research ethics for the social age: New challenges, 




Hardaker, C. (2010). Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated communication: 
From user discussions to theoretical concepts. Journal of Politeness Research, 
6(2), 215–242. https://doi.org/10.1515/jplr.2010.011 
Hedman, F., Sivnert, F., Kollanyi, B., Narayanan, V., Neudert, L., & Howard, P. N. 
(2018). News and political information consumption in Sweden: Mapping the 
2018 Swedish general election on Twitter. Oxford: Project on Computational 
Propaganda. Retrieved from http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/sweden- 
election/ 
Heft, A., Mayerhöffer, E., Reinhardt, S., & Knüpfer, C. (2019). Beyond Breitbart: 
Comparing right‐wing digital news infrastructures in six Western 
democracies. Policy & Internet, 12(1), 20–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.219 
Heinze, A.-S. (2018). Strategies of mainstream parties towards their right-wing 
populist challengers: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland in comparison. 
West European Politics, 41(2), 287–309. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1389440 
Hellström, A., & Bevelander, P. (2018). When the media matters for electoral 
performance. Sociologisk forskning, 55(2–3), 249–266. Retrieved from 
https://www.sociologiskforskning.se/ 
Hellström, A., & Hervik, P. (2014). Feeding the beast: Nourishing nativist appeals in 
Sweden and in Denmark. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 
15(3), 449–467. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-013-0293-5 
Hernes, V. (2018) Cross-national convergence in times of crisis? Integration policies 
before, during and after the refugee crisis. West European Politics, 41(6), 
1305–1329. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1429748 
Hervik, P. (2002). Mediernes muslimer: En antropologisk undersøgelse af mediernes 




examination of the media’s coverage of religions in Denmark]. Copenhagen: 
Nævnet for Etnisk Ligestilling. 
Hervik, P. (2018). Racialization in the Nordic countries: An introduction. In: P. Hervik 
(Ed.), Racialization, racism and anti-racism in the Nordic countries (pp. 3–37). 
Cham: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Hirzalla, F., van Zoonen, L., & de Ridder, J. (2011). Internet use and political 
participation: Reflections on the mobilization/normalization controversy. The 
Information Society, 27(1), 1–15. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2011.534360 
Hjarvard, S. (1999). TV-nyheder i konkurrence [TV-news in competition]. 
Copenhagen: Samfundslitteratur. 
Hognestad, L. I., & Lamark, H. (2017). Flyktningene kommer! Lokale mediers dekning 
av flyktningkrisen [The refugees are coming! Local media’s coverage of the 
refugee crisis]. Norsk medietidsskrift, 24(2), 1–19. 
https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.0805-9535-2017-02-03 
Holt, K. (2018). Alternative media and the notion of anti-systemness: Towards an 
analytical framework. Media and Communication, 6(4), 48–57. 
https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v6i4.1467 
Holt, K., Figenschou, T. U., & Frischlich, L. (2019). Key dimensions of alternative news 
media. Digital Journalism, 7(7), 860–869. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2019.1625715 
Holm, M. (2019). The rise of online counterpublics?: The limits of inclusion in a 
digital age. (Doctoral dissertation, Uppsala University). Retrieved from 
http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1329534&dswid=- 
8327 
Horsti, K. (2008). Overview of Nordic media research on immigration and ethnic 





Hoser, B., & Nitschke, T. (2010). Questions on ethics for research in the virtually 
connected world. Social Networks, 32(3), 180–186. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2009.11.003 
Hovden, J. F., & Mjelde, H. (2019). Increasingly controversial, cultural, and political: 
The immigration debate in Scandinavian newspapers 1970–2016. Javnost - 
The Public, 26(2), 138–167. https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2019.1589285 
Hovden, J. F., Mjelde, H., & Gripsrud, J. (2018). The Syrian refugee crisis in 
Scandinavian newspapers. Communications, 43(3), 325–356. 
https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2018-0013 
Hussain, M. (2000). Islam, media and minorities in Denmark. Current Sociology, 
48(4), 95–116. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392100048004008 
Hutchens, M. J., Cicchirillo, V. J., & Hmielowski, J. D. (2015). How could you think 
that?!?!: Understanding intentions to engage in political flaming. New Media 
& Society, 17(8), 1201–1219. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814522947 
Hvitfelt, H. (1998). Den muslimska faran: Om mediebilden av islam [The Muslim 
danger: On Islam’s media image]. In Y. Brune (Ed.), Mörk magi i vita medier 
(pp. 72–84). Stockholm: Carlsson. 
Hwang, H., Pan, Z., & Sun, Y. (2008). Influence of hostile media perception on 
willingness to engage in discursive activities: An examination of mediating role 
of media indignation. Media Psychology, 11(1), 76–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15213260701813454 
Ihlebæk, K. A., & Kalsnes, B. (2018, 15 August). Uakseptable kommentarer blir 
usynlig sensurert av politiske partier. Hvorfor er det problematisk? 
[Unacceptable comments are invisibly censored by political parties. Why is 





Ihlebæk, K. A., & Krumsvik, A. H. (2015). Editorial power and public participation in 
online newspapers. Journalism, 16(4), 470–487. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884913520200 
Ihlebæk, K. A., Løvlie, A. S., & Mainsah, H. (2013). Mer åpenhet, mer kontroll? – 
Håndteringen av nettdebatten etter 22. juli [More openness, more control? – 
Mediating online debate after 22 July]. Norsk medietidsskrift, 20(3), 223–240. 
Retrieved from https://www.idunn.no/nmt 
Ihlebæk, K. A., & Thorseth, I. E. (2017). Editorial perspectives on the public debate 
on immigration. In A. H. Midtbøen, K. Steen-Johnsen, & K. Thorbjørnsrud 
(Eds.), Boundary struggles: Contestations of free speech in the Norwegian 
public sphere (pp. 139–158). Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk. 
Ikegami, E. (2000). A sociological theory of publics: Identity and culture as emergent 
properties in networks. Social Research, 67(4), 989–1029. Retrieved from 
https://www.socres.org/ 
Ivarsflaten, E. (2005). The vulnerable populist right parties: No economic 
realignment fuelling their electoral success. European Journal of Political 
Research, 44(3), 465–492. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00235.x 
Ivarsflaten, E. (2006). Reputational shields: Why most anti-immigrant parties failed 
in Western Europe, 1980–2005. Annual meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/Politics/papers/2006/ivarsflatenapsa2006.pdf 
Jackson, S. J., & Welles, B. F. (2015). Hijacking #myNYPD: Social media dissent and 
networked counterpublics. Journal of Communication, 65(6), 932–952. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12185 
Jackson, S. J., & Welles, B. F. (2016). #Ferguson is everywhere: Initiators in emerging 





Jacobsen, S. J., Jensen, T. G., Vitus, K., & Weibel, K. (2013). Analysis of Danish media 
setting and framing of Muslims, Islam and racism (SFI Working paper No. 10). 
Copenhagen: Institute of Social Research. Retrieved from 
https://www.ces.uc.pt/ces/projectos/tolerace/media/WP5/WorkingPapers%2 
05_Denmark.pdf 
Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An 
empirical study of political parties’ discourse in Belgium. European Journal of 
Political Research, 46(3), 319–345. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475- 
6765.2006.00690.x 
Jakobsen, K. A. (2016). Etter Charlie Hebdo: Ytringsfrihetens krise i historisk lys [After 
Charlie Hebdo: The freedom of speech crisis in a historical light]. Oslo: 
Forlaget Press. 
Jensen, J. L. (2003). Public spheres on the Internet – anarchic or government- 
sponsored: A comparison. Scandinavian Political Studies, 26(4), 349–374. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2003.00093.x 
Jønsson, H. V., & Petersen, K. (2010). Danmark: Den nationale velfærdsstat møder 
verden [Denmark: The national welfare state in a globalised world]. 
In: G. Brochmann, & A. Hagelund (Eds.), Velferdens grenser: 
Innvandringspolitikk og velferdsstat i Skandinavia 1945–2010 (pp. 131– 
210). Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
Jungar, A.-C., & Jupskås, A. R. (2014). Populist radical right parties in the Nordic 
region: A new and distinct party family. Scandinavian Political Studies, 37(3), 
215–238. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12024 
Jupskås, A. R. (2013, 11 February). Mainstream parties in the Nordic countries have 
tried to deal with the rise of the far-right through a mix of isolation, tolerance 





Jupskås, A. R. (2015a). Persistence of populism. The Norwegian Progress Party, 1973- 
2009. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Oslo). Retrieved from 
https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/48220 
Jupskås, A. R. (2015b). Institutionalized right-wing populism in times of economic 
crisis: A comparative study of the Norwegian Progress Party and the Danish 
People’s Party. In H. Kriesi, & T. S. Pappas (Eds.), European populism in the 
shadow of the Great Recession (pp. 23–40). Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Jupskås, A. R., Ivarsflaten, E., Kalsnes, B., & Aalberg, T. (2017). Norway: Populism 
from anti-tax movement to government party. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. 
Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. de Vreese (Eds.), Populist political 
communication in Europe (pp. 29–41). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Kaiser, J., & Rauchfleisch, A. (2019). Integrating concepts of counterpublics into 
generalised public sphere frameworks: Contemporary transformations in 
radical forms. Javnost - The Public, 26(3), 241–257. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2018.1558676 
Kalnes, Ø. (2009). Norwegian parties and Web 2.0. Journal of Information 
Technology & Politics, 6(3–4), 251–266. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19331680903041845 
Kalogeropoulos, A., Negredo, S., Picone, I., & Nielsen, R. K. (2017). Who shares and 
comments on news?: A cross-national comparative analysis of online and 
social media participation. Social media + Society, 3(4), 1–12. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305117735754 
Kalsnes, B. (2016a). The power of likes: Social media logic and political 
communication. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Oslo). Retrieved from 
https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/53278 
Kalsnes, B. (2016b). The social media paradox explained: Comparing political parties’ 





Kalsnes, B. (2019). Examining the populist communication logic: Strategic use of 
social media in populist parties in Norway and Sweden. Central European 
Journal of Communication, 12(2), 187–205. https://doi.org/10.19195/1899- 
5101.12.2(23).5 
Karlsen, R., Steen-Johnsen, K., Wollebæk, D., & Enjolras, B. (2017). Echo chamber 
and trench warfare dynamics in online debates. European Journal of 
Communication, 32(3), 257–273. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323117695734 
Karpantschof, R. (2002). Populism and right wing extremism in Denmark 1980-2001. 
Copenhagen: Department of Sociology. 
Kerlinger, F. N. (1986). Foundations of behavioral research (3rd ed.). Fort Worth, TX: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers. 
Kierulf, A., & Rønning, H. (Eds.). (2009). Freedom of speech abridged? Cultural, legal 
and philosophical challenges. Gothenburg: Nordicom. 
Kildal, N., & Kuhnle, S. (Eds.). (2005). Normative foundations of the welfare state: 
The Nordic experience. London: Routledge. 
Kitschelt, H. (1995). The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis. 
Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. 
Klinger, U., & Svensson, J. (2014). The emergence of network media logic in political 
communication: A theoretical approach. New Media & Society, 17(8), 1241– 
1257. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814522952 
Knobloch-Westerwick, S., Sharma, N., Hansen, D. L., & Alter, S. (2005). Impact of 
popularity indications on readers’ selective exposure to online news. Journal 
of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 49(3), 296–313. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15506878jobem4903_3 
Koukouzelis, K. (2019). Migrant protests, the paradox of citizenship, and 
contestatory cosmopolitanism. In T. Caraus, & E. Paris (Eds.), Migration, 
protest movements and the politics of resistance: A radical political philosophy 




Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content Analysis: An introduction to its methodology (2nd 
ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Krippendorff, K. (2018). Content Analysis: An introduction to its methodology (4th 
ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Kühle, L., Schmidt, U., Jacobsen, B. A., & Pettersson, P. (2018). Religion and state: 
Complexity in change. In I. Furseth (Ed.), Religious complexity in the public 
sphere: Comparing Nordic countries (pp. 81–135). Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Kümpel, A. S., Karnowski, V., & Keyling, T. (2015). News sharing in social media: A 
review of current research on news sharing users, content, and 
networks. Social Media + Society, 1(2), 1–14. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305115610141 
Kvålseth, T. O. (1989). Note on Cohen’s Kappa. Psychological reports, 65(1), 223– 
226. https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1989.65.1.223 
Landis, J. R., & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for 
categorical data. Biometrics, 33(1), pp. 159–174. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2529310 
Landman, T., & Carvalho, E. (2017). Issues and methods in comparative politics: An 
introduction (4th ed.). Abingdon: Routledge. 
Lapidus, A. Utskällda förslaget blir verklighet – efter 16 år [Reviled proposal 
becomes reality – after 16 years]. Expressen. Retrieved from 
https://www.expressen.se 
Larsen, J. M. (2019, 24 May). Ny opgørelse: Sådan performer partierne på Facebook 
[New data: How the political parties perform on Facebook]. Dansk 
Markedsføring. Retrieved from https://www.markedsforing.dk/ 
Larsson, A. O. (2014). Online, all the time? A quantitative assessment of the 





Larsson, A. O. (2017). Going viral? Comparing parties on social media during the 
2014 Swedish election. Convergence, 23(2), 117–131. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354856515577891 
Larsson, A. O. (2018). Diversifying likes. Journalism Practice, 12(3), 326–343. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2017.1285244 
Larsson, G., & Lindekilde, L. (2009). Muslim claims-making in context: Comparing the 
Danish and the Swedish Muhammad cartoons controversies. Ethnicities, 9(3), 
361–382. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796809337426 
Lee, D. (2017, 5 December). Facebook: Now for young children too. BBC. Retrieved 
from https://www.bbc.com 
Lee, E.‐J. (2012). That's not the way it is: How user‐generated comments on the 
news affect perceived media bias. Journal of Computer‐Mediated 
Communication, 18(1), 32–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083- 
6101.2012.01597.x 
Lee, E.-J., & Jang, Y. J. (2010). What do others’ reactions to news on Internet portal 
sites tell us? Effects of presentation format and readers’ need for cognition on 
reality perception. Communication Research, 37(6), 825–846. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650210376189 
Lee, E.-J., & Nass, C. (2002). Experimental tests of normative group influence and 
representation effects in computer-mediated communication: When 
interacting via computers differs from interacting with computers. Human 
Communication Research, 28(3), 349–381. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468- 
2958.2002.tb00812.x 
Leung, D. K. K., & Lee, F. L. F. (2014). Cultivating an active online counterpublic: 
Examining usage and political impact of Internet alternative media. The 





Lewis, P., Clarke, S., Barr, C., Holder, J., & Kommenda, N. (2018, 20 November). 
Revealed: One in four Europeans vote populist. The Guardian. Retrieved from 
https://www.theguardian.com 
Lindstad, M., & Fjeldstad, Ø. (1999). Pressen og de fremmede [The press and the 
foreigners]. Kristiansand: IJ-forlaget. 
Lindstad, M., & Fjeldstad, Ø. (2005). Av utenlandsk opprinnelse: Nye nordmenn i 
avisspaltene [Of foreign origin: New Norwegians in the newspaper 
columns]. Kristiansand: IJ-forlaget. 
Lindstad, M., & Fjeldstad, Ø. (2010). Pressen som norskhetens portvakter [The press 
as gatekeepers of Norwegianness]. In Innvandrere i norske medier: 
Medieskapt islamfrykt og usynlig hverdagsliv (pp. 22–27). Retrieved from 
https://www.imdi.no/contentassets/3e937755549748368d1d9384f91e6138/i 
mdi_aarsrapport_2009.pdf 
Lombard, M., Snyder-Dutch, J., & Bracken, C. C. (2002). Content analysis in mass 
communication: Assessment and reporting of intercoder reliability. Human 
Communication Research, 28(4), 587–604. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468- 
2958.2002.tb00826.x 
Lövheim, M., Jernsletten, H. H., Herbert, D., Lundby, K., & Hjarvard, S. (2018). 
Attitudes: Tendencies and variations. In K. Lundby (Ed.), Contesting religion: 
The media dynamics of cultural conflicts in Scandinavia (pp. 33–49). Berlin: De 
Gruyter. 
Lövheim, M., Lindberg, J., Botvar, P. K., Christensen, H. R., Niemelä, K., & Backström, 
A. (2018). Religion on the political agenda. In I. Furseth (Ed.), Religious 
complexity in the public sphere: Comparing Nordic countries (pp. 137–191). 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Løvlie, A. S., Ihlebæk, A. K., & Larsson, A. O. (2018a). Friends call me racist: 
Experiences of repercussions from writing comments on newspaper websites. 




Løvlie, A. S., Ihlebæk, A. K., & Larsson, A. O. (2018b). User experiences with editorial 
control in online newspaper comment fields. Journalism Practice, 12(3), 362– 
381. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2017.1293490 
Lund, A. B., & Berg, C. E. (2009). Denmark, Sweden and Norway: Television diversity 
by duopolistic competition and co-regulation. The International 
Communication Gazette, 71(1-2), 19–37. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048508097928 
Lundby, K., Christensen, H. R., Gressaker, A. K., Lövheim, M., Niemelä, K., Sjö, S… 
Danielsson, A. S. (2018). Religion and the media: Continuity, complexity, and 
mediatization. In I. Furseth (Ed.), Religious complexity in the public sphere: 
Comparing Nordic countries (pp. 193–249). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lundby, K., Hjarvard, S., Lövheim, M., & Jernsletten, H. H. (2017). Religion between 
politics and media: Conflicting attitudes towards Islam in Scandinavia. Journal 
of Religion in Europe, 10(4), 437–456. https://doi.org/10.1163/18748929- 
01004005 
Lundby, K., & Repstad, K. (2018). Scandinavia: Traits, trends and tensions. In K. 
Lundby (Ed.), Contesting religion: The media dynamics of cultural conflicts in 
Scandinavia (pp. 13–31). Berlin: De Gruyter. 
Madsen, J. G. (2000). Mediernes konstruktion af flygtninge- og 
indvandrerspørgsmålet [Media framing of the refugee- and immigrant 
question]. Århus: University of Aarhus. 
Madsen, T. N. (2005). Medier taler ikke med indvandrere [Media do not speak with 
immigrants]. Ugebrevet A4, 32. 
Magdy, W., Darwish, K., & Abokhodair, N. (2015). Quantifying public response 
towards Islam on Twitter after Paris attacks. arXiv:1512.04570. Retrieved 
from http://arxiv.org/abs/1512.04570  




Margolis, M., & Resnick, D. (2000) Politics as usual: The cyberspace “revolution”. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Martinsson, J., & Andersson, U. (Eds.). (2019). Swedish trends 1986-2018. 
Gothenburg: SOM Institute. 
Mathisen, B. R., & Morlandstø, L. (2016). Kommentaren – en sjanger i endring [The 
commentary – a genre in transition]. Oslo: Cappelen Damm. 
Mathisen, B. R., & Morlandstø, L. (Eds.). (2019). Blindsoner og mangfold – en studie 
av journalistikken i lokale og regionale medier [Blindspots and diversity – a 
study of journalism in local and regional media]. Orkana Akademisk. 
Matthes, J., Morrison, K. R., & Schemer, C. (2010). A spiral of silence for some: 
Attitude certainty and the expression of political minority opinions. 
Communication Research, 37(6), 774–800. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650210362685 
Maurer, M., & Reinemann, C. (2015). Do uninvolved voters rely on visual message 
elements? A test of a central assumption of the ELM in the context of 
televised debates. Politische Psychologie, 2, 235–251. Retrieved from 
http://www.psychologie-aktuell.com/index.php?id=politische-psychologie 
Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the media. In. D. Albertazzi, & D. McDonald 
(Eds.), Twenty-first century populism (pp. 49–64). New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
McCluskey, M., & Hmielowski, J. (2012). Opinion expression during social conflict: 
Comparing online reader comments and letters to the editor. Journalism, 
13(3), 303–319. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884911421696 
McEnery, T., McGlashan, M., & Love, R. (2015). Press and social media reaction to 
ideologically inspired murder: The case of Lee Rigby. Discourse & 
Communication, 9(2), 237–259. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750481314568545 
McKee, H. A., & Porter, J. E. (2009). The ethics of Internet research: A rhetorical, case- 




McKeever, R., McKeever, B. W., & Li, J.-Y. (2017). Speaking up online: Exploring 
hostile media perception, health behavior, and other antecedents of 
communication. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 94(3), 812–832. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699016670121 
Meret, S., Hellström, A., & Hagelund, A. (2016). Issues and tone towards the 
nationalist populist parties in mainstream press editorials in Scandinavia. In A. 
Hellström (Ed.), Trust us: Reproducing the nation and the Scandinavian 
nationalist populist parties (pp. 112–129). New York, NY: Berghahn. 
Messing, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2014). Selective exposure in the age of social media: 
Endorsements trump partisan source affiliation when selecting news online. 
Communication Research, 41(8), 1042–1063. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650212466406 
Moe, H. (2019a). Comparing platform “ranking cultures” across languages: The case 
of Islam on YouTube in Scandinavia. Social Media + Society, 5(1), 1–10. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118817038 
Moe, H. (2019b). Wikipedia as an arena and source for the public: A Scandinavian 
comparison of “Islam”. Javnost - The Public, 26(2), 177–193. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2019.1587703 
Moe, H., Hovden, J. F., Ytre-Arne, B., Figenschou, T. U., Nærland, T. U., Sakariassen, 
H., & Thorbjørnsrud, K. (2019). Informerte borgere? Offentlig tilknytning, 
mediebruk og demokrati [Informed citizens? Public connection, media use and 
democracy]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
Moe, H., Thorbjørnsrud, K., & Fladmoe, A. (2017). Perceptions of journalistic bias: 
Party preference, media trust and attitudes towards immigration. In A. H. 
Midtbøen, K. Steen-Johnsen, & K. Thorbjørnsrud (Eds.), Boundary struggles: 
Contestations of free speech in the Norwegian public sphere (pp. 109–136). 




Moene, K. (2007). Den nordiske modellen [The Nordic model]. Working paper. Oslo: 




Moreno, M. A., Goniu, N., Moreno, P. S., & Diekema, D. (2013). Ethics of social 
media research: Common concerns and practical considerations. 
Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, 16(9), 708–713. 
https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2012.0334 
Mouffe, C. (2000). Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism. Political science 
series, 72. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies. Retrieved from 
https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/24654 
Mulinari, D., & Neergaard, A. (2017). Theorising racism: Exploring the Swedish racial 
regime. Nordic Journal of Migration Research, 7(2), 88–96. 
https://doi.org/10.1515/njmr-2017-0016 
Negt, O., & Kluge, A. (1972/1993). Public sphere and experience: Toward an analysis 
of the bourgeois and proletarian public sphere (P. Labanyi, J. O. Daniel, & A. 
Oksiloff, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: UMN Press. 




Neuendorf, K. A. (2009). Reliability for content analysis. In A. Jordan, D. Kunkel, J. 
Mangello, & M. Fishbein (Eds.), Media messages and public health: A decisions 
approach to content analysis (pp. 67–87). New York, NY: Routledge. 





Neumayer, C. (2013). When neo-Nazis march and anti-fascists demonstrate: Protean 
counterpublics in the digital age. (Doctoral dissertation, IT University of 
Copenhagen). Retrieved from 
https://www.forskningsdatabasen.dk/en/catalog/2389140238 
Nielsen, C. (2012). Newspaper journalists support online comments. Newspaper 
Research Journal, 33(1), 86–100. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/073953291203300107 
Noelle-Neumann, E. (1993). The spiral of silence: Public opinion—Our social skin (2nd 
ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Nossen, H. A. (2010). Utviklingen av Aftenpostens nyhets- og 
kommentarjournalistikk: En kvantitativ innholdsanalyse av endringer i 
Aftenpostens form, stil og innhold fra 1950 til 2008 [The evolution of 
Aftenposten’s news- and commentary journalism: A quantitative content 
analysis of changes in Aftenposten’s form, style and content from 1950 to 
2008]. (Master's thesis, University of Oslo). Retrieved from 
https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/27269 
Nygaard, M. (2017). Venligbogen [The friendly book]. Copenhagen: Jensen & 
Dalgaard. 
Nygaard, S. (2019). The appearance of objectivity: How immigration-critical 
alternative media report the news. Journalism Practice, 13(10), 1147–1163. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2019.1577697 
Nygaard, S. (2020). Boundary work: Intermedia agenda-setting between right-wing 
alternative media and professional journalism. Journalism Studies, 21(6), 766– 
782. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2020.1722731 
Oboler, A. (2016). The normalisation of Islamophobia through social media: 
Facebook. In I. Awan (Ed.), Islamophobia in cyberspace: Hate crimes go viral 




Oscarsson, H. E. (2013, 12 December). Väljarna är inga dumbommar [The voters are 
not simpletons]. Retrieved from 
https://ekengrenoscarsson.com/2013/12/10/valjare-ar-inga-dumbommar/ 
Østby, L. (2005). Befolkningsutvikling 1905-2005: Flest innvandrere i Sverige, flest 
barn i Norge [Demographic trends 1905-2005: Most immigrants in Sweden, 
most children in Norway]. In R. R. Bore (Ed.), Hundre års ensomhet? Norge og 
Sverige 1905-2005 (pp. 18–33). Oslo–Kongsvinger: Statistics Norway. 
Østbye, H., Helland, K., Knapskog, K., Larsen, L. O., & Moe, H. (2013). Metodebok for 
mediefag [Methods book for media studies] (4th ed.). Fagbokforlaget. 
Pak, C. (2019). News organizations’ selective link sharing as gatekeeping: A structural 
topic model approach. Computational Communication Research, 1(1), 45–78. 
https://doi.org/10.5117/CCR2019.1.003.PAK 
Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: What the Internet is hiding from you. New York, 
NY: Penguin Press. 
Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Pettersen, S. V., & Østby, L. (2013). Innvandrere i Norge, Sverige og Danmark 
[Immigrants in Norway, Sweden and Denmark]. Samfunnsspeilet, 27(5), 76– 
82. Retrieved from https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/artikler-og- 
publikasjoner/innvandrere-i-norge-sverige-og-danmark 
Pew Research Center (2017). Europe’s growing Muslim population. Retrieved from 
https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim- 
population/ 




Pew Research Center (2018b). Eastern and Western Europeans differ on importance 






Phillips, L., & Schrøder, K. (2004). Sådan taler medier og borgere om politik: En 
diskursanalytisk undersøgelse af politik i det medialiserede samfund [How the 
media and citizens talk about politics: A discourse-analytical study of politics 
in mediatised society]. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. 
Popping, R. (1988). On agreement indices for nominal data. In W. E. Saris, & I. N. 
Gallhofer (Eds.), Sociometric research (pp. 90–105). London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Porten-Cheé, P., Hassler, J., Jost, P., Eilders, C., & Maurer, M. (2018). Popularity cues 
in online media: Theoretical and methodological perspectives in political 
communication research. Studies in Communication and Media, 7(2), 208– 
230. doi:10.5771/2192-4007-2018-2-208 
Reich, Z. (2011). User comments: The transformation of participatory space. In J. B. 
Singer, D. Domingo, A. Heinonen, A. Hermida, S. Paulussen, T. Quandt… M. 
Vujnovic (Eds.), Participatory journalism (pp. 96–117). Chichester: Wiley‐ 
Blackwell. 
Renninger, B. J. (2015). “Where I can be myself … where I can speak my mind”: 
Networked counterpublics in a polymedia environment. New Media & 
Society, 17(9), 1513–1529. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444814530095 
Reuters Institute (2018). Digital news report 2018. Retrieved from 
http://media.digitalnewsreport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/digital- 
news-report-2018.pdf 
Reuters Institute (2019). Digital news report 2019. Retrieved from 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/inline- 
files/DNR_2019_FINAL.pdf 
Rheingold, H. (1993). The virtual community: Homesteading on the electronic 




Riffe, D., Lacy, S., & Fico, F. G. (2005). Analyzing media messages: Using quantitative 
content analysis in research (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Rindedal, C. (2013). Fremveksten av Fremskrittspartiets innvandringskritiske politikk 
1973-1989 [The emergence of the Progress Party’s immigration-critical policy 
1973-1989]. (Master’s thesis, University of Bergen). Retrieved from 
http://bora.uib.no/handle/1956/7628 
Robinson, P. (2001). Theorizing the influence of media on world politics: Models of 
media influence on foreign policy. European Journal of Communication, 16(4), 
523–544. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323101016004005 
Rodriguez, C. E. (Ed.). (2018). Latin looks: Images of Latinas and Latinos in the U.S. 
media. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Rojas, H. (2010). “Corrective” actions in the public sphere: How perceptions of 
media and media effects shape political behaviors. International Journal of 
Public Opinion Research, 22(3), 343–363. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edq018 
Rossi, L., Schwartz, S., & Mahnke, M. (2016). Social media use & political 
engagement in Denmark. Copenhagen: DECIDIS. Retrieved from 
https://blogit.itu.dk/decidis/wp- 
content/uploads/sites/5/2016/03/Decidis_report_2016.pdf 
Rowe, I. (2015). Civility 2.0: A comparative analysis of incivility in online political 
discussion. Information, Communication & Society, 18(2), 121-138. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2014.940365 
Ruiz, C., Domingo, D., Micó, J. L., Díaz-Noci, J., Meso, K., & Masip, P. (2011). Public 
sphere 2.0? The democratic qualities of citizen debates in online newspapers. 





Rydgren, J. (2004). Explaining the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties: 
The case of Denmark. West European Politics, 27(3), 474–502. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000228103 
Rydgren, J. (2010). Radical right-wing populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining 
party system change and stability. SAIS Review, 30(1), 57–71. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.0.0070 
Said, E. (1997). Covering Islam (revised edition). New York, NY: Vintage. 
Santana, A. D. (2014). Virtuous or vitriolic: The effect of anonymity on civility in 
online newspaper reader comment boards. Journalism Practice, 8(1), 18–33. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2013.813194 
Santana, A. D. (2019). Toward quality discourse: Measuring the effect of user 
identity in commenting forums. Newspaper Research Journal, 40(4), 467–486. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0739532919873089 
Sigurdsen, J. O. (2014). Retorisk brobygging: En argumentasjonsanalyse av Siv 
Jensens ytringer i den siste partilederdebatten til NRK i stortingsvalget 2013 
[Rhetorical bridge-building: An argument analysis of Siv Jensen’s statements 
in NRK’s final party leader debate in the 2013 parliamentary election]. 
(Master’s thesis, University of Oslo). Retrieved from 
https://www.duo.uio.no/handle/10852/41229 
Siim, B., & Meret, S. (2019). Dilemmas of citizenship and evolving civic activism in 
Denmark. In B. Siim, A. Krasteva, & A. Saarinen (Eds.), Citizens’ activism and 
solidarity movements: Contending with populism (pp. 25–50). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Sjøvaag, H. (2019). Journalism between the state and the market. London: 
Routledge. 
Springer, N., Engelmann, I., Pfaffinger, C. (2015). User comments: Motives and 





Squires, C. R. (2002). Rethinking the black public sphere: An alternative vocabulary 
for multiple public spheres. Communication Theory, 12(4), 446–468. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2002.tb00278.x 
Stærk, B. (2011). En nettreise gjennom islamkritikkens tiår [An online journey 
through the decade of Islam critique]. Samtiden, 120(4), 32–49. Retrieved 
from https://www.idunn.no/samtiden 
Stemler, S. (2001). An overview of content analysis. Practical Assessment, Research, 
and Evaluation, 7(17). Retrieved from 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/pare/vol7/iss1/17/ 
Stokke, C. (2012). A multicultural society in the making: How Norwegian Muslims 
challenge a white nation. (Doctoral dissertation, Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology). Retrieved from https://ntnuopen.ntnu.no/ntnu- 
xmlui/handle/11250/271411 
Storsveen, O. A. (2004). Nasjonal identitet i Norge og Danmark [National identity in 
Norway and Denmark]. Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, 21(3–4), 370–380. Retrieved 
from https://www.idunn.no/nnt 
Strabac, Z., Thorbjørnsrud, K., & Jenssen, A. T. (2012). News consumption and public 
opposition to immigration across countries. In T. Aalberg, & J. 
Curran (Eds.), How media inform democracy: A comparative approach 
(pp. 176–188). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Strand, A. K., Lindebjerg, G. D., & Bjune, T. (2018). Innvandring og integrering i 
norske medier 2017: En medieanalyse utført på oppdrag av IMDi [Immigration 
and integration in Norwegian media 2017: A media analysis commissioned by 
IMDi, The Directorate of Integration and Diversity]. Retrieved from 
https://www.imdi.no/contentassets/249dbcbd7eb948f89e12744258a2332e/i 
nnvandring-og-integrering-i-norske-medier-2017.pdf 
Strand, A. K., Nervik, H., & Nilsen, K. (2017). Islam og muslimer i norske medier i 






Strömbäck, J., Jungar, A.-C., & Dahlberg, S. (2017). Sweden: No longer a European 
exception. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. de 
Vreese (Eds.), Populist political communication in Europe (pp. 68–82). New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Stroud, N. J., Scacco, J. M., Muddiman, A., & Curry, A. L. (2015). Changing 
deliberative norms on news organizations’ Facebook sites. Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication, 20(2), 188–203. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12104 
Stubager, R., Hansen, K. M., Callesen, K., Leed, A., & Enevoldsen, C. (2016). Danske 
vælgere 1971-2015: En oversigt over udviklingen i vælgernes holdninger mv. 
[Danish voters 1971-2015: An overview of the development in voters’ 
attitudes]. Retrieved from 
https://www.valgprojektet.dk/files/Danske%20v%C3%A6lgere%201971- 
2015%2007.06.2016.pdf 
Su, L. Y.-F., Xenos, M. A., Rose, K. M., Wirz, C., Scheufele, D. A., & Brossard, D. 
(2018). Uncivil and personal? Comparing patterns of incivility in comments on 
the Facebook pages of news outlets. New Media & Society, 20(10), 3678– 
3699. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818757205 
Suler, J. (2004). The online disinhibition effect. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 7(3), 
321–326. https://doi.org/10.1089/1094931041291295 
Sunstein, C. R. (2017). #Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social 
media. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Syvertsen, T., Enli, G., Mjøs, O. J., & Moe, H. (2014). The media welfare state: Nordic 




Taber, C. S., Cann, D., & Kucsova, S. (2009). The motivated processing of political 
arguments. Political Behavior, 31(2), 137–155. doi.org/10.1007/s11109-008- 
9075-8 
Tandoc, E. C., & Vos, T. P. (2016). The journalist is marketing the news. Social media 
in the gatekeeping process. Journalism Practice, 10(8), 950–966. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2015.1087811 
Taylor, I. (2014). Local press reporting of opposition to the 2003 Iraq War in the UK 
and the case for reconceptualizing notions of legitimacy and deviance. Journal 
of War & Cultural Studies, 7(1), 36–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1179/1752628013Y.0000000006 
Tenenboim, O., & Cohen, A. A. (2015). What prompts users to click and comment: A 
longitudinal study of online news. Journalism, 16(2), 198–217. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884913513996 
Thorbjørnsrud, K. (2017). Immigration critique: Moral boundaries, silence and 
polarization. In A. H. Midtbøen, K. Steen-Johnsen, & K. Thorbjørnsrud (Eds.), 
Boundary struggles: Contestations of free speech in the Norwegian public 
sphere (pp. 257–290). Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk. 
Thorbjørnsrud, K., & Figenschou, T. U. (2016). Do marginalized sources matter? A 
comparative analysis of irregular migrant voice in Western media. Journalism 
studies, 17(3), 337–355. https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2014.987549 
Toepfl, F., & Piwoni, E. (2015). Public spheres in interaction: Comment sections of 
news websites as counterpublic spaces. Journal of Communication, 65(3), 
465–488. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12156 
Toepfl, F., & Piwoni, E. (2018). Targeting dominant publics: How counterpublic 
commenters align their efforts with mainstream news. New Media & Society, 




Törnberg, A., & Törnberg, T. (2016). Muslims in social media discourse: Combining 
topic modeling and critical discourse analysis. Discourse, Context and Media, 
13, 132–142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcm.2016.04.003 
Törnberg, A., & Wahlström, M. (2018). Unveiling the radical right online: Exploring 
framing and identity in an online anti-immigrant discussion group. Sociologisk 
forskning, 55(2–3), 267–292. Retrieved from 
https://www.sociologiskforskning.se// 
Townsend, L., & Wallace, C. (2016). Social media research: A guide to ethics. 
University of Aberdeen. Retrieved from 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/Media_487729_smxx.pdf 
Truedson, L. (Ed.). (2016). Migrationen i medierna – men det får en väl inte prata 
om? [Migration in the media – are we even allowed to talk about that?]. 
Stockholm: The Institute for Media Studies. 
Tsagkias, M., Weerkamp, W., & de Rijke, M. (2009). Predicting the volume of 
comments on online news stories. In D. Cheung (Ed.), Proceedings of the 18th 
ACM conference on Information and Knowledge Management (pp. 1765– 
1768). New York, NY: ACM. 
Tsfati, Y. (2007). Hostile media perceptions, presumed media influence, and 
minority alienation: The case of Arabs in Israel. Journal of Communication, 
57(4), 632–651. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2007.00361.x 
Tsfati, Y., & Cohen, J. (2005). The influence of presumed media influence on 
democratic legitimacy: The case of Gaza settlers. Communication Research, 
32(6), 794–821. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650205281057 
Valbum, E. (2008, 2 July). Her er Fremskridtspartiets historie [This is the history of 
the Progress Party]. Berlingske. Retrieved from https://www.berlingske.dk 
van Dalen, A., Fazekas, Z., Klemmensen, R., & Hansen, K. M. (2015). Policy 
considerations on Facebook: Agendas, coherence, and communication 




Technology & Politics, 12(3), 303–324. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2015.1061398 
van Dijck, J., & Poell, T. (2013). Understanding social media logic. Media and 
Communication, 3(3), 2–14. https://doi.org/10.12924/mac2013.01010002 
Vanparys, N., Jacobs, D., & Torrekens, C. (2013). The impact of dramatic events on 
public debate concerning accommodation of Islam in 
Europe. Ethnicities, 13(2), 209–228. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796812470899 
von Sikorski, C. (2016). The effects of reader comments on the perception of 
personalized scandals: Exploring the roles of comment valence and 
commenters’ social status. International Journal of Communication, 10, 4480– 
4501. Retrieved from https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/5748 
von Sikorski, C., & Hänelt, M. (2016). Scandal 2.0: How valenced reader comments 
affect recipients’ perception of scandalized individuals and the journalistic 
quality of online news. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 93(3), 
551–571. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699016628822 
Vromen, A. (2008). Building virtual spaces: Young people, participation and the 
Internet. Australian Journal of Political Science, 43(1), 79–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10361140701842581 
Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2001). Letters to the editor as a forum for public deliberation: 
Modes of publicity and democratic debate. Critical Studies in Media 
Communication, 18(3), 303–320. https://doi.org/10.1080/07393180128085 
Warburg, M., Johansen, B. S., & Østergaard, K. (2013). Counting niqabs and burqas 
in Denmark: Methodological aspects of quantifying rare and elusive religious 
sub-cultures. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 28(1), 33–48. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13537903.2013.750834 





Weber, P. (2014). Discussions in the comments section: Factors influencing 
participation and interactivity in online newspapers’ reader comments. New 
Media & Society, 16(6), 941–957. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444813495165 
Welbers, K., & Opgenhaffen, M. (2019). Presenting news on social media: Media 
logic in the communication style of newspapers on Facebook. Digital 
Journalism, 7(1), 45–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2018.1493939 
Wendt, M., & Åse, C. (2016). För Sverige – med livet som insats. Afghanistankriget, 
döden och demokratin [For Sweden – with life at stake. The War in 
Afghanistan, death and democracy]. Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 118(3), 359– 
388. Retrieved from https://journals.lub.lu.se/st/index 
Willis, R. (2019). Observations online: Finding the ethical boundaries of Facebook 
research. Research Ethics, 15(1), 1–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1747016117740176 
Wright, S. (2012). Politics as usual? Revolution, normalization and a new agenda for 
online deliberation. New Media & Society, 14(2), 244–261. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444811410679 
Wright, S., & Street, J. (2007). Democracy, deliberation and design: The case of 
online discussion forums. New Media & Society, 9(5), 849–869. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444807081230 
Yang, J. (2016). Effects of popularity-based news recommendations (“most-viewed”) 
on users' exposure to online news. Media Psychology, 19(2), 243–271. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2015.1006333 
Yilmaz, F. (2012). Right-wing hegemony and immigration: How the populist far-right 
achieved hegemony through the immigration debate in Europe. Current 
Sociology, 60(3), 368–381. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392111426192 





Young, I. M. (1996). Communication and the other: Beyond deliberative democracy. 
In S. Benhabib (Ed.), Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of 
the political (pp. 120–135). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Zhou, X., Chan, Y.-Y., & Peng, Z.-M. (2008). Deliberativeness of online political 
discussion: A content analysis of the Guangzhou Daily website. Journalism 
Studies, 9(5), 759–770. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700802207771 
Ziegele, M., & Quiring, O. (2013). Conceptualizing online discussion value: A 
multidimensional framework for analyzing user comments on mass-media 









Appendix 1: Variables Coded for Each Post 
1. Nationality 






2. News outlet 














V13 Ekstra Bladet 
V14 Politiken 
V15 TV2 (DK) 
 
3. Date 
Enter the date the post was published. 
4. Source’s position/role 
Code the position/role of the main source of the post. The main source is defined 
here as the first source of a post, as long as the next source is not given twice as 
much space (in an article) or time (in a video). To be considered a source in a news 
post, the person must be quoted; it is not enough to just be mentioned. For posts 
that link to debate articles, code the author of the article as the main source. For 




V1 Social democratic politician 
V2 Centre/agrarian politician 
V3 Green politician 
V4 Liberal politician 
V5 Conservative politician 
V6 Right-wing populist politician 
V7 Christian democratic politician 
V8 Socialist politician 
V9 Hard Line (Stram Kurs) politician 
V10 Non-Scandinavian politician 
V11 NGO 
V12 Intergovernmental organisation 
V13 Expert/intellectual/think tank 
V14 Anti-Islamic organisation 
V15 Advocacy group/demonstrator 
V16 Private citizen 
V17 Civil servant 
V18 Businessman 
V19 Cultural practitioner 
V20 Scandinavian media professional 
V21 Non-Scandinavian media 
professional 
V22 Employer/employee in private 
business 
V23 Religious leader/representative 
V24 Royalty 
V25 No source 
 
Code V22 if the source is linked to a particular organisation/company. Code V18 if 
the source is not linked to a particular organisation/company. 
5. Source’s religious identity 
If V1–V24 was coded for variable 4, code whether the main source is a Muslim. If 







6. Muslim source’s perspective 
If V1 was coded for variable 5, code the “type” of Muslim perspective expressed by 
the Muslim source. If V2 or V3 was coded for variable 5 or if variable 5 was skipped, 
skip this variable. 
V1 Liberal 
V2 Conservative 
V3 (Radical) Islamist 
V4 Undefined 
 
Code Liberal if the Muslim source expresses opposition to conservative or 
fundamentalist interpretations of Islam (e.g. criticises the use of hijab among 
children or conservative views on homosexuality). 
Code Conservative if the Muslim source advocates marginal versions of Islam which 
may cause significant tension with the majority population (e.g. wear a niqab or 
refuse to shake hands with the opposite sex) but is not described as an Islamist or 
Jihadist. 
Code (Radical) Islamist if the source is described as an Islamist or Jihadist. 
 






Code the main theme of the post. If a post contains several themes and there is 
doubt pertaining to which theme is most prominent, use the headline to decide 
what the main theme is. If the main theme still cannot be decided, assess the main 
picture used in the post. If the main theme still cannot be determined, assess the 






V6 Crime (not related to Jihadism) 
V7 Art and culture 
V8 Spirituality/rituals/holidays 
V9 Honour culture 





V15 Fake news/bots 
V16 LGBT 
V17 Meta debate 
V18 Political parties 
V19 Love between Muslims and non- 
Muslims 
V20 Handshaking 
V21 Reform of Islam 
V22 Elections 
V23 Journalistic ethics 
V24 Radicalism/extremism (other forms 
than Islamism/Jihadism) 
V25 Illness 
V26 Christian values 
V27 Sports stars 
V28 Archeologic findings 




















Code a post as Negative if conveys criticism of Islam, Islamic practices, Muslims, 
immigration (from countries with a substantial Muslim population), and/or 
Islam/immigration-friendly parties/politicians. Do not code a post as Negative if it 
discusses or conveys criticism of Islamism, Jihadism, war, honour culture, or crime— 
unless the post (implicitly or explicitly) links Islam or Muslims in general to these 
phenomena. 
Code a post as Positive if it conveys support, sympathy, respect or tolerance for 
Islam, Islamic practices or Muslims, emphasises problems with other religions than 
Islam, describes that problems associated with Islam are exaggerated or conveys 
criticism of Islam/immigrant-critical parties or politicians. 
Code a post as Neutral if it does not convey a clear sentiment, for instance because 
it has an even emphasis on negative and positive elements. 
Code a comment as Negatively loaded if it discusses/criticises the negatively 
charged themes Islamism/Jihadism/war, honour culture, or crime without linking 




10. Popularity cues 
Enter the number of popularity cues received by the post (in terms of likes, shares, 




Appendix 2: Variables Coded for Each Comment 
1. Sentiment 







Code a comment as Negative if criticises Islam, Islamic practices, Muslims, (Muslim) 
immigration, and/or Islam/immigration-friendly parties/politicians. Do not code a 
comment as Negative if it criticises Islamism, Jihadism, war, honour culture, or 
crime—unless the commenter blames Islam or Muslims in general for these 
phenomena. 
Code a comment as Positive if it expresses support, sympathy, respect or tolerance 
for Islam, Islamic practices, and/or Muslims, emphasises problems with other 
religions than Islam, argues that problems associated with Islam are exaggerated, 
and/or criticises Islam/immigrant-critical parties/politicians. 
Code a comment as Neutral if it does not communicate a clear sentiment, for 
instance because it has an even emphasis on negative and positive elements. 
Code a comment as Anti-Islamist if it criticises Islamism, Jihadism, war, honour 
culture, or crime, without blaming these phenomena on Islam or Muslims in 
general. 





Code Yes if a comment targets news outlets or news/journalists in general for being 
mainstream, dominant, biased, and/or censoring when it comes to how Islam and 




violent proclivities factually”, “It would be nice if the mainstream media could 
pretend for a second not to want to ruin the country with open borders”, “The 
media continues its hate campaign against Muslims”). Also code Yes if an outlet is 
criticised for having removed a comment from the comment section. Also code Yes 
if the commenter argues that one should use (right-wing or left wing) alternative 
news media rather than established news outlets if one wants to get the truth. Do 
not code Yes if only one mainstream outlet is criticised for its coverage of Islam— 
unless this includes criticism of a fully state-financed public service broadcaster 
(NRK, SVT, DR) or if the commenter contends that the outlet should be boycotted 
(due to its coverage of Islam). 
Code No if a comment does not criticise the mainstream media, or if it criticises the 
mainstream media but the criticism is not of a comprehensive and systematic 
character, for instance because the comment only criticises one news story or one 
news outlet (“The NRK’s framing of the hijab in this article is quite unfortunate”, 
“Dagbladet’s immigrant-liberal profile is painfully obvious in this story”, “Ekstra 
Bladet is so racist”). 
 





Code Yes if a comment criticises the political establishment for not taking 
(perceived) problems with Islam or Muslims seriously, for instance because 
politicians are considered to be naive, cowardly or politically correct (“The 
politicians should be punished for their lax approach to Muslim immigration”, 
“Unfortunately our representatives are unable see the truth before their very 
eyes”). Also code Yes if an anti-Islam party or politician is considered to be an 
exception to the political establishment (“Where others are silent, Pernille Vermund 




establishment for being racist or discriminating against Islam or Muslims (“The 
politicians’ rhetoric on Muslims is disgraceful”, “It is sad that the politicians use their 
time to spread fear against Muslims”), or if an Islam-friendly party or politician is 
considered to be an exception to the political establishment. 
Code No if a comment does not criticise the political establishment or if politicians 
are criticised, but this criticism does not target a broad range of politicians from the 
left to the right (“The Labour Party’s immigration policies are misguided”, “The 
Prime Minister is way off in this case”, “Unlike the right, the left fails to adequately 
address problems with Islam”). 





Code Yes if a comment criticises the police, courts, or criminal justice system in 
general for unfair treatment of Muslims or radical Islamists (“He will probably spend 
7 days in a luxury facility with Xbox and Netflix”, “The police is afraid to act against 
Muslims”). 
Code No if a comment does not criticise the police, courts or criminal justice system, 
or if it does criticise these actors but not in a systematic fashion (“The police did not 
handle this situation well”, “I completely disagree with the court’s decision in this 
case”). 





Code Yes if a comment criticises other powerful actors (than the mainstream media, 
political establishment, and criminal justice system) for dominating/censoring 




celebrities). Also code Yes if someone from the other actors category is pointed to 
as an exception to an otherwise reality-detached/naïve or racist/discriminatory 
group of actors (“Finally a celebrity who understands Islam”). 
 
Code No if a comment does not criticise other powerful actors (than the mainstream 
media, political establishment, and criminal justice system) for 
dominating/censoring discussions around Islam. 





Code Yes if a comment deconstructs power relations without criticising a specific 
actor (“People nowadays are content with remaining politically correct”, “It is 
impossible to criticise Islam without being branded a racist,” “In the current debate 
climate, it is unfortunately impossible to say something positive about Islam without 
being branded naïve”). Also code Yes if a commenter describes their country as 
naïve, cowardly, clueless, politically correct or racist (“Sweden is afraid to act against 
Islam”, “Norway is completely lost when it comes to handling Islam”, “Denmark is so 
racist”). 
Code No if a comment does not deconstruct power relations by targeting 
unspecified power relations. Also code No if the comment deconstructs unspecified 
power relations but also targets the mainstream media, political establishment, 
criminal justice system, or other actors. 





Code Yes if Yes was coded for at least one of the variables 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. 









Code Yes if the comment is emotional, for instance because it uses emotionally 
charged words (“amazing”, “lovely”, “tragic”), humour, sarcasm/irony, CAPSLOCK, 
emojis (that expresses emotions such as happiness, sadness, anger), exclamation 
marks, and/or at least two question marks/dots in a row. Also code Yes if the 
comment is impolite and/or uses swear words. 
Code No if the comment does not feature emotional content. 
 





Code Yes if a comment contains mocking or derogatory characteristics, for instance 
about political opponents and Muslims (“What an idiotic pig”, “She is completely 
braindead”, “He is such a Nazi”). Also code Yes if a comment tells people to leave 
the country (“Go back to where you come from”, “Get out!!”, “Bye bye :D”). Do not 
code Yes if a comment uses a swear word, unless the swear word is used in a 
comment that also contains mocking or derogatory remarks. 
Code No if a comment does not use an impolite tone. 
 





Code Yes if a commenter identifies with or indicates committed support for a 





Code No if a commenter does not identify with or express committed support for a 
political party or politician. This includes if a commenter expresses some agreement 
with a party or politician (“I will not vote for the party, but the SD unfortunately 
makes some good points”). 
11. Strengthening of collective identity 3.2: Which type of party does the 
commenter support? 
 
V1 Extreme right145 
V2 Right-wing populist 
V3 Liberal/conservative 
V4 Agrarian 
V5 Social democratic 
V6 Socialist/communist 
V7 No political identification 
 





Code Yes if a comment expresses a need to take drastic measures to avoid a societal 
collapse due to Islam or immigration (“We need to start deporting Muslims now if 
we want to avoid the end of Europe”). Also code Yes if the comment states that 
there is no reason to take measures because society is already doomed (“I don’t 
know why you still bother with politics, the Islamisation is already complete”). Also 
code Yes if a comment expresses fears that Muslims will be stripped of all their 






145 By extreme right, I here refer to the parties that are considered to be to the right of the 
dominant right-wing populist parties (FrP, SD, and DF) in matters relating to Islam (e.g. The New 




Muslim bigotry, or that the situation for Muslims today is reminiscent of the 
situation for Jews in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Code No if a comment does not use alarmist rhetoric. 
 





Code Yes if a comment uses the words “we”, “us”, “our”, or “ours” to indicate a 
sense of personal belonging to a continent, nation, religion, organisation, or other 
community. Also code Yes if the commenter uses the flag emoji of their country. 
Code No if the comment does not indicate of sense of personal belonging to a 
continent, nation, religion, organization, or other community. 






Code Yes if Yes was coded for at least one of the variables 8, 9, 10, 12, or 13. 
Code No if No was coded for variables 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13. 
15. Argumentative countering 1.1: Does the comment discuss any of these 
(Islamic) practices/traits associated with Islam, and, if so, which one(s)? 
 
V1 Face veils (burka/niqab) 
V2 Headscarves (hijab/abaya) 
V3 Not shaking hands with the opposite sex 
V4 Islamic holidays 
V5 Circumcision 
V6 Halal food 
V7 Call to prayer 
V8 Islamic private schools 
V9 Mosques 




V11 Several of these practices/traits 
V12 None of these practices/traits 
 
16. Argumentative countering 1.2: What is the commenter’s stance on this Islamic 
practice/trait associated with Islam? 
 
V1 It should be completely banned/should have 
been banned a long time ago 
V2 It should be banned in certain areas 
V3 It should be criticised (but not banned) 
V4 It should be accepted/tolerated 
V5 A combination of V1 and V2 
V6 A combination of V1/V2 and V3 
V7 A combination of V3 and V4 
V8 Unclear 
V9 None of the practices/traits associated with 
Islam mentioned in variable 16 are addressed 
17. Argumentative countering 2: Does the comment explicitly support another 












V11 The Netherlands 
V12 “Several other countries” 
V13 The comment does not explicitly support 
another country’s policies or discourse 
 
Only code V1-V12 if a comment either mentions the country/politician from that 
country or uses the flag emoji of that country (“Go Denmark!”, “Congratulations to 
Sebastian Kurz for showing how it is done”) or explicitly argues that the other 




(“We should have the same laws here”). This means that V13 should be coded for 
not only comments that do not support another country’s policies/discourse on 
Islam but also for comments that support another country’s policy/discourse 
without (explicitly) championing the country, unless the commenter states clearly 
that the policy/discourse should apply also in Norway/Sweden/Denmark. 
18. Argumentative countering 3: Does the comment make a general evaluation of 






V5 The comment does not make a general 
evaluation of Islam or Muslims 
 
Negative comments feature negative essentialist/generalising views of Islam and/or 
Muslims (“Islam stands for violence and war”, “Islam is a dangerous political 
ideology, not a religion”, “Unfortunately Muslims are unable to integrate into 
Western society”, “Muslims are always so easily offended”). This includes negative 
essentialist comments about the Quran and the Islamic prophet Muhammad. 
Positive comments feature positive essentialist/generalising views of Islam and/or 
Muslims (“Islam stands for peace”, “Muslims are wonderful people”, “No Muslim 
parent would force their child to wear a hijab”, “ISIS has nothing to do with Islam”). 
This includes positive essentialist comments about the Quran and the Islamic 
prophet Muhammad. 
Nuanced/neutral comments emphasise that there are different interpretations of 
Islam (“Remember that most Muslims do not use a face veil, this is typically only 
practiced by women who are advocates of Salafism”, “I have only met one Muslim 




practice an extreme version of Islam, that is vastly different from how many 
moderate Muslims choose to lead their lives”, “Not all Muslims do that”). 
19. Argumentative countering 4: Does the comment address conversion to Islam, 
and, if so, what is the commenter’s stance on conversion to Islam? 
 
V1 That it is insane/idiotic/deeply 
problematic 
V2 That it is great/unproblematic 
V3 That it is challenging (but not insane, 
idiotic, or deeply problematic) 
V4 Unclear 
V5 The comment does not address 
conversion to Islam 
 
20. Argumentative countering 5: Does the comment engage in political labelling of 










V9 The comment does not engage in 
political labelling 
 
Code V9 if a comment engages in political labelling of actors that the news media’s 
posts have described as Islamists/jihadists. 
21. Argumentative countering 6: Does the comment discuss physical or verbal 
harassment of political opponents, and, if so, what is the commenter’s stance on 
this harassment? 
 
V1 It is acceptable against Muslims 
V2 It is acceptable against far-right politicians 





V5 The comment does not address physical or 
verbal harassment of political opponents 
 
 
Code V5 if a comment argues that it is acceptable to harass Islamists and/or jihadists 
(opinions on how to handle Islamists and jihadists are considered in variable 22). 
22. Argumentative countering 7: Does the comment discuss (alleged) 
Islamists/jihadists, and, if so, what is the commenter’s stance on (how to handle) 
Islamists/jihadists? 
 
V1 They should be killed extrajudicially or receive the death penalty 
V2 They should be deported/lose their citizenship 
V3 They should be imprisoned 
V4 They should stay in ISIS territory and not be allowed to return to 
Scandinavia 
V5 They should be allowed to return from ISIS territory and receive 
their sentence in Scandinavia 
V6 They should be forgiven/not sentenced 
V7 They are no worse than the USA/the West/Israel 
V8 They should be excluded from organisations/their organisation 
should be banned 
V9 They should not receive public support/funding 
V10 Unspecified condemnation 
V11 Unclear 
V12 The comment does not discuss Islamists/jihadists 
 
The difference between V10 and V11 is that the former is used for comments that 
clearly criticise Islamists/jihadists, whereas the latter is used when it cannot be 
discerned what the comments mean about these actors. 
23. Argumentative countering 8: Does the comment discuss religion in general, 
and, if so, what is the commenter’s attitude towards religion? 
 
V1 Religion should be banned/completely removed from public 
space 
V2 Religion should play a minor/smaller role in public space (but not 
be banned or completely removed) 
V3 Religious freedom should be respected/strengthened 
V4 It is important/acceptable to criticise/ridicule religion 




V6 Religion is fundamentally good 
V7 Religion can be a force for good as well as a force for bad 
V8 Unclear 
V9 The comment does not discuss religion in general 
 
24. Argumentative countering 9: Does the commenter discuss Muslim immigration 
to their country/the West, and, if so, what is the commenters’ attitude towards 
Muslim immigration? 
 
V1 It should be stopped 
V2 It should be restricted to a higher degree than it is today (but not 
be completely stopped) 
V3 Female Muslim immigrants should be prioritised over male 
Muslim immigrants 
V4 The borders should be completely open 
V5 Muslim immigration should be accepted/tolerated (but the 
borders should not be completely open) 
V6 Unclear/other 
V7 The comment does not discuss Muslim immigration 





Code Yes if the comment discussed at least one of the topics from variable 15-25. 
Code No if none of the topics from variable 15-25 were discussed. 
26. Popularity cues 
 
Enter the number of popularity cues received by the comment (in terms of likes, 




Code the national origin of the news outlet that published the post to which the 









28. News outlet 
 















V13 Ekstra Bladet 
V14 Politiken 









Appendix 3: Results from Subcategories of Argumentative 
Countering 
Religion in general 
Table: Prevalence of arguments in relation to religion in general, percent of all 
comments in the three countries (N=6797) 
 
 Norway (1207) Sweden (1710) Denmark (3880) 
It is important/acceptable to 
criticise/ridicule religion 
2 (19) 2 (40) 0 (8) 
Religion should play a minor role in 
public space (but not be banned) 
1 (18) 2 (31) 0 (15) 
Religion is fundamentally bad 1 (12) 1 (13) 0 (14) 
Religious freedom should be 
respected/strengthened 
0 (2) 1 (12) 0 (14) 
Religion should be banned/ completely 
removed from public space 
0 (5) 0 (4) 0 (2) 
Religion can be a force for good 
as well as a force for bad 
0 (4) 0 (4) 0 (2) 
Religion is fundamentally good 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (2) 
Unclear 0 (4) 0 (6) 0 (3) 
 
Conversion to Islam 
Table: Prevalence of arguments in relation to conversion to Islam, percent of all 
comments in the three countries (N=6797) 
 
Converting to Islam is… Norway (1207) Sweden (1710) Denmark (3880) 
Insane/idiotic/deeply 
problematic 
2 (20) 2 (32) 2 (68) 
Great/unproblematic 1 (10) 2 (28) 1 (42) 
Challenging (but not 
idiotic/deeply problematic) 
0 (1) 0 0 (8) 





Table: Prevalence of arguments in relation to Muslim immigration, percent of all 
comments in the three countries (N=6797) 
 
 Norway (1207) Sweden (1710) Denmark (3880) 
It should be completely stopped 1 (9) 0 (8) 2 (67) 
It should be accepted/tolerated 1 (12) 0 (2) 1 (54) 
It should be more restricted 
(but not completely stopped) 
0 (3) 1 (16) 0 (18) 
Female Muslim immigrants should be 
prioritised over male Muslim 
immigrants 
0 0 (4) 0 
The borders should be completely 
open 
0 0 0 (2) 
Unclear/other 0 0 0 (4) 
 
Political labelling 
Table: Percent of comments engaging in different forms of political labelling 
(N=6797) 
 
 Norway (1207) Sweden (1710) Denmark (3880) 
Racist/Islamophobe/ 
Nazi/fascist 
1 (13) 2 (36) 2 (59) 
Islamist/terrorist 0 (2) 0 (6) 1 (27) 
Totalitarian 0 (5) 0 0 (7) 
Extremist 0 (2) 0 (3) 0 (4) 
Populist 0 0 (1) 0 (8) 
Communist/socialist 0 (4) 0 0 (4) 




Championing other countries 
Table: Prevalence of comments championing other countries, percent of all 
comments in the three countries (N=6797) 
 
 Norway (1207) Sweden (1710) Denmark (3880) 
Denmark 1 (11) 3 (57)  
Austria 0 (3) 1 (11) 0 (16) 
Norway  1 (15) 0 (1) 
USA 0 (1) 0 (6) 0 (1) 
Switzerland 0 0 0 (7) 
Other 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (14) 
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The objectives of this dissertation are twofold: First, the dissertation seeks to contribute 
to existing literature on Scandinavian discourse on Islam by comparing Norwegian, 
Swedish, and Danish content on Facebook, a central arena for news as well as public 
debate. Second, it aims to contribute to existing literature on counterpublics as it 
attempts to analyse to what extent counterpublic discourses appear in mainstream news 
outlets’ comment sections on Facebook. Existing research on online counterpublics 
has largely focused on (progressive and left-wing) counterpublic collectives in secluded 
communicative spaces, such as blogs, discussions forums, and alternative news sites. In 
contrast, this thesis analyses (both Islam-hostile and Islam-sympathetic) counterpublic 
discourses expressed in the comment sections of highly influential, mainstream news 
media.
A quantitative content analysis is carried out of Facebook posts (and associated articles) 
published by mainstream news outlets (N=602) and comments written by ordinary 
citizens in response to these posts (N=6797), in data from 2018. It is found that while 
the news outlets’ Facebook posts depict Islam mainly positively, the user comments are 
largely negative.
While a majority of the comments are found to express a mainstream view, a substantial 
minority also engages in counterpublic discourses, contesting the bounds of established 
discourse around Islam in the Scandinavian public spheres. It is, however, mainly 
those who are sceptical of Islam and/or Muslims who engage in this agitational activity. 
Particularly the Swedish comment sections are found to be permeated by Islam-sceptic 
counterdiscursive comments, while this is less so the case in Denmark, with Norway in 
a middle position. I argue that different national contexts around Islam, immigration, 
integration, and national identity have created varying incentives for Scandinavian 
citizens to challenge the limits of the debatthrough the online realm, thus leading to 
varying prevalence of counterdiscursive comments in the three countries’ comment 
sections.
In light of the finding that both Islam-sceptic and Islam-friendly commenters engage 
in counterpublic discourses, the dissertation highlights the need to view counterpublics 
as self-perceived correctives to an excluding mainstream rather than as excluded per se.
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